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state
oil
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pp
although
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rule
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number
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factors
see
arizona
maricopa
county
medical
types
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informed
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toolson
new
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kuhn
unavailing
pp
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experience
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continental
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light
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reviewed
appeals
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pp
vacated
remanded
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print
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decisions
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goes
press
state
oil
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petitioner
barkat
khan
andkhan
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writ
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seventh
circuit
november
sherman
act
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amended
contract
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respondents
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khan
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entered
agreement
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state
oil
company
lease
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oil
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obtain
station
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oil
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oil
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per
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state
oil
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app
subsequently
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respondents
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pet
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held
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claim
id
appeals
seventh
circuit
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indeed
fix
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fixing
concluded
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oil
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light
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atlantic
richfield
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petroleum
arco
found
respondents
suffered
antitrust
injury
able
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prices
granted
certiorari
consider
two
questions
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oil
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se
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congress
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see
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medical
citing
joint
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antitrust
claims
analyzed
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finder
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whether
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dr
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park
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person
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within
territory
id
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nine
years
later
continental
gte
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scholarly
journals
federal
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number
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confronted
analogous
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noting
schwinn
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four
years
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pacific
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porting
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id
citing
posner
antitrust
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analysis
restricted
distribution
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merger
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colum
rev
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areeda
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antitrust
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blair
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rev
easterbrook
maximum
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chi
rev
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laws
protect
interbrand
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business
electronics
sharp
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low
prices
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benefit
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prices
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long
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supra
interpretation
sherman
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lower
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consumers
especially
costly
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essence
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matsushita
elec
industrial
zenith
radio
informed
find
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maintain
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competition
extent
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justify
per
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invalidation
chief
judge
posner
wrote
appeals
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maximum
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fixing
unless
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margins
competitive
level
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drive
dealers
arms
competing
supplier
supplier
might
however
fix
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resale
price
order
prevent
dealers
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monopoly
position
uppose
state
oil
perhaps
encourage
dealer
ices
spaced
dealers
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far
apart
limit
competition
among
even
given
exclusive
territory
suppose
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popular
brand
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dealers
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state
oil
might
want
place
ceiling
dealers
resale
prices
order
vent
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power
fully
disinterested
malice
commercial
higher
price
gasoline
resold
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volume
sold
lower
profit
supplier
higher
profit
per
gallon
higher
price
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dealer
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also
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albrecht
one
suspects
paper
legitimate
interest
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order
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number
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premises
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grounded
fear
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one
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freedom
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trader
albrecht
professed
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areeda
antitrust
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integration
newspaper
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since
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given
rise
litigation
independent
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areeda
hovenkamp
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pp
albrecht
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maximum
prices
may
set
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dealers
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consumers
essential
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driving
away
customers
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likely
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manufacturers
well
dealers
consumers
