west
lynn
creamery
healy
argued
march
decided
june
massachusetts
pricing
order
subjects
fluid
milk
sold
dealers
massachusetts
retailers
assessment
although
milk
produced
state
entire
assessment
distributed
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
petitioners
licensed
dealers
purchase
milk
produced
farmers
sell
within
massachusetts
sued
enjoin
enforcement
order
ground
violated
federal
commerce
clause
state
denied
relief
judicial
massachusetts
affirmed
concluding
order
facially
discriminatory
applied
evenhandedly
incidentally
burdened
interstate
commerce
burden
outweighed
local
benefits
dairy
industry
held
pricing
order
unconstitutionally
discriminates
interstate
commerce
pp
order
clearly
unconstitutional
decisions
invalidating
state
laws
designed
benefit
local
producers
goods
creating
barriers
neutralized
competitive
economic
advantages
possessed
lower
cost
producers
see
bacchus
imports
dias
premium
payments
effectively
tax
making
milk
produced
state
expensive
although
tax
also
applies
milk
produced
massachusetts
effect
massachusetts
producers
entirely
indeed
offset
subsidy
provided
exclusively
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
thereby
empowered
sell
price
charged
lower
cost
producers
pp
page
ii
respondent
principal
argument
local
subsidy
nondiscriminatory
tax
components
order
valid
combination
two
equally
valid
rejected
even
granting
respondent
assertion
components
pricing
order
constitutional
standing
alone
order
must
still
fall
funded
principally
taxes
sale
milk
produced
therefore
burdens
interstate
commerce
fundamentally
argument
logically
flawed
assumption
lawfulness
two
acts
establishes
legality
combination
indeed
conjoining
tax
subsidy
massachusetts
created
program
dangerous
interstate
commerce
either
part
alone
commonwealth
political
processes
relied
prevent
legislative
abuse
dairy
farmers
one
powerful
interests
ordinarily
expected
lobby
order
premium
tax
raising
milk
prices
mollified
subsidy
pp
respondent
second
argument
order
discriminatory
dealers
pay
premiums
competitors
farmers
receive
disbursements
withstand
scrutiny
imposition
differential
burden
part
stream
commerce
wholesaler
retailer
consumer
invalid
burden
placed
point
result
disadvantage
producer
pp
accepted
respondent
third
argument
order
protectionist
program
costs
borne
massachusetts
dealers
consumers
benefits
distributed
exclusively
massachusetts
farmers
undermine
almost
every
discriminatory
tax
case
state
taxes
ordinarily
paid
businesses
consumers
yet
discriminate
products
unconstitutional
fundamentally
argument
ignores
fact
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
part
integrated
interstate
market
obvious
impact
order
production
demonstrates
simply
wrong
assume
burdens
consumers
dealers
pp
acceptance
respondent
final
argument
order
incidental
burden
commerce
justified
local
benefit
saving
financially
distressed
dairy
industry
make
virtue
vice
rule
discrimination
condemns
preservation
local
industry
protecting
rigors
interstate
competition
hallmark
economic
protectionism
commerce
clause
prohibits
pp
stevens
delivered
opinion
kennedy
souter
ginsburg
joined
scalia
filed
opinion
concurring
judgment
thomas
joined
rehnquist
filed
dissenting
opinion
blackmun
joined
west
lynn
creamery
healy
justice
stevens
delivered
opinion
massachusetts
pricing
order
imposes
assessment
fluid
milk
sold
dealers
massachusetts
retailers
milk
produced
state
entire
assessment
however
distributed
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
question
presented
whether
pricing
order
unconstitutionally
discriminates
interstate
commerce
hold
petitioner
west
lynn
creamery
milk
dealer
licensed
business
massachusetts
purchases
raw
milk
processes
packages
sells
wholesalers
retailers
milk
dealers
raw
milk
purchases
produced
farmers
petitioner
lecomte
dairy
also
licensed
massachusetts
milk
dealer
purchases
milk
west
lynn
distributes
retail
outlets
massachusetts
since
agricultural
marketing
agreement
act
stat
amended
et
authorized
secretary
agriculture
regulate
west
lynn
creamery
healy
minimum
prices
paid
producers
raw
milk
issuing
marketing
orders
particular
geographic
areas
federal
government
sets
minimum
prices
based
local
conditions
prices
high
prevent
substantial
competition
among
producers
different
