atlantic
richfield
usa
petroleum
argued
december
decided
may
petitioner
atlantic
richfield
company
arco
integrated
oil
company
increased
retail
gasoline
sales
market
share
encouraging
dealers
match
prices
independents
respondent
usa
petroleum
company
competes
directly
dealers
retail
level
usa
sales
dropped
sued
arco
district
charging
inter
alia
vertical
scheme
constituted
conspiracy
restraint
trade
violation
sherman
act
granted
summary
judgment
arco
holding
usa
satisfy
antitrust
injury
requirement
purposes
private
damages
suit
clayton
act
unable
show
arco
prices
predatory
appeals
reversed
holding
injuries
resulting
vertical
nonpredatory
agreements
constitute
antitrust
injury
reasoning
form
price
fixing
contravenes
congress
intent
market
forces
alone
determine
goods
services
offered
prices
whether
particular
sellers
succeed
fail
concluded
usa
shown
losses
resulted
disruption
market
caused
arco
price
fixing
held
actionable
antitrust
injury
injury
type
antitrust
laws
intended
prevent
flows
makes
defendants
acts
unlawful
injury
although
causally
related
antitrust
violation
qualify
unless
attributable
anticompetitive
aspect
practice
scrutiny
since
inimical
antitrust
laws
award
damages
losses
stemming
continued
competition
cargill
monfort
colorado
vertical
conspiracy
violation
sherman
act
must
result
predatory
pricing
cause
competitor
antitrust
injury
pp
competitor
usa
suffered
antitrust
injury
since
losses
flow
harmful
effects
dealers
consumers
rendered
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
per
se
illegal
albrecht
herald
usa
benefited
rather
harmed
arco
pricing
policies
restricted
arco
sales
large
dealers
prevented
dealers
offering
services
desired
consumers
even
maximum
price
agreement
acquired
attributes
scheme
usa
still
suffered
antitrust
injury
higher
arco
prices
worked
usa
advantage
pp
usa
argument
even
harmed
albrecht
anticompetitive
effects
lost
business
caused
arco
agreement
lowering
prices
predatory
levels
constitutes
antitrust
injury
rejected
since
cutting
prices
increase
business
often
essence
competition
pp
inappropriate
require
showing
predatory
pricing
antitrust
injury
established
case
sherman
act
although
price
agreement
illegal
losses
flowing
agreement
definition
antitrust
injuries
low
prices
benefit
consumers
regardless
set
long
predatory
levels
threaten
competition
hence
give
rise
antitrust
injury
pp
loss
flowing
per
se
violation
automatically
satisfy
antitrust
injury
requirement
distinct
matter
must
shown
independently
purpose
per
se
analysis
determine
whether
particular
restraint
unreasonable
actions
per
se
unlawful
may
nonetheless
procompetitive
effects
private
parties
might
suffer
losses
therefrom
antitrust
injury
requirement
however
ensures
plaintiff
recover
loss
stems
aspect
effect
defendant
behavior
pp
providing
competitors
private
cause
action
enforce
rule
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
protect
rights
dealers
consumers
class
persons
whose
normally
motivate
vindicate
albrecht
anticompetitive
consequences
antitrust
laws
usa
injury
inextricably
intertwined
dealer
antitrust
injury
since
competitor
incentive
vindicate
legitimate
interests
rival
dealer
injured
motivated
sue
arrangement
procompetitive
impact
market
pp
brennan
delivered
opinion
rehnquist
marshall
blackmun
scalia
kennedy
joined
stevens
filed
dissenting
opinion
white
joined
post
ronald
redcay
argued
cause
petitioner
briefs
matthew
heartney
otis
pratt
pearsall
philip
curtis
francis
mccormack
donald
bright
edward
clark
john
roberts
argued
cause
et
al
amici
curiae
urging
reversal
brief
solicitor
general
starr
acting
assistant
attorney
general
boudin
deputy
solicitor
general
shapiro
michael
dreeben
catherine
kevin
arquit
maxwell
blecher
argued
cause
respondent
brief
alicia
rosenberg
lawrence
sullivan
daniel
mayers
david
westin
terry
maguire
filed
brief
american
newspaper
publishers
association
amicus
curiae
urging
reversal
briefs
amici
curiae
urging
affirmance
filed
state
california
et
al
john
van
de
kamp
attorney
general
california
andrea
ordin
chief
assistant
attorney
general
sanford
gruskin
assistant
attorney
general
thomas
dove
richard
light
deputy
attorneys
general
douglas
baily
attorney
general
alaska
richard
monkman
assistant
attorney
general
warren
price
iii
attorney
general
hawaii
thomas
miller
attorney
general
iowa
gordan
allen
deputy
attorney
general
william
guste
attorney
general
louisiana
anne
benoit
assistant
attorney
general
robert
spire
attorney
general
nebraska
dale
comer
assistant
attorney
general
brian
mckay
attorney
general
nevada
kenneth
creighton
deputy
attorney
general
dave
frohnmayer
attorney
general
oregon
ernest
preate
attorney
general
pennsylvania
eugene
wayne
chief
deputy
attorney
general
carl
hisiro
senior
deputy
attorney
general
charles
burson
attorney
general
tennessee
terry
craft
deputy
attorney
general
paul
van
dam
attorney
general
utah
arthur
strong
assistant
attorney
general
service
station
dealers
america
dimitri
daskalopoulos
society
independent
gasoline
marketers
america
william
scott
christopher
macaroy
justice
brennan
delivered
opinion
case
presents
question
whether
firm
incurs
injury
within
meaning
antitrust
laws
loses
sales
competitor
charging
nonpredatory
prices
pursuant
vertical
scheme
hold
firm
suffer
antitrust
injury
therefore
bring
suit
clayton
act
stat
amended
respondent
usa
petroleum
company
usa
sued
petitioner
atlantic
richfield
company
arco
district
central
district
california
alleging
existence
vertical
agreement
prohibited
sherman
act
stat
amended
attempt
monopolize
local
retail
gasoline
sales
market
violation
sherman
act
misconduct
relevant
petitioner
arco
integrated
oil
company
inter
alia
markets
gasoline
western
sells
gasoline
consumers
directly
stations
indirectly
dealers
respondent
usa
independent
retail
marketer
gasoline
like
independents
buys
gasoline
major
petroleum
companies
resale
brand
name
respondent
competes
directly
arco
dealers
retail
level
respondent
outlets
typically
discount
stations
charge
less
stations
selling
equivalent
quality
gasoline
major
brand
names
early
petitioner
arco
adopted
new
marketing
strategy
order
compete
effectively
discount
independents
respondent
petitioner
encouraged
dealers
match
retail
