vieth et al jubelirer president pennsylvania senate et argued december decided april pennsylvania general assembly adopted congressional redistricting plan sued enjoin plan implementation alleging inter alia constituted political gerrymander violation article fourteenth amendment equal protection clause district dismissed gerrymandering claim plaintiffs appealed held judgment affirmed supp affirmed justice scalia joined chief justice justice justice thomas concluded political gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable judicially discernible manageable standards adjudicating claims exist therefore overrule davis bandemer held political gerrymandering claims justiciable agree upon standard assessing political gerrymandering claims pp political gerrymanders existed colonial times continued framing framers provided remedy problem constitution gives state legislatures initial power draw federal election districts authorizes congress make alter districts art bandemer held equal protection clause also grants judges power duty control practice pp neither art equal protection clause provides judicially enforceable limit political considerations congress may take account districting pp among tests determining existence nonjusticiable political question lack judicially discoverable manageable standards resolving question baker carr bandemer persuaded standards deciding political gerrymandering cases cases justiciable however majority bandemer discern standards might past years lower courts simply applied bandemer plurality standard almost invariably producing result obtained question nonjusticiable judicial intervention refused eighteen years judicial effort virtually nothing show justifies revisiting whether standard promised bandemer exists pp bandemer plurality standard political gerrymandering claim succeed plaintiffs show intentional discrimination identifiable political group actual discriminatory effect group proved unmanageable application standard misguided proposed improved subsequent application even defended appellants affirmed constitutional requirement pp appellants proposed standard based art equal protection clause neither discernible manageable appellants mistaken contend intent prong predominant intent different applied racial gerrymandering cases cases predominant intent test applied challenged district plaintiffs voted see miller johnson whereas appellants assert test satisfied partisan advantage predominant motivation behind entire statewide plan vague test might used evaluate single districts evaporates applied statewide reasons racial gerrymandering cases provide comfort effects prong appellants proposal requires plaintiffs show rival party voters systematically packed cracked persuaded totality circumstances map thwart plaintiffs ability translate majority votes majority seats standard discernible constitution provides right proportional representation even standard discernible judicially manageable effective way ascertain party majority status event majority status statewide races establish majority status particular district contests moreover even majority party identified impossible assure majority seats unless traditional election structures radically revised pp many reasons justice powell bandemer standard analysis evaluates districts eye ascertaining whether particular gerrymander fair must also rejected fairness judicially manageable standard criterion solid demonstrably met necessary enable state legislatures discern limits districting discretion meaningfully constrain courts discretion win public acceptance courts intrusion process foundation democratic decisionmaking pp writing separately dissent justices stevens souter breyer propose different standard adjudicating political gerrymandering claims proposed standards deficiencies additionally fail reasons identified respect standards proposed appellants proposed bandemer justice kennedy concurs judgment recognizing existing manageable standards measuring whether political gerrymander burdens representational rights party voters pp stare decisis require bandemer allowed stand stare decisis claims weakest respect decision interpreting constitution particularly reliance decision justice kennedy agreeing appellants complaint must dismissed concluded possibility judicial relief foreclosed cases limited precise rationale may yet found correct established constitutional violation courts confront two obstacles presented claim injury partisan gerrymandering first lack comprehensive neutral principles drawing electoral boundaries substantive definition fairness districting commands general assent second absence rules limit confine judicial intervention courts grant relief districting cases involving race answer need fairness principles since cases involve sorting permissible districting classifications impermissible ones politics different matter gaffney cummings determination gerrymander violates law must rest something conclusion political classifications applied must rest instead conclusion classifications though generally permissible applied invidious manner way unrelated legitimate legislative objective object districting establish fair effective representation citizens reynolds sims might seem courts determine exercise judgment whether political classifications related object instead burden representational rights lack however agreed upon model fair effective representation makes analysis difficult agreed upon substantive principles fair districting basis define clear manageable politically neutral standards measuring burden given partisan classification imposes representational rights suitable standards measuring burden critical intervention case plurality convincingly demonstrates standards proposed davis bandemer parties dissents either unmanageable inconsistent precedent weighty arguments holding cases like nonjusticiable however compelling require bar future partisan gerrymandering claims baker carr makes clear abstract standards guide analysis fourteenth amendment claims suffice assure justiciability claims like workable standard measuring gerrymander burden representational rights yet emerged mean none emerge future adjudicate case case absent standard measure burden appellants claim imposed representational rights appellants evidence best demonstrates legislature adopted political classifications describes constitutional flaw governing fourteenth amendment standard gaffney pp scalia announced judgment delivered opinion rehnquist thomas joined kennedy filed opinion concurring judgment stevens filed dissenting opinion souter filed dissenting opinion ginsburg joined breyer filed dissenting opinion richard vieth norma jean vieth susan furey appellants robert jubelirer president pennsylvania senate et al appeal district middle district pennsylvania april justice scalia announced judgment delivered opinion chief justice justice justice thomas join richard vieth norma jean vieth susan furey challenge map drawn pennsylvania general assembly establishing districts election congressional representatives ground districting constitutes unconstitutional political davis bandemer held political gerrymandering claims justiciable agree upon standard adjudicate present appeal presents questions whether decision bandemer error standard facts alleged plaintiffs follows population figures derived census showed pennsylvania entitled representatives congress decrease commonwealth previous delegation pennsylvania general assembly took task drawing new districting map time republican party controlled majority state houses held governor office prominent national figures republican party pressured general assembly adopt partisan redistricting plan punitive measure democrats enacted redistricting plans elsewhere republican members pennsylvania house senate worked together plan january general assembly passed plan signed law governor schweiker act plaintiffs registered democrats vote pennsylvania brought suit district middle district pennsylvania seeking enjoin implementation act rev stat commonwealth pennsylvania various executive legislative officers responsible enacting implementing act complaint alleged among things legislation created malapportioned districts violation requirement article constitution constituted political gerrymander violation article equal protection clause fourteenth amendment regard latter contention complaint alleged districts created act meandering irregular ignor ed traditional redistricting criteria including preservation local government boundaries solely sake partisan advantage juris statement panel convened pursuant defendants moved dismiss district granted motion respect political gerrymandering claim eleventh amendment grounds claims commonwealth declined dismiss apportionment claim defendants see vieth pennsylvania supp md vieth trial apportionment claim district ruled favor plaintiffs see vieth pennsylvania supp md vieth ii retained jurisdiction case pending review approval remedial redistricting plan april governor schweiker signed law act stat tit purdon supp act remedial plan pennsylvania general assembly enacted cure apportionment problem act plaintiffs moved impose remedial districts arguing district consider act proper remedial scheme malapportioned constituted unconstitutional political gerrymander like predecessor district denied motion concluding new districts malapportioned rejecting political gerrymandering claim reasons previously assigned vieth vieth pennsylvania supp md vieth iii plaintiffs appealed dismissal act political gerrymandering noted probable jurisdiction ii political gerrymanders new american scene one scholar traces back colony pennsylvania beginning century several counties conspired minimize political power city philadelphia refusing allow merge expand surrounding jurisdictions denying additional representatives see griffith rise development gerrymander hereinafter griffith two members majesty council attorney general deputy inspector comptroller general affairs province north carolina reported governor proceeded divide old precincts established law enact new ones places whereby arts endeavored prepossess people future election according desire designs herein either endeavor means get majority creatures lower house disrupt assembly proceedings colonial records north carolina saunders ed see also griffith political gerrymander remained alive well though yet known name time framing allegations patrick henry attempted unsuccessfully gerrymander james madison first congress see rives life times james madison reprint letter thomas jefferson william short reprinted works thomas jefferson ford ed course occurred notoriously outrageous political districting massachusetts gave gerrymander name amalgam names massachusetts governor elbridge gerry creature salamander outline election district credited forming thought resemble see webster new international dictionary ed gerrymander recognized force party politics generally attempted legislation enacted formation election districts generally conceded party attempt gain power proportionate numerical strength griffith significant framers provided remedy practices constitution article leaving state legislatures initial power draw districts federal elections permitted congress make alter districts many objected congressional oversight established provision course debates constitutional convention charles pinkney john rutledge moved strike relevant language james madison responded defense provision congress must given power check partisan manipulation election process whenever state legislatures favorite measure carry take care mould regulations favor candidates wished succeed besides inequality representation legislatures particular produce like inequality representation natl legislature presumable counties power former case secure latter danger giving controuling power natl legislature records federal convention pp farrand ed although motion pinkney rutledge failed opposition make alter provision article defense needed prevent political gerrymandering continued voiced state ratifying debates delegate massachusetts convention warned state legislatures might make unequal partial division districts election representatives might even disqualify one third electors without powers congress people remedy section provides remedy controlling power legislature composed senators representatives twelve without influence commotions factions hear impartially preserve restore people equal sacred rights election debates federal constitution elliot ed power bestowed congress regulate elections particular restrain practice political gerrymandering lain dormant apportionment act stat congress provided representatives must elected districts composed contiguous territory see griffith noting law attempt forbid practice gerrymander congress imposed requirements apportionment act stat required districts contai nearly practicable equal number inhabitants stat apportionment act congress imposed compactness requirement stat requirements contiguity compactness equality population repeated apportionment legislation stat thereafter continued today remains see recent history however attests congress awareness sort districting practices appellants protest power article control since fewer five bills introduced regulate gerrymandering congressional districting see sess sess sess sess sess eighteen years ago held equal protection clause grants judges power duty control political gerrymandering see davis bandemer consideration precedent turn iii chief justice marshall proclaimed two centuries ago emphatically province duty judicial department say law marbury madison cranch sometimes however law judicial department business entertaining claim unlawfulness question entrusted one political branches involves judicially enforceable rights see nixon challenge procedures used senate impeachment proceedings pacific telephone telegraph oregon claims arising guaranty clause article iv questions said nonjusticiable political questions baker carr set forth six independent tests existence political question textually demonstrable constitutional commitment issue coordinate political department lack judicially discoverable manageable standards resolving impossibility deciding without initial policy determination kind clearly nonjudicial discretion impossibility undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack respect due coordinate branches government unusual need unquestioning adherence political decision already made potentiality embarrassment multifarious pronouncements various departments one question tests probably listed descending order importance certainty second issue doubt validity judicial power created article iii constitution whatever judges choose see valley forge christian college americans separation church state cf grupo mexicano de desarrollo alliance bond fund even whatever congress chooses assign see lujan defenders wildlife chicago southern air lines waterman power act manner traditional english american courts one obvious limitations imposed requirement judicial action must governed standard rule laws promulgated legislative branch inconsistent illogical ad hoc law pronounced courts must principled rational based upon reasoned distinctions dissent three justices held davis bandemer since persuaded judicially discernible manageable standards political gerrymander cases decided cases justiciable clumsy shifting burden proof premise persuaded standards exist rather persuaded necessitated uncomfortable fact majority discern judicially discernable standards might majority point four justices finding justiciability believed standard one thing see plurality opinion white joined brennan marshall blackmun jj two believed something else see powell joined stevens concurring part dissenting part lower courts lived assurance standard precisely lack assurance standard coupled inability specify standard past years time considered numerous political gerrymandering claims never revisited unanswered question standard governs said lower courts years succeeded shaping standard initially unable enunciate simply applied standard set forth bandemer plurality opinion might thought prove plurality standard met test time fact application almost invariably produced result except incurring attorney fees obtained question nonjusticiable judicial intervention refused one commentary put hroughout subsequent history bandemer served almost exclusively invitation litigation without much prospect redress issacharoff karlan pildes law democracy rev ed one case relief provided merely preliminary relief involve drawing district cases aware involving common form political gerrymandering relief moreover although case relief provided seemingly involved ne plus ultra partisan manipulation see supra loss explain bandemer line drawn embraced several districting plans upheld despite allegations extreme partisan discrimination