early
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
began
lose
market
share
lower
cost
producers
neighboring
response
governor
massachusetts
appointed
special
commission
study
dairy
industry
commission
found
many
producers
sold
dairy
farms
past
decade
prices
paid
farmers
milk
significantly
increased
majority
remaining
farmers
massachusetts
forced
business
within
year
app
january
west
lynn
creamery
healy
relying
commission
report
commissioner
massachusetts
department
food
agriculture
respondent
declared
state
emergency
declaration
noted
average
federal
blend
price
declined
per
hundred
pounds
cwt
raw
milk
costs
production
massachusetts
farmers
risen
estimated
average
concluded
regionally
industry
serious
trouble
ultimately
federal
solution
required
meantime
must
act
state
level
preserve
local
industry
maintain
reasonable
minimum
prices
dairy
farmers
thereby
ensure
continuous
adequate
supply
fresh
milk
market
protect
public
health
order
requires
every
dealer
massachusetts
make
monthly
premium
payment
massachusetts
dairy
equalization
fund
amount
payments
computed
two
steps
first
monthly
order
premium
determined
subtracting
federal
blend
price
month
dividing
west
lynn
creamery
healy
difference
three
thus
federal
price
order
premium
second
premium
multiplied
amount
pounds
dealer
class
sales
massachusetts
month
fund
distributed
massachusetts
producers
massachusetts
producer
receives
share
total
fund
equal
proportionate
contribution
state
total
production
raw
milk
petitioners
west
lynn
lecomte
complied
pricing
order
two
months
paying
almost
massachusetts
dairy
equalization
fund
starting
july
however
petitioners
refused
make
premium
payments
respondent
commenced
license
revocation
proceedings
petitioners
filed
action
state
seeking
west
lynn
creamery
healy
injunction
enforcement
order
ground
violated
commerce
clause
federal
constitution
state
denied
relief
respondent
conditionally
revoked
licenses
parties
agreed
expedited
appellate
procedure
judicial
massachusetts
transferred
cases
docket
affirmed
concluded
pricing
order
discriminate
face
evenhanded
application
incidentally
burdens
interstate
commerce
west
lynn
creamery
commissioner
dept
food
agriculture
mass
noted
pricing
order
designed
aid
massachusetts
producers
conceded
ommon
sense
indicated
plan
adverse
impact
interstate
commerce
fund
distribution
scheme
burden
producers
nevertheless
asserted
burden
incidental
given
purpose
design
program
found
local
benefits
provided
commonwealth
dairy
industry
outweigh
incidental
burden
interstate
commerce
sustained
constitutionality
pricing
order
granted
certiorari
reverse
ii
commerce
clause
vests
congress
ample
power
enact
legislation
providing
regulation
prices
paid
farmers
products
darby
wickard
filburn
mandeville
island
farms
american
crystal
sugar
affirmative
exercise
power
led
promulgation
federal
order
setting
minimum
milk
prices
west
lynn
creamery
healy
commerce
clause
also
limits
power
commonwealth
massachusetts
adopt
regulations
discriminate
interstate
commerce
negative
aspect
commerce
clause
prohibits
economic
protectionism
regulatory
measures
designed
benefit
economic
interests
burdening
competitors
thus
state
statutes
clearly
discriminate
interstate
commerce
routinely
struck
unless
discrimination
demonstrably
justified
valid
factor
unrelated
economic
protectionism
new
energy
indiana
limbach
paradigmatic
example
law
discriminating
interstate
commerce
protective
tariff
customs
duty
taxes
goods
imported
tax
similar
products
produced
state
tariff
attractive
measure
simultaneously
raises
revenue
benefits
local
producers
burdening
competitors
nevertheless
violates
principle
unitary
national
market
handicapping
competitors
thus
artificially
encouraging
production
even
goods
produced
lower
cost
distorting
effects
geography
production
tariffs
long
recognized
violative
commerce
clause
fact
tariffs
west
lynn
creamery
healy
products
patently
unconstitutional
cases
reveal
single
attempt
state
enact
one
instead
cases
filled
state
laws
aspire
reap
benefits
tariffs
means
baldwin
seelig
state
new
york
attempted
protect
dairy
farmers
adverse
effects
vermont
competition
establishing
single
minimum
price
milk
whether
produced
new
york
elsewhere
hesitate
however
strike
writing
unanimous
justice
cardozo
reasoned