gasoline
prices
offered
independents
various
ways
petitioner
made
available
dealers
distributors
discounts
temporary
competitive
allowances
temporary
volume
allowances
reduced
dealers
costs
example
eliminating
credit
card
sales
arco
strategy
increased
sales
market
share
amended
complaint
respondent
usa
charged
arco
engaged
direct
competition
discounters
drastically
lowered
prices
ways
sought
appeal
consumers
first
amended
complaint
app
respondent
asserted
petitioner
conspired
retail
service
stations
selling
arco
brand
gasoline
fix
prices
levels
arco
organized
resale
price
maintenance
scheme
direct
result
competition
otherwise
exist
among
dealers
eliminated
agreement
retail
price
gasoline
fixed
stabilized
maintained
artificially
low
uncompetitive
levels
app
respondent
alleged
petitioner
solicited
dealers
distributors
participate
acquiesce
conspiracy
used
threats
intimidation
coercion
secure
compliance
terms
app
according
respondent
conspiracy
drove
many
independent
gasoline
dealers
california
business
app
count
one
amended
complaint
charged
petitioner
vertical
scheme
constituted
agreement
restraint
trade
thus
violated
sherman
act
count
two
later
withdrawn
prejudice
respondent
asserted
petitioner
engaged
attempt
monopolize
retail
gasoline
market
predatory
pricing
violation
sherman
act
district
granted
summary
judgment
arco
claim
stated
ven
assuming
respondent
usa
establish
vertical
conspiracy
maintain
low
prices
respondent
satisfy
antitrust
injury
requirement
clayton
act
without
showing
prices
predatory
app
pet
cert
concluded
respondent
make
showing
predatory
pricing
given
petitioner
market
share
ease
entry
market
petitioner
position
exercise
market
power
divided
panel
appeals
ninth
circuit
reversed
acknowledging
decision
conflict
approach
appeals
seventh
circuit
several
recent
cases
see
ninth
circuit
nonetheless
held
injuries
resulting
vertical
nonpredatory
agreements
constitute
antitrust
injury
purposes
private
suit
clayton
act
reasoned
form
price
fixing
contravenes
congress
intent
market
forces
alone
determine
goods
services
offered
price
goods
services
sold
whether
particular
sellers
succeed
fail
believed
key
inquiry
determining
whether
respondent
suffered
antitrust
injury
whether
losses
resulted
disruption
market
caused
antitrust
violation
ibid
concluded
present
case
inquiry
seems
straightforward
usa
claimed
injuries
direct
result
indeed
allegations
accept
true
intended
objective
arco
scheme
according
usa
purpose
arco
disrupt
market
retail
gasoline
sales
disruption
source
usa
injuries
ibid
granted
certiorari
ii
private
plaintiff
may
recover
damages
clayton
act
merely
showing
injury
causally
linked
illegal
presence
market
brunswick
pueblo
instead
plaintiff
must
prove
existence
antitrust
injury
say
injury
type
antitrust
laws
intended
prevent
flows
makes
defendants
acts
unlawful
ibid
emphasis
original
cargill
monfort
colorado
reaffirmed
injury
although
causally
related
antitrust
violation
nevertheless
qualify
antitrust
injury
unless
attributable
anticompetitive
aspect
practice
scrutiny
since
inimical
antitrust
laws
award
damages
losses
stemming
continued
competition
quoting
brunswick
supra
see
also
associated
general
contractors
california
carpenters
blue
shield
virginia
mccready
truett
payne
chrysler
motors
respondent
argues
competitor
show
antitrust
injury
vertical
conspiracy
fix
maximum
prices
unlawful
sherman
act
even
prices
set
predatory
levels
addition
respondent
maintains
loss
flowing
per
se
violation
automatically
satisfies
antitrust
injury
requirement
reject
contentions
hold
respondent
failed
meet
antitrust
injury
test
case
therefore
reverse
judgment
appeals
albrecht
herald
found
vertical
scheme
unlawful
per
se
sherman
act
threatened
inhibit
vigorous
competition
dealers
bound
threatened
become
scheme
case
concerned
newspaper
distributor
sought
charge
customers
suggested
retail
price
advertised
publisher
publisher
attempted
discipline
distributor
hiring
another
carrier
take
away
distributor
customer
distributor
brought
suit
found
combination
formed
publisher
case
force
distributor
maintain
specified
price
resale
newspapers
purchased
publisher
constituted
without
illegal
restraint
trade
sherman
act
holding
vertical
agreement
illegal
analyzed
manner
might
restrain
competition
dealers
first
noted
scheme
substituting
perhaps
erroneous
judgment
seller
forces
competitive
market
may
severely
intrude
upon
ability
buyers
compete
survive
market
explained
aximum
prices
may
fixed
low
dealer
furnish
services
essential
value
goods
consumer
furnish
services
conveniences
consumers
desire
willing
pay
limiting
ability
small
dealers
engage
nonprice
competition
agreement
might
channel
distribution
large
specifically
advantaged
dealers
finally
observed
actual
price
charged
maximum
price
scheme
nearly
always
fixed
maximum
price
increasingly
likely
maximum
price
approaches
actual
cost
dealer
scheme
tends
acquire
attributes
arrangement
fixing
minimum
prices
ibid
respondent
alleges
suffered
losses
result
competition
firms
following
vertical
agreement
albrecht
held
agreement
per
se
unlawful
potential
effects
dealers
consumers
effect
competitors
respondent
asserted
injury
competitor
resemble
potential
dangers
described
albrecht
example
vertical
agreement
fixes
aximum
prices
low
dealer
furnish
services
desired
consumers
way
channel
business
large
distributors
firm
dealing
competing
brand
harmed
respondent
benefited
rather
harmed
petitioner
pricing
policies
restricted
arco
sales
large
dealers
prevented
petitioner
dealers
offering
services
desired
consumers
credit
card
sales
even
agreement
ultimately
acquired
attributes
scheme
respondent
still
suffered
antitrust
injury
higher
arco
prices
worked
usa
advantage
competitor
may
complain
conspiracies
set
minimum
prices
level
matsushita
electric
industrial
zenith
radio
see
also
espondents
recover
damages
conspiracy
petitioners
charge
higher
competitive
prices
market
conduct
indeed
violate
sherman
act
injure
respondents
petitioners
competitors
respondents
stand
gain
conspiracy
raise
market
price
indeed
gravamen
respondent
complaint
scheme
petitioner
dealers
enabled
dealers
increase
sales
amounts
assertion
dangers
concerned
albrecht
materialized
instant
case
sum
respondent