bizarrely shaped districts disproportionate results see session perry supp ed tex per curiam miller supp ed summarily aff badham eu supp nd cal summarily aff think jurisprudence brought forth judicially discernible manageable standards fantasy eighteen years judicial effort virtually nothing show justify us revisiting question whether standard promised bandemer exists following discussion reveals judicially discernible manageable standards adjudicating political gerrymandering claims emerged lacking must conclude political gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable bandemer wrongly decided begin review possible standards proposed justice white plurality opinion bandemer narrowest ground decision case standard employed lower courts plurality concluded political gerrymandering claim succeed plaintiffs showed intentional discrimination identifiable political group actual discriminatory effect group intent element plurality acknowledged long redistricting done legislature difficult prove likely political consequences reapportionment intended however effects prong significantly harder satisfy relief based merely upon fact group persons banded together political purposes failed achieve representation commensurate numbers apportionment scheme made winning elections difficult rather shown taking account variety historic factors projected election results group denied chance effectively influence political process whole achieved even without electing candidate enough establish example democrats placed district supermajority democratic voters district departs political boundaries rather challenge individual district inquiry focus opportunity members group participate party deliberations slating nomination candidates opportunity register vote hence chance directly influence election returns secure attention winning candidate statewide challenge contrast involve analysis voters direct indirect influence elections state legislature whole ibid emphasis added proved gross understatement plurality acknowledged necessity difficult inquiry bandemer concurrence justice predicted plurality standard time either prove unmanageable arbitrary else evolve towards loose form proportionality opinion concurring judgment joined burger rehnquist similar prediction unmanageability expressed justice powell opinion making prognostication majority see basic flaw plurality opinion failure enunciate standard affords guidance legislatures courts prognostication amply fulfilled lower courts legacy plurality test one long record puzzlement consternation see session supra throughout case borne witness powerful conflicting forces nurtured bandemer holding judiciary address partisan leaving issue virtually unenforceable vieth supp noting recondite standard enunciated bandemer offers little concrete guidance martinez bush supp sd jordan concurring lower courts continue struggle attempt interpret apply effect prong bandemer standard supra describing bandemer standard assessing discriminatory effect somewhat murky test criticized indeterminacy host academic commentators see tribe american constitutional law ed neither justice white justice powell approach question partisan apportionment gives real guidance lower courts forced adjudicate issue still hunting gerrymander ucla rev noting plurality opinion confounded legislators practitioners academics alike schuck thickest thicket partisan gerrymandering judicial regulation politics colum rev noting bandemer plurality standard requires judgments largely subjective beg questions lie heart political competition democracy issacharoff judging politics elusive quest judicial review political fairness texas rev bandemer begot confusion grofman expert witness perspective continuing emerging voting rights controversies stetson rev far aware one two people believe bandemer makes sense moreover person daniel lowenstein diametrically opposed view plurality opinion means standard misguided proposed improved subsequent application even defended us today appellants decline affirm constitutional requirement appellants take run enunciating workable standard based article equal protection clause consider length reflects litigant view best derived years experience also shares many features proposed standards said may said well appellants proposed standard retains framework bandemer plurality intent plus effect modifies type showing sufficient satisfy satisfy appellants intent standard plaintiff must show mapmakers acted predominant intent achieve partisan advantage shown direct evidence circumstantial evidence neutral legitimate redistricting criteria subordinated goal achieving partisan advantage brief appellants emphasis added compared bandemer plurality test mere intent disadvantage plaintiff group proposal seemingly makes standard difficult meet expense making standard indeterminate predominant intent disadvantage plaintiff political group refers relative importance goal compared goals map seeks pursue contiguity districts compactness districts observance lines political subdivision protection incumbents parties cohesion natural racial ethnic neighborhoods compliance requirements voting rights act regarding racial distribution etc appellants contend intent test must discernible manageable borrowed racial gerrymandering cases see miller johnson shaw reno begin important respect racial gerrymandering context predominant intent test applied challenged district plaintiffs voted see miller supra hays however appellants assert apportionment fails intent test single district since quixotic attempt bar state legislatures considering politics redraw district lines brief appellants appellants propose test satisfied partisan advantage predominant motivation behind entire statewide plan emphasis added vague predominant motivation test might used evaluate single districts evaporates applied statewide mean instance partisan intent must outweigh goals contiguity compactness preservation neighborhoods statewide statewide outweighing determined map districts forgo pursuit partisan ends favor strictly observing lines ignore lines disadvantage plaintiffs observance political subdivisions predominant goal two sure appellants think even within narrower compass challenges single district applying predominant intent test racial gerrymandering easier less disruptive constitution clearly contemplates districting political entities see article unsurprisingly turns matter politics see miller supra edistricting cases implicate political calculus various interests compete recognition shaw supra white dissenting istricting inevitably expression interest group politics gaffney cummings reality districting inevitably intended substantial political consequences contrast purpose segregating voters basis race lawful one much rarely encountered determining whether shape particular district substantially affected presence rare constitutionally suspect motive invalidate quite different determining whether substantially affected excess ordinary lawful motive invalidate moreover fact partisan districting lawful common practice means almost always room lawsuit contending partisan advantage predominant motivation claims racial gerrymandering finally courts might justified accepting modest degree unmanageability enforce constitutional command like fourteenth amendment obligation refrain racial discrimination clear whereas justified inferring judicially enforceable constitutional obligation obligation apply much partisanship districting dubious severely unmanageable reasons extent racial gerrymandering cases represent model discernible manageable standards provide comfort effects prong appellants proposal replaces bandemer plurality vague test denied chance effectively influence political process person politics rarely readily discernible never permanently discernible person race political affiliation immutable characteristic may shift one election next even within given election voters follow party line dare say hope political party puts forward utterly incompetent candidate lose even registration stronghold facts make impossible assess effects partisan gerrymandering fashion standard evaluating violation finally craft remedy see bandemer supra concurring judgment assuming however effects partisan gerrymandering determined appellants test invalidate districting prevents majority electorate electing majority representatives considering whether particular standard judicially manageable question whether judicially discernible sense relevant constitutional violation deny appellants may standard rests upon principle groups least groups right proportional representation constitution contains principle guarantees equal protection law persons equal representation government equivalently sized groups nowhere says farmers urban dwellers christian fundamentalists jews republicans democrats must accorded political strength proportionate even standard relevant however judicially manageable begin party majority status established appellants propose using results statewide races benchmark party support complaint describes pennsylvania statewide elections republicans democrats see juris statement describing democrat candidates received votes president auditor general republicans received votes senator attorney general treasurer moreover think majority status statewide races establishes majority status district contests one believe factor determining voting behavior levels political affiliation assuredly true one law review comment put statewide vote country house representatives state legislature rather separate elections separate candidates separate districts districts change candidates change strengths weaknesses change campaigns change ability raise money changes issues change everything changes political parties compete highest statewide vote totals highest mean district vote percentages compete specific seats lowenstein steinberg quest legislative districting public interest elusive illusory ucla rev see also schuck partisan gerrymandering political problem without judicial solution political gerrymandering courts grofman ed identify majority party find impossible assure party wins majority seats unless radically revise traditional structure elections district system guarantee matter district lines drawn majority party votes statewide produce majority seats party point proved congressional elections pennsylvania according appellants pleadings conducted judicially drawn district map free partisan gerrymandering juris statement neutral playing fiel democrats statewide majority vote translated minority seats versus republicans whether reason partisan districting party constituents may always wind packed districts cracked throughout others see dixon democratic representation districting schuck colum consider example legislature draws district lines objectives mind except compactness respect lines political subdivisions system political groups tend cluster case democratic voters cities systematically affected might called natural packing effect see bandemer concurring judgment cases see reynolds sims wesberry sanders bearing upon question neither principle practicality principle say individual must equal say selection representatives hence majority individuals must majority say say discernable group whether farmers urban dwellers political parties must representation equivalent numbers practicality easily administrable standard population equality adopted wesberry reynolds enables judges decide whether violation occurred remedy essentially basis three readily determined factors plaintiff lives many voters district many voters districts whereas requiring judges decide whether districting system produce statewide majority majority party casts forth upon sea imponderables asks make determinations even election experts agree upon reasons find appellants proposed standards neither discernible manageable many reasons also reject standard suggested justice powell bandemer agreed plurality plaintiff show intent effect believed ultimate inquiry focus whether district boundaries drawn solely partisan ends exclusion neutral factors relevant fairness redistricting opinion concurring part dissenting part see also inquiry courts consider numerous factors though one factor dispositive important shapes voting districts adherence established political subdivision boundaries ibid relevant considerations include nature legislative procedures apportionment law adopted legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative goals ibid factors bear directly fairness redistricting plan combined evidence concerning population disparities statistics tending show vote dilution make claim unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering ibid justice powell rightly criticized bandemer plurality failing suggest constitutionally based judicially manageable standard standard proposed opinion also falls short mark essentially analysis conceivable factors none dispositive weighed eye ascertaining whether particular gerrymander gone far justice powell terminology whether fair fairness seem us judicially manageable standard fairness compatible noncontiguous districts compatible districts straddle political subdivisions compatible party winning number seats mirrors proportion vote criterion solid demonstrably met seems us necessary enable state legislatures discern limits districting discretion meaningfully constrain discretion courts win public acceptance courts intrusion process foundation democratic decisionmaking iv turn next consideration standards proposed today dissenters preface observation mere fact four dissenters come three different standards different two proposed bandemer one proposed appellants goes long way establishing constitutionally discernible standard justice stevens concurs judgment address plaintiffs statewide political gerrymandering challenges though reaches result via standing analysis post dissenting opinion reach analysis conclusions statewide claims nonjusticiable justice stevens however require courts consider political gerrymandering challenges level much dissent addressed incompatibility severe partisan gerrymanders democratic principles disagree judgment disagree judgment unconstitutional senate employ impeachment proceedings procedures incompatible obligation try impeachments see nixon issue discussed whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate constitution whether courts say violation occurred design remedy point justice stevens dissent less helpful saying essentially racial gerrymandering context examined supra many reasons challenged justice stevens says mistakenly assum race provide legitimate basis making political judgments post say decisionmaking always unlawful race used example indicator achieve purpose neighborhood cohesiveness districting said impermissible purpose segregating voters basis race supra say racial gerrymandering race sake equivalent political gerrymandering politics sake justice stevens says er assuming politics ordinary lawful districting post brings forward contest argument excessive injection politics unlawful opinion assume alter reality setting segregate voters race unlawful hence rare setting segregate political affiliation long one go far lawful hence ordinary justice stevens confidence courts done racial gerrymandering done political gerrymandering rests part upon belief standards apply post fact standards quite different purpose discriminate basis race receives strictest scrutiny equal protection clause similar purpose discriminate basis politics othing case law compels conclusion racial political gerrymanders subject precisely constitutional scrutiny fact country long persistent history racial discrimination voting well fourteenth amendment jurisprudence always reserved strictest scrutiny discrimination basis race seem compel opposite conclusion shaw plurality opinion subjected political gerrymandering strict scrutiny justice stevens relies first amendment cases suggest politically discriminatory gerrymanders subject strict scrutiny equal protection clause see post elementary scrutiny levels claim specific action triggers heightened level scrutiny one claim may receive different level scrutiny different claim underlying rights consequently constitutional harms comparable say suppression political speech claimed first amendment violation triggers strict scrutiny say failure give political groups equal representation claimed equal protection violation triggers strict scrutiny equal protection claim us present case perhaps good reason first amendment claim sustained render unlawful consideration political affiliation districting renders unlawful consideration political affiliation hiring government jobs cases elrod burns require merely republicans given decent share jobs democratic administration political affiliation disregarded failed make case strict scrutiny political gerrymandering justice stevens