neither
power
tax
police
power
may
used
state
destination
aim
effect
establishing
economic
barrier
competition
products
another
state
labor
residents
restrictions
contrived
unreasonable
clog
upon
mobility
commerce
set
equivalent
rampart
customs
duties
designed
neutralize
advantages
belonging
place
origin
west
lynn
creamery
healy
cases
massachusetts
pricing
order
clearly
unconstitutional
avowed
purpose
undisputed
effect
enable
higher
cost
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
compete
lower
cost
dairy
farmers
premium
payments
effectively
tax
makes
milk
produced
state
expensive
although
tax
also
applies
milk
produced
massachusetts
effect
massachusetts
producers
entirely
indeed
offset
subsidy
provided
exclusively
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
like
ordinary
tariff
tax
thus
effectively
imposed
products
pricing
order
thus
allows
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
produce
higher
cost
sell
price
charged
lower
cost
producers
west
lynn
creamery
healy
federal
minimum
prices
milk
producers
might
still
able
retain
market
share
lowering
prices
nevertheless
ability
remain
competitive
lowering
prices
immunize
discriminatory
measure
new
energy
indiana
limbach
case
federal
government
sets
minimum
prices
producers
may
even
option
reducing
prices
order
retain
market
share
massachusetts
pricing
order
thus
almost
certainly
cause
local
goods
constitute
larger
share
goods
source
constitute
smaller
share
total
sales
market
exxon
governor
maryland
west
lynn
creamery
healy
fact
effect
motive
behind
promulgation
pricing
order
effect
renders
program
unconstitutional
like
tariff
neutralize
advantages
belonging
place
origin
baldwin
ways
massachusetts
pricing
order
similar
law
issue
bacchus
imports
dias
involve
tax
single
kind
good
special
provisions
producers
bacchus
involved
excise
tax
liquor
sales
coupled
exemption
fruit
wine
manufactured
hawaii
okolehao
brandy
distilled
root
shrub
indigenous
hawaii
held
hawaii
law
unconstitutional
purpose
effect
discriminating
favor
local
products
see
also
darnell
son
memphis
invalidating
property
tax
exemption
favoring
local
manufacturers
granting
tax
exemption
local
products
hawaii
effect
created
protective
tariff
goods
produced
state
taxed
produced
state
subject
net
tax
obvious
result
bacchus
instead
exempting
certain
hawaiian
liquors
tax
hawaii
rebated
amount
tax
collected
sale
liquors
see
new
energy
west
lynn
creamery
healy
indiana
limbach
discriminatory
tax
credit
discriminatory
tax
rebate
unconstitutional
massachusetts
pricing
order
surely
invalid
massachusetts
rebates
domestic
milk
producers
tax
paid
sale
massachusetts
milk
also
tax
paid
sale
milk
produced
elsewhere
additional
rebate
tax
paid
sale
milk
produced
elsewhere
way
reduces
danger
national
market
posed
barriers
instead
exacerbates
danger
giving
domestic
producers
additional
tool
shore
competitive
position
iii
respondent
advances
four
arguments
conclusion
pricing
order
imposes
unconstitutional
burden
interstate
commerce
component
program
local
subsidy
nondiscriminatory
tax
valid
combination
two
equally
valid
dealers
pay
order
premiums
tax
competitors
farmers
receive
disbursements
dairy
equalization
fund
pricing
order
discriminatory
west
lynn
creamery
healy
pricing
order
protectionist
costs
program
borne
massachusetts
dealers
consumers
benefits
distributed
exclusively
massachusetts
farmers
order
incidental
burden
commerce
justified
local
benefit
saving
dairy
industry
collapse
discuss
arguments
turn
respondent
principal
argument
milk
order
achieves
goals
lawful
means
order
whole
constitutional
brief
respondent
argues
payments
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
dairy
equalization
fund
valid
subsidies
constitutional
exercises
state
power
order
premium
provides
money
fund
valid
nondiscriminatory
tax
therefore
pricing
order
constitutional
merely
combination
two
independently
lawful
regulations
effect
respondent
argues
state
may
impose
valid
tax
dealers
free
use
proceeds
tax
chooses
may
independently
subsidize
farmers
free
finance
subsidy
means
legitimate
tax
even
granting
respondent
assertion
components
pricing
order
constitutional
standing
alone
pricing
order
nevertheless
must
west
lynn
creamery
healy
fall
pure
subsidy
funded
general
revenue