suffered
antitrust
injury
since
losses
flow
aspects
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
render
illegal
respondent
argues
even
harmed
anticompetitive
effects
identified
albrecht
nonetheless
suffered
antitrust
injury
low
prices
produced
vertical
restraint
disagree
firm
even
group
firms
adhering
vertical
agreement
lowers
prices
maintains
predatory
levels
business
lost
rivals
viewed
anticompetitive
consequence
claimed
violation
firm
complaining
harm
suffers
nonpredatory
price
competition
really
claiming
unable
raise
prices
blair
harrison
rethinking
antitrust
injury
vand
rev
antitrust
injury
indeed
cutting
prices
order
increase
business
often
essence
competition
matsushita
supra
antitrust
laws
enacted
protection
competition
competitors
brown
shoe
emphasis
original
hold
antitrust
laws
protect
competitors
loss
profits
due
nonpredatory
price
competition
effect
render
illegal
decision
firm
cut
prices
order
increase
market
share
cargill
respondent
argues
inappropriate
require
showing
predatory
pricing
antitrust
injury
established
asserted
antitrust
violation
agreement
restraint
trade
illegal
sherman
act
rather
attempt
monopolize
prohibited
respondent
notes
two
sections
act
quite
different
price
fixing
violates
example
even
single
firm
decision
price
level
create
liability
see
generally
copperweld
independence
tube
case
price
agreement
illegal
respondent
contends
losses
flowing
agreement
must
definition
constitute
antitrust
injuries
respondent
observes
general
per
se
rule
particular
grounded
faith
price
competition
market
force
policy
low
selling
prices
price
eliminating
competition
arizona
maricopa
county
medical
society
quoting
rahl
price
competition
price
fixing
rule
preface
perspective
nw
rev
sum
respondent
maintains
suffered
antitrust
injury
even
petitioner
pricing
predatory
sherman
act
reject
respondent
argument
although
vertical
agreement
unlawful
sherman
act
cause
competitor
antitrust
injury
unless
results
predatory
pricing
antitrust
injury
arise
purposes
clayton
act
see
supra
private
party
adversely
affected
anticompetitive
aspect
defendant
conduct
see
brunswick
context
pricing
practices
predatory
pricing
requisite
anticompetitive
effect
see
areeda
turner
predatory
pricing
related
practices
section
sherman
act
harv
rev
mcgee
predatory
pricing
revisited
law
econ
low
prices
benefit
consumers
regardless
prices
set
long
predatory
levels
threaten
competition
hence
give
rise
antitrust
injury
adhered
principle
regardless
type
antitrust
claim
involved
cargill
monfort
colorado
example
found
plaintiff
competitor
shown
antitrust
injury
thus
challenge
merger
assumed
illegal
clayton
act
even
though
merged
company
threatened
engage
vigorous
price
competition
reduce
plaintiff
profits
observed
nonpredatory
price
competition
increased
market
share
reflected
prices
market
price
even
costs
firm
rivals
activity
forbidden
antitrust
laws
prices
charged
predatory
found
antitrust
injury
similarly
determined
antitrust
injury
absent
brunswick
pueblo
supra
even
though
plaintiffs
alleged
illegal
acquisition
threatened
bring
deep
pocket
parent
market
pygmies
scenario
cause
plaintiffs
economic
harm
opined
nevertheless
plaintiffs
injured
reason
anything
forbidden
antitrust
laws
plaintiffs
loss
occurred
reason
unlawful
acquisitions
occur
reason
made
acquisitions
unlawful
sure
source
price
competition
instant
case
agreement
allegedly
unlawful
sherman
act
rather
merger
violation
clayton
act
difference
salient
prices
predatory
losses
flowing
said
stem
anticompetitive
aspect
defendant
conduct
interest
competition
permit
dominant
firms
engage
vigorous
competition
including
price
competition
cargill
quoting
arthur
langenderfer
johnson
cert
denied
also
reject
respondent
suggestion
antitrust
injury
need
shown
per
se
violation
involved
per
se
rule
method
determining
whether
sherman
act
violated
indicate
whether
private
plaintiff
suffered
antitrust
injury
thus
whether
may
recover
damages
clayton
act
per
se
analysis
two
methods
determining
whether
restraint
unreasonable
whether
anticompetitive
effects
outweigh
procompetitive
effects
per
se
rule
presumption
unreasonableness
based
business
certainty
litigation
efficiency
arizona
maricopa
county
medical
society
represents
longstanding
judgment
prohibited
practices
nature
substantial
potential
impact
competition
ftc
superior
trial
lawyers
quoting
jefferson
parish
hospital
dist
hyde
experience
particular
kind
restraint
enables
predict
confidence
rule
reason
condemn
applied
conclusive
presumption
restraint
unreasonable
maricopa
county
medical
society
supra
purpose
antitrust
injury
requirement
different
ensures
harm
claimed
plaintiff
corresponds
rationale
finding
violation
antitrust
laws
first
place
prevents
losses
stem
competition
supporting
suits
private
plaintiffs
either
damages
equitable
relief
actions
per
se
unlawful
antitrust
laws
may
nonetheless
procompetitive
effects
private
parties
might
suffer
losses
therefrom
see
maricopa
county
medical
society
supra
continental
gte
sylvania
conduct
violation
antitrust
laws
may
three
effects
often
interwoven
respects
conduct
may
reduce
competition
respects
may
increase
competition
still
respects
effects
may
neutral
competition
antitrust
injury
requirement
ensures
plaintiff
recover
loss
stems
aspect
effect
defendant
behavior
need
showing
least
great
per
se
rule
rule
reason
indeed
insofar
per
se
rule
permits
prohibition
efficient
practices
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cases
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se
violations
right
action
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act
available
private
plaintiffs
suffered
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example
case
involving
horizontal
price
fixing
perhaps
paradigm
unreasonable
restraint
trade
national
collegiate
athletic
assn
board
regents
university
oklahoma
observed
plaintiffs
still
required
show
conspiracy
caused
injury
antitrust
laws
provide
relief
matsushita
citing
brunswick
emphasis
added
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associated
general
contractors
california
carpenters
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trade
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se