falls back argument scrutiny levels simply matter purposes justiciability asserts standard imposing strong presumption invalidity strict scrutiny discernible manageable standard requiring evenhanded balancing considerations thumb scales ordinary scrutiny state refute well known strict scrutiny readily almost always results invalidation moreover mere fact exist standards apply proposition much justice stevens opinion devoted establishing see post mean standard discernible constitution may apply standards even manageable standards relation constitutional harms justice stevens points see post bandemer said differences racial political groups may relevant manner case adjudicated differences justify refusal entertain case years shown bandemer wrong justice souter like justice stevens restrict plaintiffs allegations us political gerrymandering claims post dissenting opinion unlike justice stevens however justice souter recognizes existing workable standard adjudicating claims proposes fresh start post newly constructed standard loosely based form title vii cases see mcdonnell douglas green complete prima facie test sewn together parts among things voting rights act jurisprudence law review articles apportionment cases even clues unconstitutionality manageably applied doubt reason think detect constitutional crime justice souter investigating extremity unfairness partisan competition post justice souter proposed standard order challenge particular district plaintiff must show member cohesive political group district residence paid little heed traditional districting principles specific correlations district deviations traditional districting principles distribution population group hypothetical district exists includes plaintiff residence remedies packing cracking plaintiff group deviates less traditional districting principles defendants acted intentionally manipulate shape district order pack crack group post showings made burden shift defendants justify district reference objectives naked partisan advantage post test seems eminently scientific upon analysis one finds last four steps requires quantifying judgment unguided ill suited development judicial standards much disregard traditional districting principles many correlations deviations distribution much remedying packing cracking hypothetical district many legislators must intent pack crack efficacious must intent must example sine qua non cause districting predominant cause step two example justice souter require lower courts assess whether mapmakers paid little heed traditional districting principles post lower often case district adheres traditional criteria others justice souter response question evade necessary say exactly district balance good showing one indices poor showing another sort detail best worked case case post devil lurks precisely detail central problem determining political gerrymandering gone far solve problem break original unanswerable question much political motivation effect much four discrete equally unanswerable questions justice souter proposal doomed failure basic reason test yea even test possibly successful unless one knows testing present context test identify deprivation minimal degree representation influence political group constitutionally entitled seen bandemer test sought unhelpfully least gamely specify minimal degree chance effectively influence political process appellants proposed test ability translate majority votes majority seats brief appellants justice souter avoids difficulties formulations never telling us test looking utterly unhelpful extremity unfairness vaguely describes harm concerned vote dilution post term usually implies actual effect weight vote element test looks effect gerrymander electoral success electoral opportunity even political influence plaintiff group know precise constitutional deprivation test designed identify prevent even though implausible justice souter believes constitutional deprivation consists merely vote dilution test even identify effect despite claimed reliance mcdonnell douglas framework justice souter allow plaintiff opportunity show mapmakers compliance traditional districting factors reason never stated certainly adherence traditional districting factors negates possibility intentional vote dilution explained packing cracking whether intentional quite consistent adherence compactness respect political subdivision lines see supra even better example traditional criterion incumbency protection justice souter previously acknowledged traditional constitutionally acceptable districting principle see vera dissenting opinion since test protect packed often tightly ensure reelection representatives either party indeed efforts maximize partisan representation statewide might well begin packing voters opposing party districts existing incumbents party means incumbent protected potential adversary districting mollified votes opposing party diluted like us justice souter acknowledges accepts intent gain political advantage inescapable whenever political bodies devise district plan effect results intent post thus like us recognizes issue one much much ibid premises conceded line drawn must based justice souter candidly admits upon substantive notio fairness ibid flabby goal deprived justice powell test determinacy sure justice souter frames somewhat differently courts must intervene says partisan competition reached extremity unfairness post emphasis added think problem solved adding modifier agree much justice breyer dissenting opinion convincingly demonstrates political considerations likely play important proper role drawing district boundaries post places justice breyer like dissenters difficult position drawing line good politics bad politics unlike tackle problem statewide level criterion justice breyer proposes nothing precise unjustified use political factors entrench minority power post emphasis original invokes passing equal protection clause clear reader constitutes unjustified entrenchment depends theory effective government post one must agree justice breyer incredibly abstract starting point constitution sought create basically democratic form government long impassable distance away conclusion judiciary may assess whether group somehow defined achieved level political power somehow defined commensurate entitled absent unjustified political machinations whatever means justice breyer provides real guidance journey despite promise post never tells us testing beyond unhelpful unjustified entrenchment post instead set forth several sets circumstances lay indicia abuse along continuum post proceeding presumably clearly unconstitutional possibly unconstitutional regard first scenario willing assert indicia sufficient support claim post seems refreshingly categorical one realizes indicia consist merely failure party receiving majority votes acquire majority seats two successive elections also fact neutral explanation phenomenon ibid course always neutral explanation criterion incumbent protection indicia set forth justice breyer second scenario also add unconstitutional gerrymandering post emphasis added third may conclude map crosses constitutional line post emphasis added find none helpful scenario suffers least one problems previously identified notably difficulties assessing partisan strength statewide ascertaining whether entire statewide plan motivated political neutral justifications see supra even last two scenarios even purport provide answer presumably leaving district determine whether circumstances unjustified entrenchment occurred sum neither know precisely justice breyer testing precisely fails test perhaps surprising omission justice breyer dissent given views matters absence analysis justice breyer acknowledges majority normally work political post well describes number actors statewide executive officers redistricting commissions congress people ballot initiatives referenda stand ready make happen see post gives instance know none permanent frustration majority majority failed assert indeterminate period two successive elections believe first scenario justice breyer simply assumes action may prove necessary post real world course action available tends sought necessary interest seeking party vaguer test availability frequently interest rather necessity produce litigation regular insertion judiciary districting delay uncertainty brings political process partisan enmity brings upon courts worth benefit achieved accelerated unknown degree effectuation majority think justice kennedy recognizes demonstrat ed shortcomings standards considered date post opinion concurring judgment acknowledges moreover lack comprehensive neutral principles drawing electoral boundaries post absence rules limit confine judicial intervention ibid premises one might think justice kennedy reach conclusion political gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable instead however concludes courts continue adjudicate claims standard may one day discovered first thing said justice kennedy disposition legally available district case considered plaintiffs claims justiciable dismissed standard unconstitutionality met logically impossible affirm dismissal without either finding standard applied district standard applied met finding claim nonjusticiable justice kennedy seeks affirm ecause case us standard post job plaintiffs explicate standard makes facts alleged plaintiffs adequate inadequate state claim nonsuit failure justice kennedy asserts declare nonjusticiability incautious post rush holding mere years fruitless litigation contrasts starkly says patient approach taken past post think come determining areas fall beyond article iii authority adjudicate practice earliest days republic present reminiscent hannibal hamlet july secretary state thomas jefferson wrote justices direction president washington asking whether might answer questions depend solution construction treaties laws nature nations laws land arise circumstances give cognisance tribunals country correspondence public papers john jay johnston ed emphasis original letter specifically invited justices give less categorical answer offering present particular questions justices strike circumstances might opinion forbid pronounce august justices responded categorical decidedly impatient manner saying giving advisory opinions advisory opinions particular questions advisory opinions presumably even concerning legislation affecting judiciary beyond power lines separation drawn constitution three departments government prevented rejected cautious course deny ing hopes intervention post leaving door open possibility least advisory opinions theory yet imagine violate separation powers gilligan morgan case filed ohio national guard shooting students kent state university plaintiffs sought initial judicial review continuing surveillance federal training weaponry orders guard held suit nonjusticiable matter committed political branches inter alia difficult conceive area governmental activity courts less competence adopt cautious course letting lower courts try hand regulating military declared impossible recently nixon joined justice kennedy held claim senate employed certain impermissible procedures trying impeachment nonjusticiable political question decision limited particular procedures challenge reserve possibility sometime somewhere technology wisdom derived experience might make challenge senate impeachment right cases justice kennedy cites defense approach baker carr bandemer see post bandemer provides cover justices concluded political gerrymandering claims justiciable proceeded describe regarded discernible manageable standard rendered lower courts set wandering wilderness years bandemer majority thought good idea five justices agree upon single standard standard plurality proposed turned work baker carr true enough experience whatever apportionment matters sort refrained spelling standard mere two years later reynolds sims judgment review baker unlike one review demand determination standard lower baker held apportionment claim plaintiffs nonjusticiable logically possible dispose appeal simply disagreeing nonjusticiability determination observed earlier possible lower held claim justiciable unsupported facts must either enunciate standard causes us agree disagree merits judgment else affirm claim beyond competence adjudicate justice kennedy worries determination deny hopes intervention erode confidence courts much premature decision intervene post function courts provide relief hope think erode confidence refusal job announcing may well valid claim yet prepared figure moreover course erode confidence placing district courts back business pretending afford help fact give none deters political process affording genuine relief noted lower confronted political gerrymandering claim resolves vieth may choose retreat decision question justiciable may offer guidance nature required effect learned firsthand result chooses neither throughout case borne witness powerful conflicting forces nurtured bandemer holding judiciary address partisan leaving issue virtually unenforceable inevitably political party power uses district lines lock present advantage party power attempts stretch protective cover voting rights act urging dilution critical standards may accepted aid party work detriment persons protected act casting appearance wrong judiciary stands ready remedy bandemer applied steps legislative incentives session supp conclusive refutation justice kennedy position point first made available disposition affirm political districting presents nonjusticiable question affirm believe correct standard identifies unconstitutional political districting met affirm know correct standard reduced essence justice kennedy opinion boils presently advised know discernible manageable standard render claim justiciable unhappy hope able change opinion future lower courts make pronouncement suggest must treat reluctant fifth vote justiciability district statewide levels vote may change future case holds time matter nonjusticiable vi conclude neither article equal protection clause appellants fleetingly invoke article provides judicially enforceable limit political considerations congress may take account districting considerations stare decisis compel us allow bandemer stand case involved interpretation constitution claims stare decisis weakest field mistakes corrected congress see payne tennessee doubly weak bandemer majority inability enunciate judicially discernible manageable standard thought existed think exist presaged need reconsideration light subsequent experience triply weak hard imagine action taken reliance upon bandemer conceivably frustrated except bringing lawsuits sort primary conduct relevant lightly overturn one holdings governing decisions unworkable badly reasoned never felt constrained follow precedent quoting smith allwright eighteen years essentially pointless litigation persuaded us bandemer incapable principled application therefore overrule case decline adjudicate political gerrymandering claims judgment district affirmed ordered richard vieth norma jean vieth susan furey appellants robert jubelirer president pennsylvania senate et al appeal district middle district pennsylvania april justice kennedy concurring judgment decision ordering correction election district lines drawn partisan reasons commit federal state courts unprecedented intervention american political process correct refrain directing substantial intrusion nation political life agreeing plurality complaint appellants filed district must dismissed understanding great caution necessary approaching subject foreclose possibility judicial relief limited precise rationale found correct established violation constitution redistricting cases presented claim injury partisan gerrymandering courts confront two obstacles first lack comprehensive neutral principles drawing electoral boundaries substantive definition fairness districting seems command general assent second absence rules limit confine judicial intervention uncertain limits intervening courts even proceeding best intentions risk assuming political legal responsibility process often produces ill distrust courts grant relief districting cases race involved answer need fairness principles controversies implicate different inquiry involve sorting permissible classifications redistricting context impermissible ones race impermissible classification see shaw reno politics quite different matter see gaffney cummings idle think contend political consideration taken account fashioning reapportionment plan sufficient invalidate determination gerrymander violates law must rest something conclusion political classifications applied must rest instead conclusion classifications though generally permissible applied invidious manner way unrelated legitimate legislative objective object districting establish fair effective representation