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california
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chief
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hughes
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shortly
thereafter
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system
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constitution
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representatives
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cooke
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madison
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congress
explaining
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online
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footnotes
six
authorized
national
party
committees
republican
national
committee
democratic
national
committee
national
republican
senatorial
committee
democratic
senatorial
campaign
committee
national
republican
congressional
committee
democratic
congressional
campaign
committee
see
pac
business
labor
interest
group
raises
spends
money
connection
federal
election
cases
contributing
candidates
super
pac
pac
makes
independent
expenditures
contribute
candidates
base
aggregate
limits
govern
contributions
traditional
pacs
independent
expenditure
pacs
see
federal
election
cadc
en
banc
multicandidate
pac
pac
contributors
registered
least
six
months
made
contributions
five
candidates
federal
office
cfr
pacs
qualify
multicandidate
pacs
must
abide
base
limit
applicable
individual
contributions
dissent
contends
remand
development
evidentiary
record
answering
question
presented
see
post
opinion
breyer
parties
treated
question
purely
legal
one
government
insisted
aggregate
limits
upheld
existing
record
alone
see
tr
oral
arg
take
case
comes
us
see
felsenthal
obama
attends
fundraiser
hosted
beyonce
reuters
coleman
kid
rock
supports
paul
ryan
campaign
fundraiser
rolling
stone
mason
robert
duvall
host
romney
fundraiser
times
july
piazza
hillary
lands
rocket
man
daily
news
apr
fact
opinion
address
base
limits
also
belies
dissent
concern
silently
overruled
holding
mcconnell
federal
election
see
post
issue
mcconnell
bcra
extension
base
limits
soft
money
previously
unregulated
contributions
national
party
committees
see
see
also
post
appendix
opinion
breyer
excerpts
mcconnell
record
discussing
unregulated
soft
money
holding
constitutionality
aggregate
limits
clearly
overrule
mcconnell
holding
soft
money
especially
odd
regard
aggregate
limits
essential
enforce
base
limits
state
campaign
finance
schemes
typically
include
base
limits
aggregate
limits
eight
imposed
base
limits
contributions
individuals
candidates
also
imposed
aggregate
limits
excluding
restrictions
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subset
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see
stat
rev
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tit
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law
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stat
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ann
ii
government
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must
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contributors
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donor
share
eventual
contribution
smith
diluted
justice
department
agrees
acting
assistant
attorney
general
mythili
raman
recently
testified
congress
anticipate
seeing
fewer
cases
conduit
contributions
directly
campaign
committees
parties
individuals
corporations
wish
influence
elections
officials
longer
need
attempt
conduit
contribution
schemes
criminally
prosecuted
instead
likely
simply
make
unlimited
contributions
super
pacs
hearing
current
issues
campaign
finance
law
enforcement
subcommittee
crime
terrorism
senate
committee
judiciary
addition
percentage
contributions
aggregate
limits
even
used
circumvention
limited
fact
many
modes
potential
circumvention
used
election
example
one
donor
gives
candidates
safe
house
seats
hopes
candidate
reroute
representative
smith
candidate
contested
district
donor
candidates
safe
seats
exhausted
permissible
contributions
smith
risk
circumvention
scheme
repeat
multiple
donors
smith