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condemned
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proof
actual
market
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may
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course
necessarily
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party
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laws
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meaning
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dilute
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find
need
encourage
private
enforcement
competitors
rule
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
scheme
causes
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consequences
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consumers
manufacturers
dealers
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class
persons
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motivate
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public
interest
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limits
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rev
competitor
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respondent
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comes
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summary
judgment
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underlying
facts
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electric
industrial
zenith
radio
quoting
diebold
district
granted
petitioner
motion
dismiss
claim
originally
pleaded
supp
respondent
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amended
claim
shortly
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judgment
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voluntarily
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app
appeals
framed
issue
whether
competitor
injuries
resulting
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
fall
within
category
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added
purposes
case
likewise
assume
petitioner
pricing
predatory
nature
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indiana
grocery
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valu
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local
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supply
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jack
walters
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morton
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price
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per
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rule
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case
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seagram
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competition
among
dealers
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additional
horizontal
component
however
see
arizona
maricopa
county
medical
society
since
agreement
two
suppliers
agreed
sell
liquor
wholesalers
adhering
maximum
prices
wholesalers
resell
supra
appeals
implied
antitrust
injury
requirement
satisfied
showing
effect
agreements
eliminate
retailers
ultimately
reduce
competition
disagree
rivals
excluded
long
run
nonpredatory
scheme
unless
relatively
inefficient
even
false
however
firm
claim
antitrust
injury
nonpredatory
price
competition
asserted
ground
ruinous
cf
topco
associates
oil
statutory
policy
precludes
inquiry
question
whether
competition
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national
society
professional
engineers
appeals
erred
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respondent
satisfied
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injury
requirement
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removal
elements
price
competition
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markets
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participants
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assumed
disrupt
distort
competition
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areeda
hovenkamp
antitrust
law
respondent
theory
equate
injury
fact
antitrust
injury
declined
adopt
approach
brunswick
pueblo
cargill
monfort
colorado
reject
today
antitrust
injury
requirement
met
broad
allegations
harm
market
abstract
entity
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violations
per
se
rule
analysis
distort
market
every
loss
stemming
violation
counts
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injury
deny
vertical
scheme
may
facilitate
predatory
pricing
supplier
example
reduce
prices
downstream
dealers
share
losses
forcing
competing
dealers
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full
loss
imposed
lower
prices
cf
ftc
sun
oil
firm
always
able
challenge
directly
rival
pricing
predatory
reason
dispense
antitrust
injury
requirement
action
competitor
vertical
agreement
reach
contrary
conclusion
matsushita
electric
industrial
zenith
radio
declined
define
precisely
term
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pricing
stated
instead
purposes
case
enough
note
respondents
suffered
antitrust
injury
unless
petitioners
conspired
drive
respondents
relevant
markets
pricing
level
necessary
sell
products
ii
pricing
appropriate
measure
cost
statement
imply
losses
nonpredatory
pricing
might
qualify
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injury
quite
careful
limit
discussion
case
predatory
pricing
see
ibid
nonpredatory
prices
cause
antitrust
injury
leave
respondents
position
market
forces
noted
xcept
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conspiracy
monopolize
market
predatory
pricing
alleged
conspiracies
caused
respondents
suffer
antitrust
injury
also
observed
respondents
must
show
conspiracy
caused
injury
antitrust
laws
provide
relief
showing
depends
turn
proof
petitioners
conspired
price
predatorily
american
market
since
conduct
involved
alleged
conspiracy
caused
injury
citations
omitted
see
also
cargill
supra
interpreting
decision
matsushita
occasion
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case
consider
proper
definition
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pricing