citizens reynolds sims first might seem courts determine exercise judgment whether political classifications related object instead burden representational rights lack however agreed upon model fair effective representation makes analysis difficult pursue second obstacle absence rules confine judicial intervention related first yet agreed upon substantive principles fairness districting basis define clear manageable politically neutral standards measuring particular burden given partisan classification imposes representational rights suitable standards measuring burden however critical intervention absent sure guidance results one gerrymandering case next likely disparate inconsistent case overcome obstacles determining challenged districting violated appellants rights fairness principle appellants propose majority voters commonwealth able elect majority commonwealth congressional delegation authority precept even novelty proposed principle accompanied convincing rationale adoption obvious way draw satisfactory standard measuring alleged burden representational rights plurality demonstrates shortcomings standards considered date see ante parts iii iv demonstrating standards proposed davis bandemer parties us dissenting colleagues either unmanageable inconsistent precedent add two comments plurality analysis first parties shown us able discover helpful discussions principles fair districting discussed annals parliamentary legislative bodies attention drawn statements principled rules fairness govern districting helpful formulations legislator duty drawing district lines second even criteria might seem promising outset contiguity compactness altogether sound independent judicial standards measuring burden representational rights promise political neutrality used basis relief instead seems decision standards unavoidably significant political effect whether intended example demand congressional districts take particular shape assure parties criterion neutral enough face fact benefit one political party another see gaffney supra district lines rarely neutral phenomena well determine district predominantly democratic predominantly republican make close race likely see also bork tempting america political seduction law documenting author service special master responsible redistricting connecticut noting final plan benefited democratic party albeit unintentionally party chairman personally congratulated altman modeling effect mandatory district compactness partisan gerrymanders pol geography explaining compactness standards help republicans democrats likely live high density regions challenge finding manageable standard assessing burdens representational rights long recognized see lowenstein steinberg quest legislative districting public interest elusive illusory ucla rev hat matters us think matters almost americans district lines drawn fortunes parties policies parties stand affected things stake neutrality political contest dearth helpful historical guidance must part cause uncertainty weighty arguments holding cases like nonjusticiable arguments may prevail long run view however arguments compelling require us bar future claims injury partisan gerrymander tradition foreclose judicial process attempt define standards remedies alleged constitutional right burdened denied alien judiciary draw approve election district lines courts already many instances determination deny hopes intervention erode confidence courts much premature decision intervene willingness enter political thicket apportionment process respect claims makes particularly difficult justify categorical refusal entertain claims type gerrymandering plurality conclusion absent easily administrable standard ante appellants claim must nonjusticiable contrasts starkly patient approach baker carr mention controlling precedent question justiciability davis bandemer supra case plurality overrule see ante baker made clear abstract standards guide analysis fourteenth amendment claims sufficed assure justiciability claim see need appellants order succeed action ask enter upon policy determinations judicially manageable standards lacking judicial standards equal protection clause well developed familiar open courts since enactment fourteenth amendment determine particular facts must discrimination reflects policy simply arbitrary capricious action ibid said specific standard familiar emerged measure burden nonequipopulous districting causes representational rights see reynolds concluding ince achieving fair effective representation citizens concededly basic aim legislative apportionment legislature reliance apportionment interests invalid arbitrary capricious action leads unequal populations among districts plurality response baker sat review nonjusticiability holding wide mark see ante plurality instructs conclude business entertaining claim must conclude judicially enforceable righ issue ante whether manageable standard made right issue baker enforceable much necessary inquiry light baker davis bandemer directly address question nonjusticiability specific context districting asserted violations fourteenth amendment plurality survey cases involving different approaches justiciability different claims thought controlling see ante even putting baker side assuming existence workable standard measuring gerrymander burden representational rights distinguishes claims partisan gerrymandering claims justiciability purposes still reject plurality conclusions nonjusticiability relying distinction claim workable standard sort involves difficult proof proof categorical negative different treatment claims otherwise alike hinges entirely proof standard exist difficult proposition establish proving negative challenge context standard emerged case taken prove none emerge future important rights involved impossibility full analytical satisfaction reason err side caution allegations unconstitutional bias apportionment serious claims long believed right vote one political processes ordinarily relied upon protect minorities carolene products state passed enactment declared future apportionment shall drawn burden party rights fair effective representation though still accord principles surely conclude constitution violated admit possibility remains legislature might attempt reach result without express directive possibility suggests another case standard might emerge suitably demonstrates apportionment de facto incorporation partisan classifications burdens rights fair effective representation establishes classification unrelated aims apportionment thus used impermissible fashion plurality says years effect prove negative ante eighteen years essentially pointless litigation persuaded us justice souter correct point however past years lower courts follow davis bandemer formulated single apparently insuperable standard see post dissenting opinion moreover timeline law years rather short period addition rapid evolution technologies apportionment field suggests yet unexplored possibilities computer assisted districting become routine sophisticated legislatures experts courts use databases map electoral districts matter hours months see larios cox supp nd technology threat promise one hand courts refuse entertain claims partisan gerrymandering temptation use partisan favoritism districting unconstitutional manner grow hand new technologies may produce new methods analysis make evident precise nature burdens gerrymanders impose representational rights voters parties facilitate efforts identify remedy burdens judicial intervention limited derived standards suitable standards measure burden gerrymander imposes representational rights emerge hindsight show prematurely abandoned field risk take instead adjudicate papers us see baker harlan dissenting concluding malapportionment claim dismissed state claim upon relief ntil first decided extent right apportion limited federal constitution whether state done failed runs afoul limitation need reach issues case us standard measure burden appellants claim imposed representational rights appellants establish alleged political classifications burden rights failing show alleged classifications unrelated aims apportionment appellants evidence best demonstrates legislature adopted political classifications describes constitutional flaw least governing fourteenth amendment standard see gaffney consequence appellants complaint alleges impermissible use political classifications valid claim relief may granted must dismissed result see fed rule civ proc see also davis bandemer plurality thinks resolve case reference standard see ante wrong fourteenth amendment standard governs doubt analysis notes subsidiary standard show otherwise permissible classification applied burdens representational rights conclude appellants evidence provable claim fourteenth amendment standard though briefs argument appellants relied equal protection clause source substantive right basis relief note complaint case also alleged violation first amendment rights see amended complaint juris statement first amendment may relevant constitutional provision future cases allege unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering allegations involve first amendment interest burdening penalizing citizens participation electoral process voting history association political party expression political views see elrod burns plurality opinion general first amendment principles burdens contexts unconstitutional absent compelling government interest see representative democracy populous unit government unimaginable without ability citizens band together promoting among electorate candidates espouse political views california democratic party jones precedents show first amendment concerns arise state enacts law purpose effect subjecting group voters party disfavored treatment reason views context partisan gerrymandering means first amendment concerns arise apportionment purpose effect burdening group voters representational rights plurality suggests place first amendment area see ante implication first amendment consideration political interests apportionment invalid ibid equal protection claim us present case perhaps good reason first amendment claim sustained render unlawful consideration political affiliation districting misrepresents first amendment analysis inquiry whether political classifications used inquiry instead whether political classifications used burden group representational rights find state impose burdens restrictions groups persons reason views likely first amendment violation unless state shows compelling interest course depends first courts available manageable standard measure effect apportionment conclude state impose burden restriction rights party voters alleged gerrymander purpose effect imposing burdens disfavored party voters first amendment may offer sounder prudential basis intervention equal protection clause equal protection analysis puts emphasis permissibility enactment classifications works race involved since classifying race almost never permissible presents complicated question inquiry whether generally permissible classification used impermissible purpose question answered affirmative subsidiary showing classification applied imposes unlawful burdens first amendment analysis concentrates whether legislation burdens representational rights complaining party voters reasons ideology beliefs political association analysis allows pragmatic functional assessment accords latitude see eu san francisco county democratic central anderson celebrezze finally understand plurality conclude partisan gerrymandering disfavors one party permissible indeed seems acknowledge see ante disagree judgment partisan gerrymanders incompatible democratic principles ante noting case plurality opinion assumes case excessive injection politics districting unlawful reason admit possibility later suits holding parties failed prove well developed familiar standard legislative classifications reflec policy simply arbitrary capricious action baker said courts must cautious adopting standard turns whether partisan interests redistricting process excessive excessiveness easily determined consider apportionment schemes one state party controls apportionment process draws lines captures every congressional seat three party controls apportionment process blatant egregious proceeds subtle effort capturing less seats state still total effect party effort capture new seats party captured party gerrymander egregious party gerrymander subtle view however culpable ordered working republic democratic process depends sense decorum restraint branches government citizenry one sense legislative restraint abandoned thought serve interests political order thought serve interest demonstrating world democracy works whether spoken concern pride unfortunate legislators reached point declaring comes apportionment business rigging elections hoeffel six incumbents week away easy election journal quoting north carolina state senator still responsibilities require refrain intervention instance failings many proposed standards measuring burden gerrymander imposes representational rights make intervention improper workable standards emerge measure burdens however courts prepared order relief observations join judgment plurality richard vieth norma jean vieth susan furey appellants robert jubelirer president pennsylvania senate et al appeal district middle district pennsylvania april justice stevens dissenting central question presented case whether political gerrymandering claims justiciable although reasons coming conclusion differ five members convinced plurality answer question erroneous moreover apparent separate writings today share view even appellants entitled prevail contrary precedent profoundly unwise foreclose judicial review similar claims might advanced future presently somewhat differing views concerning precedential value recent cases standard applied future cases obscure fact areas agreement set forth separate opinions far greater significance concept equal justice law requires state govern impartially see romer evans lehr robertson new york city transit authority beazer today plurality opinion exempt governing officials duty context legislative redistricting give license first time partisan gerrymanders devoid rational justification view sanship legislature sole motivation pretense neutrality forsaken unabashedly traditional districting criteria subverted partisan advantage governing body said acted impartially although reaffirm central holding davis bandemer reached agreement standard govern partisan gerrymanderying claims decide case narrow ground urge us craft new rules effect authorize judicial review statewide election results protect democratic process transient majority abuse power define voting districts agree refusal undertake ambitious project ante persuaded however district failed apply propositions law granted defendants motion dismiss susan furey gerrymandering claim according complaint furey registered democrat resides address montgomery county pennsylvania located districting plan congressional district new plan adopted general assembly furey address places district furey alleges new districting plan created solely effectuate interests general assembly relied exclusively principle maximum partisan advantage drawing judgment furey allegations plainly sufficient establish standing challenge constitutionality district claim foreclosed bandemer plurality rejection statewide claim political gerrymandering stated claim least respect district pennsylvania redistricting plan violates equal protection principles enunciated voting rights cases bandemer district therefore erred granted defendants motion dismiss furey claim prior seminal decision baker carr majority heeded justice frankfurter repeated warnings dire consequences entering political thicket legislative districting colegrove green result even egregious gerrymanders sheltered judicial baker first decided constitution prohibits legislators drawing district lines diminish value individual votes overpopulated districts reaching conclusion explained legislatures bodies collectively responsive popular reynolds sims accordingly described basic aim legislative apportionment achieving fair effective representation citizens consistent goal also reviewed claims majority discriminated particular groups voters drawing multimember districts threatened minimize cancel voting strength racial political elements voting population fortson dorsey districts vulnerable constitutional challenge racial political groups ha fenced political process voting strength invidiously minimized gaffney cummings see also whitcomb chavis burns richardson holding bandemer true baker less true context question consistency state action federal constitution question decided decided political branch government coequal risk embarrassment government abroad grave disturbance home take