ordinarily
imposes
burden
interstate
commerce
merely
assists
local
business
pricing
order
case
however
funded
principally
taxes
sale
milk
produced
funding
subsidy
respondent
assists
local
farmers
burdens
interstate
commerce
pricing
order
thus
violates
cardinal
principle
state
may
benefit
economic
interests
burdening
competitors
new
energy
indiana
limbach
see
also
bacchus
imports
dias
guy
baltimore
fundamentally
respondent
errs
assuming
constitutionality
pricing
order
follows
logically
constitutionality
component
parts
conjoining
tax
subsidy
massachusetts
created
program
dangerous
interstate
commerce
either
part
alone
nondiscriminatory
measures
like
evenhanded
tax
issue
generally
upheld
spite
adverse
effects
interstate
commerce
part
existence
major
interests
adversely
affected
powerful
safeguard
legislative
abuse
minnesota
clover
leaf
creamery
see
also
raymond
motor
transportation
rice
special
deference
state
highway
regulations
burden
west
lynn
creamery
healy
usually
falls
local
economic
interests
well
economic
interests
thus
insuring
state
political
processes
serve
check
unduly
burdensome
regulations
south
carolina
state
highway
dept
barnwell
goldberg
sweet
however
nondiscriminatory
tax
coupled
subsidy
one
groups
hurt
tax
state
political
processes
longer
relied
upon
prevent
legislative
abuse
one
interests
otherwise
lobby
tax
mollified
subsidy
case
one
ordinarily
expected
least
three
groups
lobby
order
premium
tax
raises
price
hence
lowers
demand
milk
dairy
farmers
milk
dealers
consumers
tax
coupled
subsidy
one
powerful
groups
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
instead
exerting
influence
tax
fact
primary
supporters
west
lynn
creamery
healy
respondent
argument
require
us
analyze
separately
two
parts
integrated
regulation
divorce
premium
payments
use
payments
put
entire
program
contributions
fund
distributions
fund
simultaneously
burdens
interstate
commerce
discriminates
favor
local
producers
choice
constitutional
means
nondiscriminatory
tax
local
subsidy
guarantee
constitutionality
program
whole
new
york
minimum
price
order
also
used
constitutional
means
state
power
regulate
prices
held
unconstitutional
deleterious
effects
baldwin
seelig
similarly
law
held
unconstitutional
bacchus
involved
exercise
hawaii
undisputed
power
tax
grant
tax
exemptions
commerce
clause
jurisprudence
rigid
controlled
form
state
erects
barriers
commerce
rather
cases
eschewed
formalism
sensitive
analysis
purposes
effects
declared
years
ago
commerce
clause
forbids
discrimination
whether
forthright
ingenious
case
duty
determine
whether
statute
attack
whatever
name
may
practical
operation
work
discrimination
interstate
commerce
best
maxwell
maryland
louisiana
exxon
governor
maryland
see
also
guy
baltimore
invalidating
discriminatory
wharfage
fees
mere
expedient
device
accomplish
indirection
state
accomplish
direct
tax
build
domestic
commerce
means
unequal
oppressive
burdens
upon
industry
west
lynn
creamery
healy
business
baldwin
seelig
ultimate
principle
one
state
dealings
another
may
put
position
economic
isolation
formulas
catchwords
subordinate
overmastering
requirement
dean
milk
madison
new
energy
indiana
limbach
invalidating
reciprocal
tax
credit
effect
tax
es
product
made
indiana
manufacturers
rate
higher
product
made
ohio
manufacturers
respondent
also
argues
since
massachusetts
milk
dealers
pay
order
premiums
competitors
massachusetts
farmers
pricing
order
imposes
discriminatory
burden
commerce
brief
respondent
argument
withstand
scrutiny
possible
doubt
massachusetts
imposed
higher
sales
tax
milk
produced
maine
milk
produced
massachusetts
tax
struck
spite
fact
sales
tax
imposed
consumers
consumers
compete
dairy
farmers
years
cases
rightly
concluded
imposition
differential
burden
part
stream
commerce
wholesaler
retailer
consumer
invalid
burden
placed
point
result
disadvantage
producer
brown
maryland
wheat
tax
occupation
importer
like
manner
tax
importation
must
add
price
article
paid
consumer
importer
like
manner
direct
duty
article
made
distinction
tax
thing
imported
person
importer
influence
part
west
lynn
creamery
healy
subject
obvious
controversy
interfere
equally
power
regulate
commerce
darnell
son
city
memphis
differential
burden
intermediate
stage
manufacturer
bacchus
imports
dias
differential