determine
whether
dictum
matsushita
predatory
pricing
might
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pricing
level
necessary
sell
offender
products
accurate
statement
law
see
supra
appeals
purported
distinguish
cargill
brunswick
ground
cases
turned
attenuated
indirect
relationship
alleged
violation
illegal
merger
plaintiffs
injury
disagree
cases
described
injury
flowing
directly
alleged
antitrust
violation
see
cargill
supra
brunswick
supra
per
se
rules
rule
reason
employed
form
judgment
competitive
significance
restraint
national
collegiate
athletic
assn
board
regents
university
oklahoma
quoting
national
society
professional
engineers
hether
ultimate
finding
product
presumption
actual
market
analysis
essential
inquiry
remains
whether
challenged
restraint
enhances
competition
manufacturer
provides
dealer
exclusive
area
within
distribute
product
manufacturer
decision
fix
maximum
resale
price
may
actually
protect
consumers
exploitation
dealer
acting
local
monopolist
manufacturer
acts
altruism
course
desire
increase
sales
whereas
dealer
incentive
like
monopolist
reduce
output
increase
price
exclusive
dealership
efficient
means
distribution
public
served
forcing
manufacturer
abandon
method
resort
competing
distributors
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
thus
may
procompetitive
interbrand
effects
even
per
se
illegal
potential
effects
dealers
consumers
see
albrecht
herald
harlan
dissenting
maximum
price
ceilings
lessen
horizontal
competition
instead
drive
prices
toward
level
set
intense
competition
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ing
retailers
wholesalers
reaping
monopoly
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profits
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acknowledged
albrecht
aximum
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price
fixing
may
different
consequences
many
situations
procompetitive
potential
vertical
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price
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evident
albrecht
decided
exclusive
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arrangements
nonprice
restrictions
unlawful
per
se
see
arnold
schwinn
agreements
currently
subject
scrutiny
making
monopolistic
behavior
dealers
likely
see
monsanto
service
continental
gte
sylvania
many
commentators
identified
procompetitive
effects
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
see
areeda
hovenkamp
antitrust
law
supp
blair
harrison
rethinking
antitrust
injury
vand
rev
blair
schafer
evolutionary
models
legal
change
albrecht
rule
antitrust
bull
bork
rule
reason
per
se
concept
price
fixing
market
division
part
yale
easterbrook
maximum
price
fixing
chi
rev
hovenkamp
vertical
integration
newspaper
monopolist
iowa
rev
polden
antitrust
standing
rule
resale
price
maintenance
cleveland
state
rev
turner
durability
relevance
future
american
antitrust
policy
rev
justice
stevens
justice
white
joins
dissenting
today
purportedly
defines
contours
antitrust
injury
result
vertical
nonpredatory
scheme
much
reasoning
constitutes
injury
actionable
competitor
apply
even
alleged
conspiracy
joined
major
oil
companies
business
california
well
retail
outlets
undermines
enforceability
substantive
violation
flawed
construction
erroneously
assuming
level
price
fixed
conspiracy
relevant
legality
vertical
arrangements
conform
single
model
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analysis
turns
characterization
usa
cause
action
appropriate
begin
complete
description
usa
theory
case
comes
us
review
summary
judgment
assume
truth
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allegation
arco
conspired
retail
dealers
fix
price
gas
specific
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stations
compete
directly
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stations
conceded
conspiracy
per
se
violation
sherman
act
usa
theory
expressed
following
hypothetical
example
free
market
arco
advertised
gas
might
command
price
per
gallon
usa
unadvertised
gas
might
sell
penny
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retailers
brands
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stations
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price
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price
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market
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actor
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rests
premise
resources
conspirators
combined
coordinated
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selected
localities
long
enough
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usa
shift
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markets
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normal
return
investment
thus
initial
period
competitive
struggle
conspirators
independents
consumers
presumably
benefit
artificially
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prices
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campaign
successful
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case
comes
us
must
assume
long
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competition
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independents
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place
usa
alleges
fact
independent
market
already
suffered
significant
losses
ii
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alleged
conspiracy
naked
price
restraint
violation
sherman
act
undisputed
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arrangement
alleged
illegal
per
se
rule
maximum
price
fixing
faith
price
competition
market
force
policy
low
selling
prices
price
eliminating
competition
rahl
price
competition
price
fixing
rule
preface
perspective
nw
rev
arizona
maricopa
county
medical
society
issue
whether
maximum
price
administered
host
retail
stations
ostensibly
competing
one
another
well
retailers
may
challenged
competitor
targeted
pricing
scheme
section
clayton
act
allows
private
enforcement
antitrust
laws
person
shall
injured
business
property
reason
anything
forbidden
antitrust
laws
see
simpson
union
oil
california
quoting