issue pennsylvania constitutionality action challenged need appellants order succeed action ask enter upon policy determinations judicially manageable standards lacking judicial standards equal protection clause well developed familiar open courts since enactment fourteenth amendment determine particular facts must discrimination reflects policy simply arbitrary capricious action omitted hat gerrymandering claim submitted political group rather racial group distinguish cases terms justiciability bandemer issue case plurality ante baker second test presence absence judicially manageable standards judicial standards applicable gerrymandering claims deeply rooted decisions long preceded bandemer refined later cases among principles understanding district peculiar shape might symptom illicit purpose process notably gomillion lightfoot invalidated alabama statute altered boundaries city tuskegee square uncouth figure sole purpose preventing voting municipal elections allegations bizarre shape improper motive proven abundantly establish ed act ordinary geographic redistricting measure even within familiar abuses gerrymandering justice fortas concurring opinion kirkpatrick preisler referred gerrymandering deliberate arbitrary distortion district boundaries populations partisan personal political purposes also identified shape purpose relevant standards maps attached exhibits gomillion appendix opinion subsequent voting rights cases demonstrate uncouth bizarre shape easily identify district designed nonneutral purpose purpose ultimate inquiry considerations supplied ready standards testing lawfulness gerrymander dissent bandemer justice powell explained merits gerrymandering claim must determined reference configurations districts observance political subdivision lines criteria independent relevance fairness redistricting applying standard justice powell first reviewed procedures used indiana redistricting process noted party power excluded opposition deliberations placed excessive weight data concerning party voting trends second justice powell pointed strange shape districts conspicuously ignored traditional districting principles noted impact shapes residents uncouth included opinion maps illustrated irregularity district shapes third finally justice powell reviewed substantial evidence including contemporaneous statements press accounts demonstrating architects districts motivated solely partisan considerations made use three parts justice powell standard recent racial gerrymandering jurisprudence cases examined claims redistricting schemes violate equal protection guarantee highly irregular face rationally understood anything effort segregate voters race shaw reno shaw race sake districting principles legislature dominant controlling rationale drawing district lines miller johnson see also easley cromartie shaw hunt shaw ii shaw line cases emphasized reapportionment one area appearances matter shaw focused shape challenged districts purpose behind assessing constitutionality districts equal protection clause decisions like justice powell opinion bandemer also considered process districting schemes looked evidence demonstrating purely improper considerations motivated included maps illustrating outlandish district given clear line precedents thought question justiciability cases set plaintiffs argues single motivation resulted districting scheme discriminatory effects well settled plurality contrary conclusion squared long history voting rights decisions especially perplexing plurality ipse dixit distinction racial gerrymandering cases notably plurality argue judicially manageable standards used adjudicate racial gerrymandering claims equally manageable political gerrymandering cases instead distinction cases rests view race districting criterion much rarely encountered partisanship ante determining whether race rare constitutionally suspect motive dominated districting decision quite different determining whether decision substantially affected excess ordinary lawful motive invali ibid considerations wholly irrelevant issue justiciability begin plurality errs assuming politics ordinary lawful motive squarely rejected notion purpose discriminate basis politics ante never subject strict scrutiny contrary political belief association constitute core activities protected first amendment elrod burns plurality opinion discriminatory governmental decisions burden fundamental first amendment interests subject strict scrutiny cf police dept chicago mosley thus unless party affiliation appropriate requirement position question government officials may base decision hire promote transfer recall discharge retaliate employee terminate contract individual partisan affiliation speech see board wabaunsee cty umbehr truck service city northlake rutan republican party branti finkel elrod follows political affiliation appropriate standard excluding voters congressional district plurality argues patronage cases support proposition strict scrutiny applied political gerrymandering cases elementary scrutiny levels claim specific ante also elementary however level scrutiny relevant question whether constitutional violation question standards outlined discernible judicially manageable regardless number cases must applied level scrutiny analysis thus dicta shaw bush vera plurality relies ante beside point speak subject justiciability course difference exists constitutional interests protected first fourteenth amendments see relevant lesson patronage cases partisanship always benign consideration plurality appears assume event understand plurality opinion seems agree state goes far engages political gerrymandering politics sake violates constitution way undertakes racial gerrymandering race sake ibid sort constitutional violation touched courts plurality maintains judicial obligation intervene dubious ante state action discriminates political minority sole unadorned purpose maximizing power majority plainly violates decisionmaker duty remain impartial see lehr stevens concurring judgment process racial religious ethnic economic gerrymanders species political gerrymanders thus critical issue racial political gerrymandering cases whether single criterion controlled districting process extent constitution offended treated precise question justiciable gomillion shaw line cases today plurality supplied persuasive reason distinguishing justiciability partisan gerrymanders cases confirm reinforce holding partisan gerrymandering claims ii plurality opinion bandemer dealt claim indiana apportionment scheme state legislative districts discriminated democratic voters statewide basis hays altered standing rules gerrymandering claims view racial political gerrymanders species constitutional concern hays standing rule requires dismissal statewide end matter challenges specific districts considered shaw cases relate different type representational harm allegations necessarily must considered basis complaint case alleges injuries types group harm democratic voters throughout pennsylvania individualized representational injury furey resident district challenge statewide districting plan complain injured membership particular identifiable group bandemer example alleged democratic voters state whole democratic voters particular districts ha subjected unconstitutional discrimination citing complaint specifically claimed injured members group number democratic representatives commensurate number democratic voters throughout indiana much like bandemer case allege statewide plan enable republicans constitute half pennsylvania voters elect members state congressional hays however lack standing challenge districting plan statewide basis challenge specific district districts hand alleges different type injury entirely one recent racial gerrymandering cases recognized shaw held plaintiff challenging reapportionment statute equal protection clause may state claim alleging legislation though race neutral face rationally understood anything effort separate voters different districts basis race stevens concurring described message misshapen district sends elected officials district obviously created solely effectuate perceived common interests one racial group elected officials likely believe primary obligation represent members group rather constituency whole altogether antithetical system representative democracy shaw undergirding shaw cases premise racial gerrymanders effect constitutional wrong disrupt representational norms ordinarily tether elected officials constituencies whole egislatures explained bodies collectively responsive popular reynolds egislators elected voters farms cities economic interests gerrymanders subvert representative norm winner election gerrymandered district inevitably infer success primarily attributable architect district rather constituency defined neutral principles shaw cases hold disruption representative process imposes cognizable representational har hays harm falls squarely voters district whose representative might misperceive object fealty injury cognizable stated voters reside particular district see shaw ii otherwise plaintiff asserting generalized grievance governmental conduct approve hays see also bush vera plurality opinion although complaint case includes statewide challenge furey stronger claim resident misshapen district complains merely injury resulting probable election congressional delegation fairly represent entire state harm flowing probable election republican represent district also alleges grotesque configuration district imposes special harm members political minority residing district directly parallels harm recognized shaw officials elected majority party district claims likely believe primary obligation represent members group rather constituency whole precisely harm shaw cases treat cognizable context racial gerrymandering treatment warranted case risk representational harms identified shaw cases equally great greater context partisan gerrymanders shaw borne concern official elected racially gerrymandered district feel beholden portion constituents constituents defined race parallel danger partisan gerrymander representative perceive people put power drew map rather cast ballots feel beholden subset constituency part constituency problem simply put cartographers rather people judge ward recently wrote extreme partisan gerrymandering leads system representatives choose constituents rather session perry supp ed tex concurring part dissenting part iii elected officials sense serve two masters constituents elected political sponsors support primary obligations course public general neither realistic fair expect wholly ignore political consequences decisions idle contend political consideration taken account fashioning reapportionment plan sufficient invalidate gaffney political factors common permissible elements art governing democratic society political considerations may properly influence decisions elected officials decisions disadvantage members minority group whether minority defined members race religion political affiliation must rest neutral predicate see hampton mow sun wong federal sovereign like must govern impartially bandemer kennedy concurring act neutral entities ready take instruction enact laws citizens demand thus equal protection clause implements duty govern impartially requires least every decision sovereign serve nonpartisan public evaluating claim governmental decision violates equal protection clause long required showing discriminatory purpose see washington davis requirement applies full force districting decisions line divides racial ethnic minority unevenly school districts entirely legitimate chosen basis neutral factors county lines example natural boundary river major thoroughfare district lines chosen purpose limiting number minority students school number families holding unpopular religious political views invidious purpose surely invalidate district see gomillion lightfoot consistent principle recent racial gerrymandering cases examined shape district purpose districting body determine whether race criteria predominated process began holding shaw districting scheme irrational face understood effort segregate voters separate voting districts race race elevated paramount status redistricting process legislature gone far race must simply motivation predominant factor motivating legislature districting decision easley internal quotation marks citations omitted irrational shape serve objective indicator impermissible legislative purpose objective features districting map save plan invalidation explained traditional districting principles include compactness contiguity respect political subdivisions important constitutionally required objective factors may serve defeat claim district gerrymandered racial lines shaw citing gaffney karcher stevens concurring considerations basis redistricting legislation subordinated race state claim district gerrymandered racial lines miller quoting shaw view standards apply claims political gerrymandering essence gerrymander regardless whether group identified political racial gerrymandering always involves drawing district boundaries maximize voting strength dominant political faction minimize strength one groups opponents mobile stevens concurring judgment seeking desired result legislators necessarily make judgments probability members identifiable groups whether economic religious ethnic racial vote certain way overriding purpose predictions political see karcher stevens concurring mobile stevens concurring judgment follows standards enable courts identify redress racial gerrymander also perform function species gerrymanders see bandemer cousins city council chicago stevens dissenting racial gerrymandering cases therefore supply judicially manageable standard determining partisanship like race played great role districting process race factor dictate outcome districting process partisanship permissible consideration drawing district lines long predominate furey alleged predominant motive legislators designed district sole justification bizarre shape purpose discriminate political minority invidious purpose invalidate district plurality reasons standards evaluating racial gerrymanders workable cases partisan considerations unlike racial ones perfectly legitimate ante today however slightest intimation opinion written member naked purpose disadvantage political minority provide rational basis drawing district contrary opinions referring political gerrymanders consistently assumed least undesirable always indicated political considerations among factors may dominate districting purely partisan motives rational literal sense must limiting principle word least includes elements legitimacy neutrality must always characterize performance sovereign duty govern impartially cleburne cleburne living center stevens concurring legislature controlled one party instance impose special taxes members minority party use tax revenues pay majority party campaign expenses rational basis government decisions must satisfy standard legitimacy neutrality acceptable rational basis neither purely personal purely partisan see constitution course require proportional representation racial ethnic political groups agree plurality ante held however proportional representation political groups permissible objective gaffney us expressed opinion majority decision enhance representation racial minority equally permissible particularly decision designed comply voting rights act thus view plurality implicitly embraces today gerrymander contrived sole purpose disadvantaging political minority less objectionable one seeking benefit racial minority doubly flawed disregards obvious distinction invidious benign purpose mistakenly assumes race provide legitimate basis making political sum evaluating challenge specific district apply standard set forth shaw cases ask whether legislature allowed partisan considerations dominate control lines drawn forsaking neutral analysis neutral criterion identified justify lines drawn possible explanation district bizarre shape naked desire increase partisan strength rational basis exists save district equal protection challenge narrow test cover meritorious claims preclude extreme abuses disclosed record badham eu supp nd cal summarily aff perhaps shorten time period pernicious effects gerrymander felt test mitigate current trend partisan considerations becoming apportioning representatives iv furey plainly stated claim district constitutes unconstitutional partisan gerrymander according complaint pennsylvania redistricting plan splits montgomery county alone six different congressional districts new district looms like dragon descending philadelphia west splitting towns communities throughout montgomery berks counties furey alleges districting plan created solely effectuate interests general assembly relied exclusively principle maximum partisan advantage