burden
wholesaler
webber
virginia
differential
burden
sales
agent
new
energy
indiana
limbach
differential
burden
retailer
respondent
also
argues
operation
order
disproves
claim
protectionism
consumers
feel
effect
retail
price
increase
dealers
substantial
presence
brief
respondent
emphasis
original
argument
accepted
undermine
almost
every
discriminatory
tax
case
state
taxes
ordinarily
paid
businesses
consumers
yet
discriminate
products
unconstitutional
idea
discriminatory
tax
interfere
interstate
commerce
merely
burden
tax
borne
consumers
taxing
state
thoroughly
repudiated
bacchus
imports
dias
cost
tariff
also
borne
primarily
local
consumers
yet
tariff
paradigmatic
commerce
clause
violation
fundamentally
respondent
ignores
fact
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
part
integrated
interstate
market
noted
supra
purpose
effect
pricing
order
divert
market
share
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
diversion
necessarily
injures
dairy
farmers
neighboring
furthermore
massachusetts
order
regulates
portion
interstate
market
milk
broadly
regulated
federal
milk
west
lynn
creamery
healy
marketing
order
covers
new
england
cfr
massachusetts
producers
deliver
milk
dealers
regulated
market
participants
interstate
milk
market
producers
sell
market
guaranteed
minimum
blend
price
federal
order
fact
massachusetts
order
imposes
assessments
massachusetts
sales
distributes
massachusetts
producers
exclude
either
assessments
payments
interstate
market
extent
assessments
affect
relative
volume
class
milk
products
sold
marketing
area
compared
classes
milk
products
necessarily
affect
blend
price
payable
even
producers
sell
markets
obvious
impact
order
production
demonstrates
simply
wrong
assume
pricing
order
burdens
massachusetts
consumers
dealers
finally
respondent
argues
incidental
burden
interstate
commerce
outweighed
local
benefits
preserving
massachusetts
dairy
industry
brief
respondent
closely
related
west
lynn
creamery
healy
argument
respondent
urges
purpose
order
save
industry
collapse
protectionist
brief
respondent
accept
arguments
make
virtue
vice
rule
discrimination
condemns
preservation
local
industry
protecting
rigors
interstate
competition
hallmark
economic
protectionism
commerce
clause
prohibits
bacchus
imports
dias
explicitly
rejected
distinction
thriving
struggling
enterprises
whether
state
attempting
enhance
thriving
substantial
business
enterprises
subsidize
financially
troubled
ones
irrelevant
commerce
clause
analysis
ibid
characteristic
eloquence
justice
cardozo
responded
argument
respondent
echoes
today
argument
pressed
upon
us
however
end
served
milk
control
act
something
economic
welfare
farmers
class
classes
end
west
lynn
creamery
healy
served
maintenance
regular
adequate
supply
pure
wholesome
milk
supply
put
jeopardy
farmers
state
unable
earn
living
income
nebbia
new
york
supra
let
exception
admitted
state
times
stress
strain
say
farmers
merchants
workmen
must
protected
competition
without
lest
go
upon
poor
relief
lists
perish
altogether
give
entrance
excuse
invite
speedy
end
national
solidarity
constitution
framed
dominion
political
philosophy
less
parochial
range
framed
upon
theory
peoples
several
must
sink
swim
together
long
run
prosperity
salvation
union
division
baldwin
seelig
west
lynn
creamery
healy
system
fostered
commerce
clause
every
farmer
every
craftsman
shall
encouraged
produce
certainty
free
access
every
market
nation
home
embargoes
withhold
exports
foreign
state
customs
duties
regulations
exclude
likewise
every
consumer
may
look
free
competition
every
producing
area
nation
protect
exploitation
vision
founders
doctrine
given
reality
hood
sons
du
mond
ordered
footnotes
explanation
term
blend
price
see
previous
order
first
issued
february
amended
february
app
brief
respondent
amended
order
issue
case
dealer
defined
person
engaged
within
commonwealth
business
receiving
purchasing
pasteurizing
bottling
processing
distributing
otherwise
handling
milk
purchases
receives
milk
sale
consignee
agent
producer
shall
include
app
app
west
lynn
creamery
commissioner
dept
food
agriculture
mass
commissioner
appears
set
order
premium
third
difference
federal
price
massachusetts
farmers
produce
milk
sold
fluid
milk
state
app
since
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