radovich
national
football
league
laws
allowing
private
enforcement
antitrust
laws
aggrieved
party
victims
forbidden
practices
well
public
order
invoke
plaintiff
must
prove
suffered
injury
type
antitrust
laws
intended
prevent
flows
makes
defendants
acts
unlawful
brunswick
pueblo
brunswick
plaintiff
businesses
claimed
deprived
benefits
increased
concentration
resulted
failing
businesses
acquired
petitioner
allegedly
violation
concluding
plaintiffs
failed
prove
antitrust
injury
found
neither
condition
standing
satisfied
first
plaintiffs
sought
recover
damages
mergers
preserved
businesses
competition
type
injury
antitrust
laws
designed
prevent
second
plaintiffs
harmed
potential
change
market
structure
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entry
deep
pocket
parent
case
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conditions
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met
first
intended
forbid
conspiracies
designed
drive
competitors
market
see
klor
stores
illegal
coordination
tolerated
merely
victim
one
merchant
whose
business
small
destruction
makes
little
difference
economy
usa
alleges
arco
pricing
scheme
aims
forcing
independent
refiners
marketers
business
created
immediate
growing
probability
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segment
industry
destroyed
altogether
brunswick
recognized
requiring
competitor
show
loss
type
antitrust
laws
intended
prevent
necessarily
mean
plaintiffs
must
prove
actual
lessening
competition
order
recover
effect
certain
anticompetitive
behavior
predatory
pricing
example
may
stimulate
price
competition
competitors
may
able
prove
antitrust
injury
actually
driven
market
competition
thereby
lessened
second
usa
directly
immediately
harmed
scheme
say
makes
defendants
acts
unlawful
brunswick
allegedly
illegal
conduct
issue
merger
harm
plaintiffs
similarly
cargill
monfort
colorado
alleged
injury
arose
illegality
proposed
merger
merely
possible
postmerger
behavior
although
link
illegal
mergers
alleged
harms
insufficient
prove
antitrust
injury
either
brunswick
cargill
cases
recognize
illegal
pricing
practices
may
cause
competitors
antitrust
injury
accepts
alleged
vertical
scheme
arco
per
se
illegal
nevertheless
denies
usa
standing
challenge
arrangement
neither
consumer
dealer
vertical
arrangement
competitor
arco
antitrust
laws
enacted
protection
competition
competitors
ante
quoting
brown
shoe
proposition
often
used
test
whether
violation
law
occurred
read
deny
remedial
actions
competitors
competitors
injured
illicit
agreements
among
rivals
rather
free
play
market
forces
antitrust
laws
protect
competitors
precisely
purpose
protecting
competition
nevertheless
interprets
proposition
categorically
excluding
actions
competitor
suffers
others
charge
nonpredatory
prices
pursuant
vertical
scheme
ante
context
violation
however
distinctions
price
level
vertical
nature
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unfounded
two
analytical
errors
merits
discussion
iii
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cases
noncompetitive
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ante
essentially
assuming
nonpredatory
price
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see
supra
quite
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unlike
prohibitions
monopolizing
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violation
gravamen
conspiracy
condemned
unrelated
level
administered
price
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point
time
price
fixed
single
seller
acting
independently
may
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predatory
reasonableness
price
set
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conspiracy
wholly
irrelevant
whether
conspirators
work
product
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proposition
firmly
settled
law
antitrust
rule
reasonableness
particular
price
agreed
upon
defendants
constitute
defense
charge
trenton
potteries
explained
reasonable
price
fixed
today
may
economic
business
changes
become
unreasonable
price
tomorrow
cautioned
absence
express
legislation
requiring
hesitate
adopt
construction
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difference
legal
illegal
conduct
field
business
relations
depend
upon
uncertain
test
whether
prices
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determination
satisfactorily
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complete
survey
economic
organization
choice
rival
philosophies
true
cases
courts
mistaking
conceive
proper
limits
relaxation
rules
determining
unreasonableness
restraints
trade
set
sail
sea
doubt
assumed
power
say
respect
contracts
purpose
consideration
either
side
mutual
restraint
parties
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competition
public
interest
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addyston
pipe
steel
iv
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careful
limit
holding
cases
involving
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agreements
thinly
veiled
circumscription
substantive
reach
simply
interprets
antitrust
injury
excludes
challenges
competitor
alleging
vertical
conspiracy
vertical
scheme
may
facilitate
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pricing
ut
firm
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able
challenge
directly
rival
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reason
dispense
antitrust
injury
requirement
action
competitor
vertical
agreement
ante
focus
vertical
character
agreement
misleading
incorrectly
assumes
sharp
distinction
vertical
horizontal
arrangements
assumes
vertical
arrangements
affect
competition
way
characterization
arco
arrangement
vertical
limit
potential
consequences
neat
category
injuries
horizontal
conspiracy
among
arco
retailers
administered
example
trade
association
executives
instead
executives
common
supplier
generate
exactly
anticompetitive
consequences
arco
retail
dealers
share
interest
excluding
independents
like
usa
market
fact
member
group
price
fixers
may
made
separate
individual
agreement
common
agent
destroy
horizontal
character
agreement
held
masonite
case
doubt
combination
illegal
per
se
sherman
act
trenton
potteries