drawing exclusion criteria plan irregular face rationally viewed effort advance interests one political party without regard traditional redistricting principles without legitimate compelling justification problem furey claims legislature subordinated indeed ignored traditional redistricting principles legitimate bases governmental decisionmaking order favor one political viewpoint another plan ignores traditional redistricting criteria alleges thus demonstrating partisanship nothing else rationale behind plan complaint claim judicially able standard adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases reverse judgment district remand proceedings consistent opinion plurality candidly acknowledges legislatures fashion standards remedy political gerrymandering perfectly manageable indeed legislatures iowa elsewhere done ante violation constitution found impose remedy patterned statute thus problem plurality view judicially manageable standard fix unconstitutional partisan gerrymander rather judiciary lacks ability determine state legislature violated duty govern impartially quite obviously however several standards identifying impermissible partisan influence available judges enforce hold every district boundary must neutral justification apply justice powell approach bandemer apply predominant motivation standard fashioned racial gerrymandering cases endorse either approaches advocated today justice souter justice breyer clear unavailability judicially manageable standards drives today decision instead failure judicial condemn even blatant violations state legislature fundamental duty govern impartially accordingly respectfully dissent richard vieth norma jean vieth susan furey appellants robert jubelirer president pennsylvania senate et al appeal district middle district pennsylvania april justice souter justice ginsburg joins dissenting constitution guarantees formal substantial equality among voters years recognized lines dividing state voting districts must produce divisions equal populations one person one vote reynolds sims otherwise vote less populous district others carries clout creating unequally populous districts however way skew political results setting district lines choice draw district line one way another always carries consequence politics save mythical state voters every political identity distributed absolutely gray uniformity spectrum opportunity runs cracking group impotent fractions packing members one district sake marginalizing another however equal districts may population formal matter consequence vote cast minimized maximized karcher daggett unfairness sufficiently demonstrable guarantee equal protection condemns denial substantial equality davis bandemer plurality opinion notion fairness assumed denied cases described political group state chance elect representatives choice political group right effective representation powell concurring part dissenting part cf wells rockefeller harlan dissenting describing need structure fact well theory responsive sentiments community undeniable political sophisticates understand fairness go destroying see app juris statement although possibly described hard edge one person one vote difficulty translate notions fairness workable criteria distinct mere opportunities reviewing courts make episodic judgments things gone far sources difficulty facts intent gain political advantage inescapable whenever political bodies devise district plan effect results intent wells supra white dissenting reality course districting gerrymandering sense represents complex blend political economic regional historical considerations thus issue one much much exact stating verbal test much partisanship defining much race consciousness inevitable legitimate see bush vera souter dissenting instead coming verbal formula much job must identify clues objective make indicating partisan competition reached extremity unfairness plurality says effect courts trying devise practical criteria political gerrymandering nearly years without closer something workable davis decided ante true enough accept sound counsel despair take principal reason gone theoretical justiciability practical administrability political gerrymandering cases davis plurality specification criterion forbidden gerrymandering must require showing members plaintiff group essentially shut political process see badham eu supp nd cal order avoid threshold relief low almost electoral defeat let alone failure achieve proportionate results support gerrymandering claim davis plurality required demonstration pervasive devaluation period time raise real doubt case ever made davis suggested plaintiffs might need show even efforts deliberate register vote impeded standard difficult imagine major party meeting combined demanding burden significant vagueness appellants able propose practical test davis violation fault belongs less predecessors judge higginbotham recently put painfully clear justice powell concern davis offered constitutional green light gerrymanderers realized session perry supp ed tex quoting davis supra powell concurring part dissenting part ii since created problem one else able solve us make fresh start good many voices saying high time years since davis increasing efficiency partisan redistricting damaged democratic process degree predecessors began imagine issacharoff gerrymandering political cartels harv rev pattern incumbent entrenchment gotten worse computer technology exquisite gerrymandering improved karlan fire next time reapportionment census stan rev census data better predictive methods powerful computers allow increasingly sophisticated equipopulous gerrymanders pildes principled limitations racial partisan restricting yale recent cases document microscopic detail astonishing precision redistricters carve individual precincts distribute districts confidence concerning racial partisan consequences see also morrill geographer perspective political gerrymandering courts grofman ed noting gerrymandering produce high proportions safe seats brief bernard grofman et al amici curiae decline competitive seats cf wells supra harlan dissenting computer may grind district lines totally frustrate popular overwhelming number critical issues therefore preserve davis holding political gerrymandering justiciable issue otherwise start anew adopt political gerrymandering test analogous summary judgment standard crafted mcdonnell douglas green calling plaintiff satisfy elements prima facie cause action point state opportunity rebut evidence supporting plaintiff case offer affirmative justification districting choices even assuming proof plaintiff allegations judgment better luck devising workable prima facie case concentrated much possible suspect characteristics individual districts instead patterns statewide view districting somehow less important usual point gerrymandering control greatest number seats overall seen able call readily existing law defined suspect district level conceive statewide challenge function claims individual districts illegitimately drawn finally interest threshold simplicity stick problems districts devise workable scheme dealing claims forget complications posed multimember districts iii claim based specific district require plaintiff make prima facie case five elements first resident plaintiff identify cohesive political group belonged normally major party case davis reason principle however rule claimant minor political party might showed strength become target vigorous hostility one major parties state different politically coherent group whose members engaged bloc voting large labor union might point must make sense speak candidate group choice easy case large small political party though difficult organization defined politics second plaintiff need show district residence see hays requiring residence challenged district standing paid little heed traditional districting principles whose disregard shown straightforwardly contiguity compactness respect political subdivisions conformity geographic features like rivers mountains considerations already relevant justifying small deviations absolute population equality karcher doubt test relying standards fall within judicial competence indeed although compactness first blush least likely principles yield precision measured quantitatively terms dispersion perimeter population ratios development standards thus possible see generally pildes niemi expressive harms bizarre districts voting rights evaluating appearances shaw reno rev see also bush vera necessary say exactly district balance good showing one indices poor showing another sort detail best worked case case third plaintiff need establish specific correlations district deviations traditional districting principles distribution population group example one districts appellants object strongly case district say looms like dragon descending philadelphia west splitting towns communities throughout montgomery berks counties app juris statement make claim stick need point specific protuberances draconian shape reach include democrats fissures squirm away republicans need show towns communities split democrats tended fall one side republicans although counterexamples doubt present complex plan plaintiff showing whole need provide reasonable support compel inference district took shape distribution plaintiff group begin complete plaintiff case defendant chosen either pack group drawn district order include uselessly high number group crack drawn include fatally ordinary methods vote dilution district systems ante fourth plaintiff need present hypothetical district including residence one proportion plaintiff group lower packing claim higher cracking one time deviated less traditional districting principles actual district cf thornburg gingles requiring similar showing demonstrate multimember district responsible minority voters inability elect preferred candidates hypothetical district allow plaintiff claim credibly deviations traditional districting principles correlated also caused packing cracking group drawing hypothetical district course necessarily involve redrawing least one contiguous plaintiff show done subject traditional districting principles without packing cracking group another worse district challenged fifth finally plaintiff show defendants acted intentionally manipulate shape district order pack crack group see washington davis substantiating claims political gerrymandering plan devised single major party proving intent hard third fourth correlation cause elements established politicians politically disinterested characteristically naï davis bandemer think likely whenever legislature redistricts responsible legislation know likely political composition new districts however treat showing intent case equivocal count unless entire legislature controlled governor party dominant legislative party vetoproof affected group major party proof intent admittedly difficult possible legislature might even plaintiff group mind plaintiff naturally hard time showing requisite intent behind plan produced bipartisan commission plaintiff got far shown state intentionally acted dilute vote ignored reasonable alternatives consistent traditional districting principles shift burden defendants justify decision reference objectives naked partisan advantage might show rebuttal evidence districting objectives served plaintiff hypothetical district better district drawn might affirmatively establish legitimate objectives better served lines drawn plaintiff hypothetical state might example posit need avoid racial vote dilution cf vera cf johnson de grandy totality circumstances support finding vote dilution minority groups constitute effective voting majorities number state senate districts substantially proportional share population however time place comprehensive list legitimate objectives state might present point simply constitution petrify traditional districting objectives exclusive enough say state required explain demonstrate whatever reasons gave mere pretext gerrymander statewide claim attempt ambitious definition without benefit experience individual district claims limit consideration statewide claim one built upon number ones successful challenge necessarily entail redrawing least one contiguous district successful claims surrounding districts redefined certain point ripples reach state boundary longer make sense district consider problems piecemeal plurality says proposed standard solve essential problem unworkability says solve problem determining gerrymandering gone far break original unanswerable question four discrete unanswerable questions ante common sense however break large intractable issue discrete fragments way get handle larger one elements propose tractable theory subjects judges already deal practice plurality asks example hat lower often case district adheres traditional criteria others ibid question already arises cases voting rights act district courts sort difficulty answering applying davis bandemer plurality see johnson hamrick supp nd noncontiguity plaintiff gingles districts fatal claim municipal districting scheme city boundaries rough asymmetrical portions proposed districts separated unincorporated areas relatively near districts joined enquiries proposing sure wish neither degree subjectivity inconsistent judicial function plurality also says standard destined fail given precise enough account extreme unfairness prevent ante objection reliable expression plurality discouragement description achilles heel suggestion harm partisan gerrymandering said supra species vote dilution point gerrymander capture seats manipulating district lines diminish weight party votes elections devise judicial remedy harm however necessary adopt theory fairness furnishing precise measure harm caused divergence ideal case sufficient instead agree gerrymandering indeed unfair plurality dispute observe traditional methods gerrymanderer plurality summarizes ante adopt test aimed detecting preventing use methods think mine methods unnecessary effective gerrymandering plurality implies ante hard explain popular ages american politics test doubt leave substantial room party power seek advantage control districting process way prevent opportunism remove districting wholly legislative control prepared say constitution requires make impossible courts identify least worst cases gerrymandering provide remedy plurality show approach catch cf scalia rule law law rules chi rev achieve standpoint substantive policies involved answer nice one number competing values iv drafting complaint case appellants counsel naturally proceeded assumption satisfy davis bandemer plurality revision light shaw prima facie case mind richard norma jean vieth make statewide claims single district claim brought susan furey provides insufficient grounding furey claim allegations fall short example feasibility alternative district superior require might well able allege require given leave amend grant leave therefore vacate judgment district remand proceedings judgment denying opportunity respectfully dissent richard vieth norma jean vieth susan furey appellants robert jubelirer president pennsylvania senate et al appeal district middle district pennsylvania april justice breyer dissenting use purely political considerations drawing district boundaries necessary evil lack judicially manageable standards constitution inevitably must tolerate rather pure politics often helps secure constitutionally important democratic objectives sometimes sometimes purely political gerrymandering fail advance plausible democratic objective simultaneously threatening serious democratic harm sometimes courts identify equal protection violation provide remedy plaintiffs claim yet proved circumstances exist reverse district dismissal complaint plurality focuses directly difficult issue us says test yea even test possibly successful unless one knows testing ante emphasis original true thus shall describe set circumstances use purely political districting criteria conflict constitutionally mandated democratic requirements circumstances courts test shall explain believe possible find applicable judicially manageable standards shall illustrate standards start fundamental principle people ordain ed establish ed american constitution sought create protect workable form government structure whole mass basically democratic wood creation american republic quoting murray political sketches inscribed excellency john adams see also meiklejohn free speech relation modern nation close million people workable democracy constitution foresees must mean guaranteed opportunity elect legislators representing equally populous electoral districts reynolds sims kirkpatrick preisler karcher daggett must also method transforming majority effective government explained political parties play necessary role transformation minimum help voters assign responsibility current