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unlikely
supplier
set
price
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judgment
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lopatka
stephen
breyer
modern
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blair
lang
albrecht
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maximum
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reason
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supra
although
vertical
maximum
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might
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viability
inefficient
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consequence
necessarily
harmful
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easterbrook
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lopatka
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finally
albrecht
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fear
maximum
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used
disguise
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fix
minimum
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remain
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per
se
although
acknowledged
possibility
maximum
pricing
might
mask
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maricopa
county
believe
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albrecht
appropriately
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see
easterbrook
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also
pitofsky
defense
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case
per
se
rule
vertical
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potential
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less
serious
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fact
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indeed
courts
antitrust
scholars
noted
albrecht
rule
may
actually
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consumers
manufacturers
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caribe
bmw
bayerische
motoren
werke
aktiengesellschaft
breyer
areeda
supra
mathewson
winter
competition
policy
vertical
exchange
commentators
also
explained
albrecht
per
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rule
even
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decision
gte
sylvania
vertical
nonprice
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unlawful
per
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likelihood
dealer
monopoly
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easterbrook
supra
see
also
arco
intend
suggest
dealers
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market
power
exploit
monopoly
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retail
market
power
may
fact
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see
business
electronics
gte
sylvania
hold
ban
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
inevitably
anticompetitive
consequences
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dealer
context
reconsidering
albrecht
rationale
substantial
criticism
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received
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conclude
insufficient
economic
justification
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invalidation
vertical
maximum
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underlying
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also
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ongoing
enforcement
sherman
act
see
copperweld
independence
tube
moreover
neither
parties
amici
curiae
called
attention
cases
enforcement
efforts
directed
solely
conduct
encompassed
albrecht
per
se
rule
respondents
argue
reconsideration
albrecht
require
persuasive
expert
testimony
establishing
per
se
rule
distorted
market
brief
respondents
reasoning
ignores
fact
albrecht
relied
solely
upon
hypothetical
effects
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
albrech
dire
predictions
borne
even
though
manufacturers
suppliers
appear
fashioned
schemes
get
around
per
se
rule
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
circumstances
retention
rule
albrecht
respondents
rule
elimination
lacks
adequate
justification
see
gte
sylvania
supra
respondents
reliance
toolson
new
york
yankees
per
curiam
flood
kuhn
similarly
misplaced
decisions
clearly
inapposite
antitrust
exemption
professional
baseball
described
aberration
rest
ing
recognition
acceptance
baseball
unique
characteristics
needs
id
context
case
infer
little
meaning
fact
congress
reacted
legislatively
albrecht
event
history
various
legislative
proposals
regarding
price
fixing
seems
neither
clearly
support
denounce
per
se
rule
albrecht
respondents
course
free
seek
legislative
protection
gasoline
suppliers
sort
embodied
petroleum
marketing
practices
act
stat
et
seq
reasons
noted
however
remedy
respondents
dispute
state
oil
come
form
per
se
rule
affecting
conduct
entire
marketplace
despite
chief
judge
posner
aptly
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albrecht
infirmities
increasingly
wobbly
foundations
remains
question
whether
albrecht
deserves
continuing
respect
doctrine
stare
decisis
appeals
correct
applying
principle
despite
disagreement
albrecht
prerogative
alone
overrule
one
precedents
approach
reconsideration
decisions
utmost
caution
stare
decisis
reflects
policy
judgment
matters
important
applicable
rule
law
settled
settled
right
agostini
felton
slip
quoting
burnet
coronado
oil
gas
brandeis
dissenting
preferred
course
promotes
evenhanded
predictable
consistent
development
legal
principles
fosters
reliance
judicial
decisions
contributes
actual
perceived
integrity
judicial
process
payne
tennessee
expressed
reluctance
overrule
decisions
involving
statutory
interpretation
see
illinois
brick
illinois
acknowledged
stare
decisis
concerns
acme
cases
involving
property
contract
rights
see
payne
concerns
arguably
relevant
case
tare
decisis
inexorable
command
ibid
area
antitrust
law
competing
interest
decisions
recognizing
adapting
changed
circumstances
lessons
accumulated
experience
thus
general
presumption
legislative
changes
left
congress
less
force
respect
sherman
act
light
accepted
view
congress
expected
courts
give
shape
statute
broad
mandate
drawing
tradition
national
soc
professional
engineers
explained
term
restraint
trade
used
also
invokes
common
law
merely
static
content
common
law
assigned
term
business
electronics
see
also
gte
sylvania
mcnally
stevens
dissenting
accordingly
reconsidered
decisions
construing
sherman
act
theoretical
underpinnings
decisions
called
serious
question
see
copperweld
supra
gte
sylvania
supra
tigner
texas
although
lightly
assume
economic
realities
underlying
earlier
decisions
changed
earlier
judicial
perceptions
realities
error
noted
different
sorts
agreements
may
amount
restraints
trade
varying
times
circumstances
make
sense
create
single
term
trade
chronologically
schizoid
statute
reason
evolves
new
circumstances
new
wisdom
line
per
se
illegality
remains
forever
fixed
business
electronics
supra
schwinn
subject
continuing
controversy
confusion
great
weight
scholarly
criticism
gte
sylvania
supra
albrecht
widely
criticized
since
inception
views
underlying
albrecht
eroded
precedent
much
decision
salvage
see
neal
patterson
mclean
credit
union
rodriguez
de
quijas
american
express
although
rule
albrecht
effect
time
inquiry
must
undertake
requires
considering
effect
antitrust
laws
upon
vertical
distributional
restraints
american
economy
today
gte
sylvania
supra
quoting
schwinn
stewart
concurring
part
dissenting
part
noted
arco
another
case
since
albrecht
confronted
unadulterated
vertical
arrangement
confront
albrecht
directly
find
conceptual
foundations
gravely
weakened
overruling
albrecht
course
hold
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
per
se
lawful
instead
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
like
majority
commercial
arrangements
subject
antitrust
laws
evaluated
rule
reason
view
analysis
effectively
identify
situations
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
amounts
anticompetitive
conduct
remains
question
whether
respondents
entitled
recover
damages
based
state
oil
conduct
although
appeals
noted
district
judge
right
conclude
rule
reason
applicable
khan
loses
consideration
case
necessarily
premised
albrecht
per
se
rule
circumstances
matter
reviewed
appeals
first
instance
therefore
vacate
judgment
appeals
remand
case
proceedings
consistent
opinion
ordered