produce
milk
assessment
difference
federal
minimum
price
generates
enough
revenue
give
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
entire
difference
federal
minimum
price
without
leaving
surplus
paying
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
entire
difference
federal
minimum
price
order
premium
allows
massachusetts
farmers
whose
cost
production
sell
milk
without
loss
federal
minimum
price
explanation
term
class
see
supra
producer
defined
person
producing
milk
dairy
cattle
app
disbursement
subject
two
qualifications
first
farmer
produced
pounds
milk
considered
produced
pounds
second
producer
may
receive
payments
make
net
price
per
cwt
including
federal
minimum
price
payments
equalization
fund
higher
limitations
lead
surplus
dairy
equalization
fund
surplus
returned
dealers
negative
aspect
commerce
clause
considered
important
father
constitution
james
madison
one
letters
madison
wrote
commerce
clause
grew
abuse
power
importing
taxing
intended
negative
preventive
provision
injustice
among
rather
power
used
positive
purposes
general
government
farrand
records
federal
convention
numerical
example
may
make
effect
clearer
suppose
federal
minimum
price
producers
sell
milk
profitably
price
producers
need
price
order
break
even
pricing
order
tax
order
premium
difference
target
price
federal
minimum
price
assuming
tax
generates
sufficient
funds
case
long
milk
produced
state
appears
case
massachusetts
farmers
receive
subsidy
subsidy
allow
lower
prices
still
breaking
even
selling
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
able
compete
producers
net
effect
tax
subsidy
like
tariff
raise
price
paid
dealers
exactly
milk
sold
massachusetts
produced
state
net
prices
rise
farmers
produce
raw
milk
dairy
equalization
fund
surplus
refunded
milk
dealers
refund
mitigate
price
increase
although
effect
ability
program
enable
west
lynn
creamery
healy
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
compete
new
energy
noted
true
cotrell
sporhase
effect
state
refusal
accept
offered
reciprocity
total
elimination
transport
subject
product
offering
state
whereas
present
case
effect
refusal
product
placed
substantial
commercial
disadvantage
discriminatory
tax
treatment
makes
difference
purposes
commerce
clause
analysis
leading
case
baldwin
seelig
new
york
law
excluding
milk
impose
absolute
ban
rather
allowed
importation
sale
long
initial
purchase
dairy
farmer
made
new
york
price
words
appellant
order
sell
product
ohio
cut
profits
reducing
sales
price
market
price
sufficiently
compensate
ohio
forgone
tax
credit
also
milk
baldwin
order
sell
product
new
york
cut
profits
increasing
purchase
price
market
price
sufficiently
meet
new
premium
viewed
new
york
law
economic
barrier
competition
equivalent
rampart
customs
duties
say
massachusetts
dairy
industry
may
continue
shrink
market
share
massachusetts
dairy
producers
may
continue
fall
may
case
massachusetts
producers
costs
high
even
pricing
order
many
west
lynn
creamery
healy
unable
compete
nevertheless
pricing
order
certainly
allow
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
remain
business
pricing
order
imposed
commerce
clause
purposes
matter
whether
challenged
regulation
actually
increases
market
share
local
producers
whether
merely
mitigates
projected
decline
see
bacchus
imports
dias
perceive
principle
commerce
clause
jurisprudence
supporting
distinction
thriving
struggling
enterprises
baldwin
seelig
indeed
aspect
pricing
order
allows
give
massachusetts
farmers
benefit
three
times
valuable
per
cwt
tax
order
premium
imposed
see
supra
one
might
attempt
distinguish
bacchus
noting
rebate
case
goes
entity
pays
tax
milk
dealers
dairy
farmers
rebating
taxes
directly
producers
rather
dealers
however
merely
reinforces
conclusion
pricing
order
favor
local
producers
taxes
refunded
dealers
might
impact
interstate
commerce
dealers
might
use
funds
increase
price
quantity
milk
purchased
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
refund
dealers
might
therefore
result
advantage
producers
hand
refunding
monies
directly
dairy
farmers
pricing
order
ensures
massachusetts
producers
benefit
never
squarely
confronted
constitutionality
subsidies
need
however
noted
irect
subsidization
domestic
industry
ordinarily
run
afoul
negative