ethyl
gasoline
oil
true
though
district
found
negotiating
entering
first
agreements
appellee
masonite
acted
independently
others
negotiated
masonite
desired
agreement
regardless
action
might
taken
others
require
condition
acceptance
masonite
make
agreement
others
discussions
others
prices
fixed
agreed
upon
oil
supra
fixing
prices
one
member
group
pursuant
express
delegation
acquiescence
understanding
illegal
fixing
prices
direct
joint
action
id
finally
treatment
vertical
arrangements
necessarily
assumes
conspiracies
competitive
consequences
ante
quite
wrong
example
price
agreement
ancillary
exclusive
distributorship
might
protect
consumers
attempt
distributor
exploit
limited
monopoly
however
conclusion
agreement
cause
antitrust
injury
lends
support
holding
illegal
price
arrangement
designed
drive
competitor
business
immune
challenge
intended
victim
conspiracy
case
always
ask
defendants
elected
act
concert
rather
independently
although
certain
situations
collective
action
may
actually
foster
competition
see
national
collegiate
athletic
assn
board
regents
university
oklahoma
normally
presume
free
market
functions
effectively
individual
entrepreneurs
act
independently
true
respect
maximum
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pricing
arrangements
professor
sullivan
recognized
producers
fixing
maximum
prices
acting
undiluted
altruism
goals
prevention
new
entries
market
sullivan
law
antitrust
described
broad
policy
reasons
prohibit
collusive
pricing
policy
insists
individual
decisions
price
thus
source
preference
independence
small
businessman
though
surely
preference
lower
prices
policy
usually
yield
consumers
though
strongly
present
also
work
theoretical
conviction
general
function
competitive
process
allocation
reallocation
resources
rational
yet
automatic
manner
carried
independence
trader
scrupulously
required
created
confluence
parallel
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policy
breadth
makes
forbidding
maximum
price
arrangements
common
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price
decreases
fact
courts
limited
utility
examining
difficult
economic
problems
inability
weigh
meaningful
sense
destruction
competition
one
sector
economy
promotion
competition
another
sector
one
important
reason
formulated
per
se
rules
applying
rigid
rules
consistently
rejected
notion
naked
restraints
trade
tolerated
well
intended
allegedly
developed
increase
competition
general
motors
masonite
fashion
originators
guild
ftc
explained
american
tobacco
danger
deemed
arise
individual
liberty
public
acts
like
record
exhibits
led
legislative
mind
conceive
enact
act
conspiracy
alleged
complaint
poses
kind
threat
individual
liberty
free
market
sherman
act
enacted
prevent
holding
conspiracy
immune
challenge
intended
victim
unfaithful
history
respect
charter
freedom
respectfully
dissent
example
reasons
low
prices
benefit
consumers
regardless
prices
set
long
predatory
levels
threaten
competition
hence
give
rise
antitrust
injury
ante
prices
predatory
losses
flowing
said
stem
anticompetitive
aspect
defendant
conduct
ante
arco
engaged
limit
pricing
practices
prices
deliberately
set
gasoline
level
competitors
cost
purpose
effect
making
impossible
plaintiff
independents
compete
example
arco
sold
gasoline
ex
tax
retail
pump
less
independents
plaintiff
purchase
gasoline
wholesale
amended
complaint
app
arco
organized
resale
price
maintenance
scheme
direct
result
competition
otherwise
exist
among
dealers
eliminated
agreement
retail
price
gasoline
fixed
stabilized
maintained
artificially
low
uncompetitive
levels
amended
complaint
app
may
arco
accomplished
objectives
independently
merely
reducing
prices
sufficiently
induce
retail
customers
charge
abnormally
low
prices
divert
business
usa
stations
see
amended
complaint
app
independent
action
arco
followed
independent
action
retail
customers
course
lawful
even
produced
consequences
alleged
conspiratorial
program
see
parke
davis
indeed
full
trial
might
establish
happened
nevertheless
case
comes
us
assume
arco
architect
illegal
conspiracy
last
years
still
steady
continuous
reduction
competitive
effectiveness
independent
refiners
marketers
selling
california
western
time
period
dozen
large
independents
sold
liquidated
drastically
curtailed
operations
many
independent
retail
stations
closed
barriers
entry
market
high
today
barriers
effectively
insurmountable
independent
eliminated
highly
unlikely
replaced
amended
complaint
app
long
held
sherman
act
combination
purpose
effect
raising
depressing
fixing
pegging
stabilizing
price
commodity
interstate
foreign
commerce
illegal
per
se
oil
see
also
joseph
seagram
sons
maximum
resale
prices
monsanto
service
vertical
resale
prices
albrecht
herald
vertical
maximum
resale
prices
usa
amended
complaint
specifically
alleges
direct
proximate
result
combinations
conspiracy
acts
taken
furtherance
thereof
price
gasoline
artificially
fixed
maintained
stabilized
independent
refiners
marketers
suffered
substantial
losses
sales
profits
ability
compete
seriously
impaired
independent
refiners
marketers
gone
business
taken
arco
immediate
growing
probability
independent
segment
industry
destroyed
altogether
control
discount
market
acquired
arco
app
brunswick
pueblo
analysis
cargill
monfort
colorado
also
supports
conclusion
respondent
alleged
antitrust
injury
alternative
theories
first
challenged
merger
petitioners
company
able
lower
prices
efficient
second
might
attempt
drive
respondent
business
engaging
sustained
predatory
pricing
rejected
first
theory
independent
decisions
reduce
prices
based
efficiencies
legal
precisely
antitrust
laws
intended
encourage
rejected
second
theory
respondent
neither
raised
proved
claim
predatory
pricing
district
however
discussing
second
theory
recognized
predatory
pricing
practice
harms
competitors
competition
aims
elimination
competition
thus
practice
inimical
purposes
antitrust
laws
brunswick
one
capable
inflicting
antitrust
injury
omitted
competitor
suffers
antitrust
injury
illegal
conspiracy
setting
prices
designed
eliminate
suffer
single
firm
setting
predatory
prices
see
also
blair
harrison
rethinking
antitrust
injury
vand
rev
unsuccessful
predatory
efforts
cause
antitrust
injury
even