circumstances thereby enabling voters votes individual candidates express satisfaction dissatisfaction political status quo voters either vote support status quo vote throw rascals see generally mcconnell federal election slip california democratic party jones colorado republican federal campaign comm federal election political system satisfies minimal condition encourages democratic responsibility facilitates transformation voters government reflects refer elementary constitutional principles believe help courts identify least one abuse issue case understand one begin asking electoral districts norm constitution insist membership legislatures better reflect different political views held different groups voters history course part answer tell entire story answer also lies fact system helps assure certain democratic objectives better many representative proportional electoral systems course districts mean parties candidates finish first past post elect legislators fact means turn party bare majority votes even plurality votes often obtain large legislative majority perhaps freezing smaller parties districts thereby diminish need coalition governments fact makes easier voters identify party responsible government decisionmaking rascals throw simultaneously providing greater legislative stability cf mershon costs coalition coalition theories italian governments pol sci rev noting proportional systems almost italian government stayed office years many governments collapsed months hermens representation proportional representation choosing electoral system issues alternatives lijphart grofman eds describing political paralysis become hallmark fourth republic proportional representation see also duverger best electoral system choosing electoral system supra arguing proportional systems preven citizens expressing clear choice governmental team nonproportional systems allow voters choose governments capacity make decisions say districts preferable simply say systems systems reflect different conclusions proper balance different elements workable democratic government districts norm however political considerations likely play important proper role drawing district boundaries part politicians unlike nonpartisan observers normally understand location shape districts determine political complexion area gaffney cummings precisely politicians best able predict effects boundary changes districts design usually make political sense see persily defense foxes guarding henhouses case judicial acquiescence gerrymanders harv rev nn recounting author experience neutral boundary drawer plan helped draw moved uninhabited swamp one district another thereby inadvertently disrupting environmental projects important politician representing swamp former district important present purposes role political considerations reflects surprising mathematical fact given fairly large state population fairly large congressional delegation districts assigned perfectly random respect politics translate small shift political sentiment say shift republican republican seismic shift makeup legislative delegation say republican democrat see altman modeling effect mandatory district compactness partisan gerrymanders pol geography suggesting state population large enough even randomly selected compact districts generally elect politicians party wins fewer votes statewide exaggeration tiny toral changes virtually wiping legislative representation minority party seem highly undemocratic given resulting need districts nonrandom boundaries surprising traditional districting principles rarely ever politically neutral rather recent political memory democrats often concentrated cities republicans often concentrated suburbs sometimes rural areas geographically drawn boundaries tended pac former see ante plurality opinion citing davis bandemer concurring judgment lowenstein steinberg quest legislative districting public interest elusive illusory ucla rev explaining criteria live advance billing neighborhood boundaries seeking group irish jewish voters often well known politicians use knowledge effects neutral criteria partisan advantage drawing electoral maps iron laws mathematics worked extraordinary say traditional boundaries politics free rather boundaries represent series compromises principle among virtues example close representation voter views ease identifying government opposition parties stability government also represent uneasy truce sanctioned tradition among different parties seeking political advantage said reference back underlying considerations helps explain legislature use political boundary drawing considerations ordinarily violate constitution equal protection clause reason lies simply difficulty identifying abuse finding appropriate judicial remedy reason fundamental ordinarily simply abuse use purely political factors even harmful members one party often nonetheless find justification desirable democratic ends maintaining relatively stable legislatures minority party retains significant representation ii time considerations help identify least one circumstance use purely political factors amount serious remediable abuse namely unjustified use political factors entrench minority power entrenchment mean situation party enjoys minority support among populace nonetheless contrived take hold legislative power unjustified entrenchment mean minority hold power purely result partisan manipulation factors factors lead justified albeit temporary minority entrenchment include sheer happenstance existence two major parties unique constitutional requirements certain representational bodies senate reliance traditional geographic communities interest etc districting criteria democratic harm unjustified entrenchment obvious written respect electoral districts logically society ostensibly grounded representative government seem reasonable majority people state elect majority state legislators conclude differently sanction minority control state legislative bodies appear deny majority rights way far surpasses possible denial minority rights might otherwise thought result since legislatures responsible enacting laws citizens governed bodies collectively responsive popular reynolds unjustified entrenchment takes place voters find far difficult remove responsible government want democratic values dishonored need legislative stability justify entrenchment stability compatible system loss majority support implies loss power need secure minority representation legislature justify entrenchment minority party representation also compatible system loss minority support implies loss representation constitutionally specified principles representation two senators per state justify entrenchment house representatives similar state legislative body issue unless justification found particular circumstances political gerrymandering entrenches minority party power violates basic democratic norms lacks countervailing justification reason whether political gerrymandering violate constitution instances gerrymandering leads entrenchment amounts abuse violates constitution equal protection clause iii courts need intervene often prevent kind abuse described harmed constitute political majority majority normally work political state improperly gerrymandered legislative congressional districts majority disadvantage majority able elect officials statewide races particularly governor may help undo harm districting caused majority party next round districting sooner state improperly gerrymandered congressional districts congress retains power revise state districting determinations see art ante plurality opinion discussing history congress power check partisan manipulation election process moreover voters perhaps tiring political rivalry found procedural solution confiding task commission limited extent may base districts partisan concerns according national conference state legislatures currently give first final authority state legislative redistricting group legislature national conference state legislatures redistricting commissions alternatives legislature conducting redistricting available http internet materials visited mar available clerk case file number use commission congressional redistricting arizona hawaii idaho montana new jersey washington indiana using legislature pass plan iowa requiring body consider political data ibid iowa general assembly legislative service bureau legislative guide redistricting available http indeed state governments unwilling unable act informed civically militant electorate baker carr frankfurter dissenting occasionally taken matters hands ballot initiatives referendums arizona voters example passed proposition amended state constitution created independent redistricting commission draw legislative congressional districts ariz art pt west reforms borrow systems used countries utilizing districts see administration cost elections project boundary delimitation hereinafter ace project representation canadian parliament describing canada independent boundary commissions draft maps based equality population communities interest geographic factors available ace project kingdom redistribution process describing kingdom independent boundary commissions make recommendations parliament consultation public available gudgin taylor seats votes spatial organisation elections noting kingdom boundary commissions explicitly neutral party political sense always count severely gerrymandered legislature find implement remedy see bandemer party controls process incentive change political advantages gerrymander may become ever greater future availability enhanced computer technology allows parties redraw boundaries ways target individual neighborhoods homes carving safe slim victory margins maximum number districts little risk cutting margins thin see generally handley guide redistricting tools technology real problem census data redistricting technology persily ed karlan fire next time reapportionment census stan rev ante souter dissenting redrawing districts every years rather every years party might preserve political advantages notwithstanding population shifts state combination increasingly precise technology increasingly frequent map drawing means party may able bring gerrymander precise virtually impossible dislodge thus action may prove necessary necessary prove capable finding appropriate remedy courts developed districting remedies cases see branch smith affirming district injunction use state redistricting plan order plan used state plan precleared voting rights act karcher upholding district holding congressional reapportionment plan unconstitutional reynolds upholding district actions ordering effect reapportionment houses state legislature see also issacharoff judging politics elusive quest judicial review political fairness texas rev nn reporting wake census plans congressional redistricting plans courts rejected returned state legislatures redrafting state senate plans state senate plans rejected sent back state legislatures state house plans state house plans sent back legislative action meant leaving aside preclearance provisions voting rights act redistricting done either directly federal courts courts injunctive authority citing cases moreover dangers inadvertent political favoritism prove great procedural solution use politically balanced commission may prove possible bottom line courts able identify presence one important gerrymandering evil unjustified entrenching power political party voters rejected able separate unjustified abuse partisan considerations achieve end ordinary justified use able design remedy extreme cases iv claim problem identification separation easily solved even extreme instances courts identify number strong indicia abuse presence actual entrenchment always unjustified perhaps chance occurrence sign particularly accompanied use partisan boundary drawing criteria way justice stevens describes use departs traditional criteria explained efforts achieve partisan advantage set forth several sets circumstances lay indicia abuse mind scenarios fall along continuum permanently entrenched minority hold power becomes less evidence courts need minority engaged gerrymandering achieve desired result consider example following sets circumstances first suppose legislature proceeded redraw boundaries seem ordinary ways entrenchment harm become obvious legislature redrawn district boundaries within traditional period radical departure traditional districting criteria alleged majority party measured votes actually cast candidates identify members party relevant set elections congressional elections congressional map challenged twice failed obtain majority relevant legislative seats elections failure explained existence multiple parties neutral ways view circumstances sufficient support claim unconstitutional entrenchment second suppose plaintiffs point serious departures redistricting norms legislature redrawn district boundaries within traditional period criteria depart radically previous traditional criteria departure justified explained reference effort obtain partisan political advantage majority party defined failed obtain majority relevant seats election using challenged map fact explained existence multiple parties neutral ways circumstances also add unconstitutional gerrymandering third suppose legislature clearly departs ordinary districting norms entrenchment harm seriously threatened yet occurred legislature redrawn district boundaries within traditional period either behest struck initial plan unlawful see vieth pennsylvania supp md finding pennsylvania first redistricting plan violated mandate accord criteria depart radically previous traditional criteria strong objective unrefuted statistical evidence demonstrates party minority popular vote within state likelihood obtain majority seats relevant representative delegation jettisoning traditional districting criteria justified explained reference effort obtain partisan political advantage mind circumstances also support claim presence midcycle redistricting reason raises fair inference partisan machinations played major role process inference accompanied statistical evidence entrenchment likely result may conclude map crosses constitutional line describing presence similar circumstances risk entrenchment demonstrated partisan considerations render traditional compromises irrelevant justification party advantage found seem extreme enough set constitutional alarm risk harm basic democratic principle serious identification possible remedies found plurality sets forth several criticisms approach criticisms overstated compare ante course always neutral explanation gerrymandering criterion incumbent protection brief appellants pointing examples efforts gerrymander incumbent opposition party office elect new member controlling party compare ante complaining difficulties assessing partisan strength statewide supra identifying majority party simply adding votes actually cast candidates identify members party relevant set elections criticisms involve differing judgments compare ante complaining vagueness unjustified political machination whatever means unjustified entrenchment supra detailed discussion justified reynolds sims compare ante finding costs judicial intervention high supra finding costs warranted assure majority rule plurality makes one criticism warrants elaborate response observes mere fact four dissenters come three different standards different two proposed bandemer one proposed appellants goes long way establishing constitutionally discernible standard ante dissenting opinions recommend sets standards differ certain respects members majority might well seek reconcile differences dissenters might instead believe thorough specific reasoning accompanies separate statements stimulate discussion discussion lead change law one member majority disagreeing plurality justiciability remains search appropriate standards see ante kennedy concurring judgment vi case us strong likelihood plaintiffs complaint amended readily assert circumstances consistent set forth appropriate judicial intervention reason authorize plaintiffs proceed dissent majority contrary determination footnotes term political gerrymander defined practice dividing geographical area electoral districts often highly irregular shape give one political party unfair advantage diluting opposition voting strength black law dictionary ed plaintiffs apparently never amended complaint allege act political gerrymander yet district decision vieth iii resolved claim merits jurisdiction implicated neither party raised point assume district deemed plaintiffs original complaint constructively amended article provides follows times places manner holding elections senators representatives shall prescribed state legislature thereof congress may time law make alter regulations except places chusing senators course taken steps prevent abusive