north
carolina
state
board
dental
examiners
federal
trade
commission
argued
october
decided
february
north
carolina
dental
practice
act
act
provides
north
carolina
state
board
dental
examiners
board
agency
state
regulation
practice
dentistry
board
principal
duty
create
administer
enforce
licensing
system
dentists
six
eight
members
must
licensed
practicing
dentists
act
specify
teeth
whitening
practice
dentistry
nonetheless
dentists
complained
board
nondentists
charging
lower
prices
services
dentists
board
issued
least
official
letters
nondentist
teeth
whitening
service
providers
product
manufacturers
often
warning
unlicensed
practice
dentistry
crime
related
board
actions
led
nondentists
cease
offering
teeth
whitening
services
north
carolina
federal
trade
commission
ftc
filed
administrative
complaint
alleging
board
concerted
action
exclude
nondentists
market
teeth
whitening
services
north
carolina
constituted
anticompetitive
unfair
method
competition
federal
trade
commission
act
administrative
law
judge
alj
denied
board
motion
dismiss
ground
immunity
ftc
sustained
ruling
reasoning
even
board
acted
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clearly
articulated
state
policy
displace
competition
board
must
actively
supervised
state
claim
immunity
hearing
merits
alj
determined
board
unreasonably
restrained
trade
violation
antitrust
law
ftc
sustained
alj
fourth
circuit
affirmed
ftc
respects
held
controlling
number
board
decisionmakers
active
market
participants
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board
regulates
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invoke
antitrust
immunity
subject
active
supervision
state
requirement
met
pp
federal
antitrust
law
central
safeguard
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market
structures
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mandates
sherman
act
expense
values
state
may
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impose
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regulate
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interpreted
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market
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expressed
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policy
policy
actively
supervised
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ftc
phoebe
putney
health
system
quoting
california
retail
liquor
dealers
assn
midcal
aluminum
board
receive
active
supervision
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conduct
pp
entity
may
invoke
parker
immunity
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actions
exercise
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sovereign
power
see
columbia
omni
outdoor
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state
delegates
control
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actor
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act
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hoc
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ticor
title
ins
phoebe
putney
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immunity
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private
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board
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agencies
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bar
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faith
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officers
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policy
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state
argues
allowing
ftc
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citizens
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regulate
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offer
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officials
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indemnification
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litigation
also
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wisdom
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laws
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regulation
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compliance
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patrick
burget
particularly
light
risks
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boards
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market
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pose
free
market
pp
board
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act
delegates
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dentistry
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nothing
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whitening
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expel
dentists
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relied
letters
threatening
criminal
liability
instead
powers
disposal
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oversight
politically
accountable
official
whether
board
exceeded
powers
north
carolina
law
evidence
decision
state
initiate
concur
board
actions
nondentists
specific
supervisory
systems
reviewed
suffices
note
inquiry
regarding
active
supervision
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question
whether
state
review
mechanisms
provide
realistic
assurance
nonsovereign
actor
anticompetitive
conduct
promotes
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policy
rather
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party
individual
interests
patrick
identified
constant
requirements
active
supervision
supervisor
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review
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modify
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ensure
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ibid
mere
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state
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ticor
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state
supervisor
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general
however
adequacy
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otherwise
depend
circumstances
case
pp
affirmed
kennedy
delivered
opinion
roberts
ginsburg
breyer
sotomayor
kagan
joined
alito
filed
dissenting
opinion
scalia
thomas
joined
opinion
notice
opinion
subject
formal
revision
publication
preliminary
print
reports
readers
requested
notify
reporter
decisions
washington
typographical
formal
errors
order
corrections
may
made
preliminary
print
goes
press
north
carolina
state
board
dental
examiners
petitioner
federal
trade
commission
writ
certiorari
appeals
fourth
circuit
february
justice
kennedy
delivered
opinion
case
arises
antitrust
challenge
actions
state
regulatory
board
majority
board
members
engaged
active
practice
profession
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question
whether
board
actions
protected
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act
regulation
doctrine
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immunity
defined
applied
decisions
beginning
parker
brown
dental
practice
act
act
north
carolina
declared
practice
dentistry
matter
public
concern
requiring
regulation
stat
ann
act
north
carolina
state
board
dental
examiners
board
agency
state
regulation
practice
dentistry
board
principal
duty
create
administer
enforce
licensing
system
dentists
see
perform
function
broad
authority
licensees
see
board
authority
respect
unlicensed
persons
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restricted
like
resident
citizen
board
may
file
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perpetually
enjoin
person
unlawfully
practicing
dentistry
act
provides
six
board
eight
members
must
licensed
dentists
engaged
active
practice
dentistry
elected
licensed
dentists
north
carolina
cast
ballots
elections
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board
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seventh
