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system
century
come
possess
overwhelming
monopoly
power
telephone
markets
nationwide
supplying
services
well
equipment
vietor
see
also
garnet
telephone
enterprise
evolution
bell
system
horizontal
structure
pp
appendix
pervasive
market
presence
bell
providers
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provide
cross
subsidies
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gas
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reviewing
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gas
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hope
natural
gas
hope
natural
gas
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gas
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gas
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douglas
murphy
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gas
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utility
rate
base
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utilities
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rule
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value
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hand
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capitalization
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smyth
protect
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capacity
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assets
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tardiff
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telecommunications
act
three
years
economic
evaluation
implementation
federal
communications
commission
information
economics
policy
hereinafter
kahn
telecommunications
act
time
rule
intended
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utilities
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mimic
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eye
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markets
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ratepayer
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market
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support
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utilities
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markets
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encourage
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final
stage
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monopolies
great
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lay
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away
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common
methods
monopolistic
structure
within
discrete
markets
endure
provisions
act
congress
called
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achieve
entirely
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private
industry
order
let
competitors
come
try
beat
economic
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let
business
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bottleneck
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legislation
says
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congress
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ratesetting
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interests
sellers
buyers
reorganize
markets
rendering
regulated
utilities
monopolies
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interlopers
even
meant
swallowing
traditional
federal
reluctance
intrude
local
telephone
markets
approach
deliberate
hybrid
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scheme
fcc
setting
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methodology
use
setting
rates
carriers
fail
agree
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state
utility
commissions
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actual
rates
act
like
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many
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sales
see
implementation
local
competition
telecommunications
act
fcc
rcd
first
report
order
favor
novel
ratesetting
designed
give
aspiring
competitors
every
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enter
local
retail
telephone
markets
short
confiscating
incumbents
property
physical
incarnation
market
local
exchange
network
connecting
terminals
like
telephones
faxes
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terminals
within
geographical
area
like
city
terminal
network
interface
devices
feeder
wires
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called
local
loop
run
local
switches
aggregate
traffic
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trunks
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loop
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still
largely
made
copper
wire
though
cable
also
used
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far
lesser
extent
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originally
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switches
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individual
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company
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exchange
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calls
incumbent
local
exchange
carrier
almost
insurmountable
competitive
advantage
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calls
within
exchange
control
local
market
markets
terminal
equipment
calling
well
newcomer
compete
incumbent
carrier
provide
local
service
without
coming
close
replicating
incumbent
entire
existing
network
costly
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part
laying
last
mile
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wire
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loop
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millions
terminal
points
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houses
incumbent
company
also
control
plant
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place
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carriers
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another
telecommunications
carrier
forced
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conditions
never
reach
customers
local
exchange
ii
act
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state
local
regulation
impedes
provision
telecommunications
service
obligates
incumbent
carriers
allow
competitors
enter
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markets
section
addresses
practical
difficulties
fostering
local
competition
recognizing
three
strategies
potential
competitor
may
pursue
first
competitor
entering
market
requesting
carrier
may
decide
engage
pure
competition
build
network
replace
supplement
network
incumbent
entrant
takes
course
act
obligates
incumbent
interconnect
competitor
facilities
network
whatever
extent
necessary
allow
competitor
facilities
operate
end
spectrum
statute
permits
entrant
skip
construction
instead
simply
buy
resell
telecommunications
service
incumbent
duty
sell
wholesale
extremes
entering
competitor
may
choose
lease
certain
incumbent
network
elements
incumbent
duty
provide
unbundled
basis
terms
reasonable
nondiscriminatory
since
wholesale
markets
companies
engaged
resale
leasing
interconnection
facilities
created
without
addressing
rates
congress
provided
rates
set
either
contracts
carriers
state
utility
commission
rate
orders
like
federal
utility
statutes
authorize
contracts
approved
regulatory
agency
setting
rates
businesses
federal
power
act
natural
gas
act
act
permits
incumbent
entering
carriers
negotiate
private
rate
agreements
see
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duty
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faith
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utility
commissions
required
accept
agreement
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carrier
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contract
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carrier
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state
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option
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requesting
carriers
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commissions
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regulation
rate
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fcc
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rates
attack
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months
effective
date
fcc
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first
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omitted
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aside
claim
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unreasonable
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entrants
presented
figures
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invested
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billion
since
passage
act
see
association
local
telecommunications
services
local
competition
policy
new
economy
hearing
house
committee
energy
commerce
ser
statement
james
henry
managing
general
partner
greenfield
hill
capital
llp
see
also
glover
epps
telecommunications
act
working
admin
rev
billion
invested
fcc
statistics
indicate
substantial
resort
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partial
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three
entry
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june
percent
entrants
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see
fcc
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june
tables
incumbents
contradict
figures
merely
speculate
investment
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note
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recently
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idea
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entrants
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suffices
say
regulatory
scheme
boast
substantial
competitive
capital
spending
period
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ncumbent
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communications
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info
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electronic
equipment
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equipment
telephone
handsets
computer
modems
fax
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buildings
private
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new
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law
entitles
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element
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firm
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element
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competition
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local
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requires
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price
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third
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lines
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third
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permits
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question
suppose
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control
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elements
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railroad
regulator
anxious
promote
railroad
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city
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wasteful
duplicate
certain
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bridge