districting practices number adopted standards redistricting measures designed insulate process politics see iowa code art ii haw rev stat idaho code rev stat tit west supp mont code ann rev code see republican party north carolina martin upholding denial federal rule civil procedure judgment defendants republican party north carolina north carolina state board elections unpublished opinion upholding modified preliminary injunction martin dealt north carolina system electing superior judges statewide system resulted election single republican judge since later developments case described infra cases courts rejected prayers relief davis bandemer see duckworth state administrative bd election laws smith boyle la porte county republican central comm bd county la porte session perry supp ed tex per curiam martinez bush supp sd panel miller supp ed summarily aff marylanders fair representation schaefer supp md panel terrazas slagle supp wd tex panel pope blue supp wdnc panel summarily aff illinois legislative redistricting lapaille supp nd fund accurate informed representation weprin supp ndny panel summarily aff holloway hechler supp sd panel summarily aff hastert state bd elections supp nd panel anne arundel county republican central comm state administrative bd election laws supp md panel summarily aff republican party virginia wilder supp wd panel badham eu supp nd cal summarily aff legislative apportionment house representatives mcclure secretary commonwealth mass legislative redistricting cases md kenai peninsula borough state alaska packing refers practice filling district supermajority given group party cracking involves splitting group party among several districts deny group party majority districts delicious illustration one case found alluded provided relief bandemer see supra republican party north carolina hunt wl per curiam unpublished judgt order reported district trial less stipulations parties witness statements approximately exhibits days oral argument concluded north carolina system electing superior judges statewide basis resulted republican candidates experiencing consistent pervasive lack success exclusion electoral process whole effects likely continue unabated future wl elections superior judges conducted five days pronouncement every republican candidate standing office superior judge victorious state level result fourth circuit thought good reason directly odds recent prediction district causing remand case reconsideration constitution also share appellants alarm asserted tendency partisan gerrymandering create partisan representatives assuming assertion true constitution answer question whether better democratic voters state congressional delegation include democrats democratic voters effectively distributed constitute bare majorities many districts hardcore democrats democratic voters tightly packed districts choosing former dilutes vote radical democrat choosing latter moderate neither article equal protection clause takes sides dispute justice souter allow state proving affirmative defense demonstrate reasons given district shape mere pretext gerrymander post need establish affirmative defense arise plaintiff established prima facie case prima facie case fails step two district face complies traditional districting criteria footnotes app juris statement ibid colegrove example illinois legislature drawn state district lines state apportionment act reapportioned four ensuing decades despite census figures indicating great changes distribution population black dissenting populations illinois districts consequently ranged least populous district ibid nonetheless per justice frankfurter concluded due regard effective working government revealed issue peculiarly political nature therefore meet judicial determination fewer years later confronted strikingly similar set facts tennessee apportionment plan set statute remained virtually unchanged despite dramatic population growth held obvious tension colegrove complaint stated justiciable cause action baker distinguished colegrove simply refusal exercise equity powers potential voter disillusion nonparticipation great voters forced focus political activities artificial electoral units intelligent voters regardless party affiliation resent sort political manipulation electorate public purpose citation omitted reasoning decisions followed gomillion lightfoot see shaw cases proof grotesque district shapes may without provide convincing proof unconstitutional gerrymandering miller johnson reviewed procedures followed georgia legislature responding justice department objections original plan part operator reapportionment computer played designing districts support conclusion legislature subordinated traditional districting principles race see also bush vera plurality opinion discussing use computer program manipulate district lines shaw ii instance considered fact certain reports regarding effects past discrimination legislature therefore played role districting process hunt cromartie bush vera plurality opinion miller shaw plurality opinion seems assume dissenting opinions umbehr scalia rutan scalia correctly state law namely practice expressly prohibited text bill rights bears endorsement long tradition open widespread unchallenged use dates back beginning republic proper basis striking cf ante tracing history political gerrymanders beginning century ur inquiry begin judgment history ather inquiry must commence identification constitutional limitations implicated challenged governmental practice elrod goes without saying claim otherwise trigger strict scrutiny might nonetheless nonjusticiable see allen wright defunis odegaard per curiam plurality explains willing accep modest degree unmanageability constitutional command clear constitutional obligation dubious severely unmanageable ante statement cast doubt plurality faith racial gerrymandering cases reasoning clearly tautological plurality reluctance recognize justiciability partisan gerrymanders seems driven part fear recognizing claims give rise flood litigation see ante list cases cites lengthy ante suggests two decades since bandemer average three four partisan gerrymandering cases filed every year volume obviously trivial compared example amount litigation followed adoption rule see reynolds sims writing bandemer justice white put well characteristics complaining group immutable group subject historical stigma may relevant manner case adjudicated differences justify refusal entertain case cases plurality cites today ante support conclusion wise endorse views expressed justice powell dissent bandemer remain convinced opinions correctly interpreted law standard applied statewide challenge case trial entire case required purpose deciding case even though dissented decision shaw remain convinced incorrectly decided give shaw cases stare decisis effect political gerrymandering context given illogical disposition case however future cases feel free reexamine standing issue surely suggest plaintiff never standing litigate statewide claim app juris statement explained hays oters gerrymandered districts may suffer special representational harms constitutionally suspect classifications cause voting context hand plaintiff live district suffer special harms plurality bandemer acknowledged focus equal protection inquiry statewide challenge necessarily somewhat different involved review individual districts cf mcconnell federal election slip troubling functioning democracy classic quid pro quo corruption danger officeholders decide issues merits desires constituencies according wishes made large financial contributions valued officeholder richard norma jean vieth registered democrats reside district app juris statement complaint claim resided different district old districting scheme anywhere allege furey behalf district particular irregularly shaped glance appended map infra reveals district especially unusual contours without specific allegations regarding district limit analysis district residence located district furey represented democrat app app juris statement mple evidence demonstrates many today congressional representatives owe allegiance people several mercy state legislatures note harv rev omitted sense partisan gerrymander american cousin english rotten borough english system members parliament elected geographic units remained unchanged despite population changes wrought industrial revolution representation based population vast inequities developed time form rotten boroughs old sarum instance human residents sheep yet sent number representatives parliament yorkshire nearly million inhabitants zagarri politics size representation omitted result system many insignificant places returned members many important towns even large towns members often elected tiny fraction population butler passing great reform bill meanwhile government bribed patron member means distinctions offices actual cash patron member bribed electors way ibid rotten boroughs clearly violate familiar rule also troubling representative borough owed primary loyalty patron government rather constituents similarly gerrymandered districts instead local groups defined neutral criteria selecting representatives architects districts select constituencies effect representatives realm federal elections requirement governmental neutrality buttressed recognition elections clause source power dictate electoral outcomes favor disfavor class candidates evade important constitutional restraints cook gralike citing term limits thornton duty govern impartially extends executive legislative officials alike beginning early first session congress passed number statutes designed guarantee executive branch employees neutrally carry duties see ex parte curtis laws avoided danger government may made furnish indirectly money defray expenses keeping political party power happens time control public patronage fundamental federal employees expected enforce law execute programs government without bias favoritism political party group members thereof civil service letter carriers expectation reflects principle impartial execution laws great end government washington davis referred earlier challenge new york reapportionment statute failed plaintiffs shown statute product state contrivance segregate basis race place origin emphasized wright unanimous identifying issue whether purposefully drawn racial lines quoting wright elsewhere explained view race factor districting process different political consideration creating district better worse creating district events relevant question whether sovereign abrogated obligation govern neutrally see karcher stevens concurring mobile stevens concurring judgment cousins city council chicago stevens dissenting plurality long discussion history political gerrymanders interesting ante surely intended suggest vintage invidious practice even american political tradition old republic board wabaunsee cty umbehr scalia dissenting insulate constitutional review compare bradwell state wall nevada dept human resources hibbs historical discussion might relevant attempted justify political gerrymandering acceptable use governmental power end however plurality defense position comes unconvincing assertion lacks juridical capacity administer standards fashioned recent racial gerrymandering jurisprudence bandemer plurality opinion gaffney cummings whitcomb chavis burns richardson fortson dorsey consistent statements district recent case correctly described political gerrymandering purely partisan exercise abuse power core evinces fundamental distrust voters serving political parties expense public good app juris statement balderas texas see shaw ii stevens dissenting bush vera stevens dissenting miller ginsburg dissenting race seldom provides rational basis governmental decision racial classifications almost always fail survive rational basis scrutiny ot every decision influenced race equally objectionable grutter bollinger race used basis making predictive political judgments may reliable unreliable group characteristics political affiliation economic status national origin fact race immutable characteristic mean anything immutable certain political behavior members racial class see mobile bolden stevens concurring judgment registered republicans races sometimes vote democratic candidates vice versa plurality asserts person politics unlike race readily discernible ante assertion belied evidence architects political gerrymanders seem difficulty discerning voters political affiliation eligibility vote primary elections often requires citizen register party affiliation never requires register race rule obviously constitutes neutral districting criterion gerrymandering cases never cited principle one traditional criteria may serve defeat claim district gerrymandered racial lines shaw thus require district justified reference rule neutral criterion see bandemer powell concurring part dissenting part california districting scheme issue badham featured large number districts highly irregular shapes designed alleged dilute republican voting strength throughout state see juris statement badham eu exh three members dissented summary affirmance badham noted probable jurisdiction app juris statement ibid footnotes plurality says dissenters labor still vain today ante join justice breyer response post plurality says easy define group person politics rarely readily discernible never permanently discernible person race ante anytime political gerrymandering shown occur evidence must least imply defendants sat identified relevant groups set concentrate vote one dilute others plaintiff evidence figure going cases see problem permitting plaintiff allege registered republican example state legislature set gerrymandering minimize number republicans elected references registration serve plaintiff need show criteria partisan affiliation employed defendants challenged districting process measures defined professors pildes niemi include dispersion ratio area district area smallest circle circumscribes district pildes niemi perimeter ratio area district area circle whose diameter equals length area perimeter population ratio district population population contained minimum convex figure encloses district area population measure also taken using district circumscribing circle denominator see also polsby popper third criterion compactness procedural safeguard partisan gerrymandering yale rev discussing quantitative measures compactness favoring perimeter measure superior antigerrymandering purposes schwartzberg reapportionment gerrymanders notion compactness minn rev discussing proposed legislation applied variant perimeter measure necessarily involve redrawing noncontiguous districts permit plaintiff ask remedy unless first made prima facie case multiple districts see infra amici joann erfer et al suggest political party strong enough redistrict without approval analogous firm exercises monopolistic control market ability exercise unilateral control therefore trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny brief citing terry adams texas jaybird primary case see also issacharoff gerrymandering political cartels harv rev issacharoff pildes politics markets partisan lockups democratic process stan rev analogy antitrust intriguing one may prove fruitful though embrace point caution wholesale conceptual transfer economics politics commentators criticized gaffney failing account harm bipartisan political gerrymandering political process issacharoff political cartels supra gaffney illustrates problem use discrimination model unmoored positive account electoral process gaffney settled law today purposes take given approval bipartisan gerrymanders associated goal incumbent protection plurality may correct ante test propose catch objectionable gerrymanders rejected incumbent protection acceptable purpose districting wary lumping measures aimed incumbent protection together point think gain better sense waited upon experience district courts assessing particular efforts incumbency protection offered responding prima facie cases worth moment address plurality charge judicial remedy political gerrymandering necessarily assumes right proportional representation ante deny appellants may standard rests upon principle groups least groups right proportional representation agree earlier statements constitution guarantees right proportional representation see davis bandemer plurality opinion citing whitcomb chavis white regester follow constitution permits every state action intended achieve extreme form disproportionate representation proportional representation usually refers set procedural mechanisms used guarantee less precision political party seats legislature proportionate share vote see generally issacharoff karlan pildes law democracy rev ed discussing voting systems district constitution requires state adopt neither mechanisms goal giving party seats proportionate vote