though
consumers
suffered
agree
every
loss
causally
related
antitrust
violation
antitrust
injury
ante
scheme
prices
services
conspirators
competitors
may
cause
injury
competitor
may
recover
damages
blue
shield
virginia
mccready
presumed
injury
competitors
strong
enough
support
even
indirect
action
patient
competitor
petitioners
medical
insurance
company
organization
psychiatrists
conspired
violation
compensate
patients
services
psychiatrists
psychologists
recognized
patients
chosen
go
psychiatrists
antitrust
injury
borne
first
instance
psychologist
competitors
conspirators
instead
patient
mccready
went
psychologist
expense
held
lthough
mccready
competitor
conspirators
injury
suffered
inextricably
intertwined
injury
conspirators
sought
inflict
psychologists
psychotherapy
market
see
trenton
potteries
see
also
freight
addyston
pipe
steel
association
defendants
however
reasonable
prices
fixed
however
great
competition
encounter
however
great
necessity
curbing
joint
agreement
committing
financial
suicide
competition
void
common
law
restraint
trade
tending
monopoly
like
determination
reasonable
price
determination
predatory
price
far
certain
declines
define
predatory
pricing
purpose
inquiry
creates
today
ante
predatory
pricing
conspiracy
rather
single
actor
may
result
pricing
appropriate
measure
cost
see
matsushita
electric
industrial
zenith
radio
see
also
poultry
farms
rose
acre
farms
describing
many
considerations
single
firm
case
make
difficult
infer
predatory
conduct
relation
price
cost
thus
victim
vertical
conspiracy
successfully
driving
market
bring
action
long
conspirators
take
care
fix
prices
nonpredatory
levels
masonite
see
also
ante
suggesting
horizontal
component
arrangement
business
electronics
sharp
electronics
stevens
dissenting
indeed
elsewhere
acknowledges
aximum
minimum
price
fixing
may
different
consequences
many
situations
ante
quoting
albrecht
quite
true
see
arizona
maricopa
county
medical
society
per
se
rule
maximum
prices
guards
elimination
competition
discouraging
entry
market
deterring
experimentation
allowing
hidden
price
setting
continental
gte
sylvania
vertical
price
fixing
reduces
interbrand
intrabrand
competition
may
facilitate
cartelizing
sylvania
also
recognized
congress
recently
expressed
approval
per
se
analysis
vertical
price
restrictions
repealing
provisions
mcguire
acts
allowing
pricing
option
individual
ibid
see
also
white
motor
brennan
concurring
resale
price
maintenance
designed
almost
invariably
fact
reduce
price
competition
among
sellers
affected
product
quite
much
product
competing
brands
grudgingly
assume
arguendo
albrecht
correctly
held
vertical
maximum
price
fixing
subject
per
se
rule
ante
seeks
limit
holding
potential
effects
dealers
consumers
competitors
ante
however
zeal
narrow
antitrust
injury
assumes
vertical
arrangements
mimic
circumstances
present
discussed
albrecht
monopoly
power
production
exclusive
distributorship
stages
approach
incorrect
example
albrecht
identified
possible
injury
consumers
one
basis
per
se
rule
even
though
evidence
actual
consumer
injury
case
furthermore
albrecht
treat
albrecht
dealer
conspiracy
essentially
competitor
targeted
conspiracy
herald
company
new
dealers
hired
force
petitioner
conform
advertised
retail
price
selling
newspapers
territory
lower
fixed
prices
although
albrecht
potential
herald
dealer
thus
strictly
dealer
competitor
use
terms
critical
standing
bring
action
victim
vertical
conspiracy
underprice
sales
finally
contradicts
contrived
model
admits
vertical
schemes
may
facilitate
predatory
pricing
competitor
suffer
antitrust
injury
violation
ante
today
clearly
understood
fundamentally
differs
antitrust
violations
reason
congress
treated
concerted
behavior
strictly
unilateral
behavior
readily
appreciated
concerted
activity
inherently
fraught
anticompetitive
risk
deprives
marketplace
independent
centers
decisionmaking
competition
assumes
demands
conspiracy
two
entities
previously
pursued
interests
separately
combining
act
one
common
benefit
reduces
diverse
directions
economic
power
aimed
suddenly
increases
economic
power
moving
one
particular
direction
course
mergings
resources
may
well
lead
efficiencies
benefit
consumers
anticompetitive
potential
sufficient
warrant
scrutiny
even
absence
incipient
monopoly
copperweld
independence
tube
see
ante
rivals
excluded
long
run
nonpredatory
scheme
unless
relatively
inefficient
ante
nsofar
per
se
rule
permits
prohibition
efficient
practices
name
simplicity
need
antitrust
injury
requirement
underscored
firms
may
properly
go
business
inefficient
market
inefficiencies
may
also
create
imperfections
leading
firms
demise
sanctions
new
force
illegally
combined
group
firms
target
resources
drive
otherwise
competitive
firm
business
cf
note
sales
buying
market
share
stan
rev
discussing
displacement
otherwise
efficient
producers
pricing
buy
market
share
geographic
area
chief
justice
hughes
regarded
sherman
act
charter
freedom
appalachian
coals
judge
learned
hand
recognized
congress
desire
strengthen
small
business
concerns
put
end
great
aggregations
capital
helplessness
individual
aluminum
america
recently
reaffirmed
sherman
act
magna
carta
free
enterprise
topco
associates
see
also
handler
antitrust
centennial
time
obsequies
renewed
faith
national
policy
cardozo
rev
hovenkamp
distributive
justice
antitrust
laws
geo
rev
flynn
ponsoldt
legal
reasoning
jurisprudence
vertical
restraints
limitations
neoclassical
economic
analysis
resolution
antitrust
disputes
rev
discussing
political
social
moral
well
economic
goals
motivating
congress
enacting
antitrust
legislation
see
simpson
union
oil
california
see
also
polden
antitrust
standing
rule
resale
price
maintenance
clev
rev
furthers
congressional
objectives
deterrence
compensation
allowing
private
suits
injured
competitors
blair
harrison
vand
treating
losses
firms
targeted
unsuccessful
predatory
efforts
antitrust
injury
furthers
private
enforcement
antitrust
laws
avoids
suboptimal
levels
deterrence
appeals
observed
barring
competitor
standing
leaves
enforcement
vast
majority
unlawful
maximum
resale
price
agreements
hands
unenthusiastic
department
justice
certain
circumstances
dealers
parties
resale
price
maintenance
agreement
appalachian
coals