across
mississippi
river
ordered
bridge
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share
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new
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elements
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communications
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fifth
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lodged
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utilities
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affirming
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view
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act
fcc
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third
report
order
given
pricing
rules
fledgling
competitors
ever
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investment
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armstrong
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common
carrier
status
telecommunications
reports
chief
executive
officer
supports
commission
regulations
cited
huber
company
invest
billions
dollars
competitors
invested
penny
capital
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risk
come
along
get
free
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risks
recognize
regulator
likely
enforce
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rules
strictly
investment
literally
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trickle
indeed
majority
cites
figures
showing
past
several
years
new
firms
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communications
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see
ante
know
much
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historical
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offers
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know
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might
compare
federal
communications
commission
statistics
common
carriers
edition
table
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communications
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statistics
common
carriers
edition
table
federal
communications
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edition
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communications
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carriers
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worldcom
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carriers
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regulations
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brandeis
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bell
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utilities
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third
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new
hampshire
telecommunications
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difficulties
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future
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affidavit
baumol
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willig
comments
cc
docket
matter
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telecommunications
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hubbard
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majority
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provide
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find
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affirm
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dissent
footnotes
together
worldcom
et
al
verizon
communications
et
federal
communications
commission
et
al
iowa
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board
et
iowa
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et
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certiorari
footnotes
justice
scalia
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part
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opinion
justice
thomas
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parts
iii
iv
section
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nationalization
historical
policy
choice
regulation
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service
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road
telephone
regulation
policy
history
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cohen
vogel
freer
markets
rules
regulatory
reform
advanced
industrial
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first
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principally
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civil
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stat
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unregulated
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weingarten
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review
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mankiw
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loop
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local
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state
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incumbent
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exchange
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carrier
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regard
standards
set
forth
subsections
section
title
agreement
shall
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detailed
schedule
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state
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rates
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order
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technical
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carlton
perloff
modern
industrial
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ed
hereinafter
carlton
perloff
sunk
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historical
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value
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sidak
spulber
tragedy
telecommons
government
pricing
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colum
rev
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opportunity
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oil
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mit
dictionary
modern
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say
reasonable
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order
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incorporated
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demonstrates
either
higher
lower
level
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capital
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conducting
rate
based
proceeding
justice
breyer
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propriety
chevron
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post
state
farm
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breyer
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fcc
rules
stressing
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prices
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discuss
policy
promoting
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lease
prices
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position
build
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infra
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infra
discussing
fcc
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ramsey
pricing
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justice
breyer
says
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incumbents
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statutory
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incumbents
lease
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carlton
perloff
michigan
state
commission
september
order
implementing
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first
report
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justice
breyer
characterizes
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breyer
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long
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compensating
incumbents
justice
breyer
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right
firms
share
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breyer
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incumbents
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service
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hundreds
smaller
entrants
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carrier
worldcom
seeking
gain
toeholds
markets
see
fcc
local
telephone
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june
firms
competitive
carriers
justice
breyer
elsewhere
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order
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competitors
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incumbents
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avail
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commission
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respect
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communications
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require
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justice
breyer
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desire
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sidak
spulber
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back
incumbents
lease
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support
justice
breyer
assertion
telric
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incumbents
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post
justice
breyer
notes
incumbents
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figure
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long
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invest
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incumbents
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underdepreciation
book
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increasing
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argument
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incumbent
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justice
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percent
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table
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justice
white
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make
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show
pricing
methodology
applied
result
confiscatory
rates
first
report
order
fcc
words
willing
consider
challenge
telric
advance
rate
order
challenger
needs
go
beyond
general
criticism
method
tendency
show
specific
information
confiscatory
rate
bound
result
additionally
fcc
acknowledged
smallest
rural
incumbent
carriers
likely
suffer
immediately
imposition
unduly
low
rates
expressly
exempt
telric
pricing
rules
see
first
report
order
rural
incumbents
may
obtain
exemptions
rules
applying
state
commissions
raise
issue
relevant
petition
certiorari
claims
see
pet
cert
iowa
utilities
pp
see
order
iowa
utilities
bd
fcc
etc
june
pp
briefs
also
address
whether
light
decision
take
action
respect
rules
incumbent
denies
requested
combination
burden
prove
technical
infeasibility
show
combination
impede
others
access
incumbent
lec
shall
make
available
without
unreasonable
delay
requesting
telecommunications
carrier
individual
interconnection
service
network
element
arrangement
contained
agreement
party
approved
state
commission
pursuant
section
act
upon
rates
terms
conditions
provided
agreement
cfr