member
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elected
licensed
hygienists
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members
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oath
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state
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procedure
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et
public
records
act
et
law
et
seq
board
may
promulgate
rules
regulations
governing
practice
dentistry
within
state
provided
mandates
inconsistent
act
approved
north
carolina
rules
review
commission
whose
members
appointed
state
legislature
see
dentists
north
carolina
started
whitening
teeth
many
including
board
members
period
issue
case
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substantial
fees
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scene
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lower
prices
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dentists
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board
new
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concern
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prices
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nondentists
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pet
cert
board
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result
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rules
review
commission
even
though
act
terms
specify
teeth
whitening
practice
dentistry
starting
board
issued
least
letters
official
letterhead
nondentist
teeth
whitening
service
providers
product
manufacturers
many
letters
directed
recipient
cease
activity
constituting
practice
dentistry
warned
unlicensed
practice
dentistry
crime
strongly
implied
expressly
stated
teeth
whitening
constitutes
practice
dentistry
app
early
board
persuaded
north
carolina
board
cosmetic
art
examiners
warn
cosmetologists
providing
teeth
whitening
services
later
year
board
sent
letters
mall
operators
stating
kiosk
teeth
whiteners
violating
dental
practice
act
advising
malls
consider
expelling
violators
premises
actions
intended
result
nondentists
ceased
offering
teeth
whitening
services
north
carolina
federal
trade
commission
ftc
filed
administrative
complaint
charging
board
violating
federal
trade
commission
act
stat
amended
ftc
alleged
board
concerted
action
exclude
nondentists
market
teeth
whitening
services
north
carolina
constituted
anticompetitive
unfair
method
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board
moved
dismiss
alleging
immunity
administrative
law
judge
alj
denied
motion
appeal
ftc
sustained
alj
ruling
reasoned
even
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board
acted
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state
policy
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hybrid
must
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state
claim
immunity
app
pet
cert
ftc
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make
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merits
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alj
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alia
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whitening
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stop
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affirmed
ftc
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certiorari
ii
federal
antitrust
law
central
safeguard
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free
market
structures
regard
important
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freedom
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bill
rights
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personal
freedoms
topco
associates
antitrust
laws
declare
considered
decisive
prohibition
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government
cartels
price
fixing
combinations
practices
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free
market
sherman
act
stat
amended
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serves
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welfare
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ftc
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ins
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objectives
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values
state
may
deem
fundamental
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antitrust
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impose
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burden
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regulate
see
exxon
governor
maryland
see
also
easterbrook
antitrust
economics
federalism
law
econ
reasons
parker
brown
interpreted
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laws
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ruling
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balance
embody
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community
communications
boulder
since
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ticor
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hoover
ronwin
lafayette
louisiana
power
light
iii
case
board
argues
members
invested
north
carolina
power
state
result
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actions
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supervised
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ftc
phoebe
putney
health
system
slip
quoting
california
retail
liquor
dealers
assn
midcal
aluminum
parties
assumed
clear
articulation
requirement
satisfied
north
carolina
prohibits
unauthorized
practice
dentistry
however
act
silent
whether
broad
prohibition
covers
teeth
whitening
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bar
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bar
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federal
antitrust
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allied
tube
conduit
indian
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rev
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garland
antitrust
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action
economic
efficiency
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yale
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whether
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patrick
burget
answer
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test
set
forth
california
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liquor
dealers
assn
midcal
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case
arising
california
delegation
authority
wine
merchants
midcal
state
law
regulatory
scheme
basis
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articulated
clear
policy
allow
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conduct
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state
provides
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citing
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displacement
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state
legislature
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must
foreseen
implicitly
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consistent
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putney
slip
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supervision
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alia
state
officials
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white
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shrylock
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shrylock
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restraints
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rev
shepard
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dental
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handler
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johnson
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medical
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