commerce
clause
new
energy
indiana
limbach
see
also
hughes
alexandria
scrap
stevens
concurring
addition
undisputed
may
try
attract
business
creating
environment
conducive
economic
activity
maintaining
good
roads
sound
public
education
low
taxes
zobel
williams
brennan
concurring
bacchus
imports
dias
west
lynn
creamery
healy
metropolitan
life
ins
ward
undisputed
overwhelming
majority
milk
sold
massachusetts
produced
elsewhere
thus
even
though
tax
applied
milk
produced
state
state
tax
collected
comes
taxes
milk
addition
tax
milk
unlike
imposed
milk
impose
burden
producers
dairy
farmers
confident
taxes
paid
milk
returned
via
dairy
stabilization
fund
principle
recognized
conceptually
similar
field
intergovernmental
taxation
nondiscrimination
also
plays
central
role
setting
boundary
permissible
impermissible
washington
political
check
provided
state
tax
falls
significant
group
state
citizens
counted
upon
use
votes
keep
state
raising
tax
excessively
thus
placing
unfair
burden
federal
government
south
carolina
baker
county
fresno
governor
special
commission
relative
establishment
dairy
stabilization
fund
realized
consumers
unlikely
organize
effectively
oppose
pricing
order
commission
report
remarked
estimated
two
cent
increase
per
quart
milk
noticed
consuming
public
app
price
milk
varies
often
many
reasons
consumers
unlikely
feel
price
increases
attribute
pricing
order
way
changing
demand
class
milk
products
changes
blend
price
producers
entire
area
covered
marketing
order
see
supra
among
local
benefits
respondent
identifies
protecting
unique
open
space
related
benefits
brief
respondent
massachusetts
judicial
recognized
relegating
open
space
point
single
west
lynn
creamery
commissioner
dept
food
agriculture
mass
argument
environmental
benefits
central
enhancement
market
share
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
merely
incidental
turns
pricing
order
head
addition
even
environmental
west
lynn
creamery
healy
preservation
central
purpose
pricing
order
sufficient
uphold
discriminatory
regulation
see
philadelphia
new
jersey
finally
suggestion
collapse
dairy
industry
endangers
open
space
dairy
farms
enclosed
fences
decline
farming
may
well
lead
less
rather
intensive
land
use
one
scholar
noted
many
people
assume
land
lost
agriculture
urban
uses
true
agricultural
land
urbanized
especially
since
world
war
ii
major
portion
land
moving
agriculture
years
abandoned
natural
forest
growth
foster
macconnell
agricultural
land
use
change
massachusetts
research
bulletin
see
also
department
agriculture
daugherty
major
uses
land
pp
agricultural
economic
decline
grazing
pasture
land
offset
increased
wilderness
wildlife
park
areas
distinction
power
state
shelter
people
menaces
health
safety
fraud
even
dangers
emanate
interstate
commerce
lack
power
retard
burden
constrict
flow
commerce
economic
advantage
one
deeply
rooted
history
law
hood
sons
du
mond
see
also
bacchus
imports
dias
surprisingly
large
number
commerce
clause
cases
arose
attempts
protect
local
dairy
farmers
schollenberger
pennsylvania
baldwin
seelig
hood
sons
du
mond
dean
milk
madison
polar
ice
cream
creamery
andrews
great
atlantic
pacific
tea
cottrell
reasons
political
effectiveness
milk
producers
explored
miller
industrial
organization
political
production
case
study
institutional
theoretical
economics
west
lynn
creamery
healy
justice
scalia
justice
thomas
joins
concurring
judgment
view
challenged
massachusetts
pricing
order
invalid
negative
commerce
clause
jurisprudence
reasons
explained
part
ii
agree
reasons
assigned
seem
explained
part
broad
expansion
current
law
accordingly
concur
judgment
purpose
negative
commerce
clause
often
said
create
national
market
follow
however
never
held
every
state
law
obstructs
national
market
violates
commerce
clause
yet
says
today
seems
canvassed
entire
corpus
negative
commerce
clause
opinions
culled
every
snippet
reasoning
melded
sweeping
principle
constitution
violated
state
law
regulation
artificially
encourag
es
production
even
goods
produced
lower
cost
west
lynn
creamery
healy
ante
see
also
ante
law
unconstitutional
neutraliz
es
advantage
possessed
lower
cost
producers
ante
price
order
unconstitutional
allows
producers
produce
higher
cost
sell
price
charged
lower
cost
producers
ante
state
program
unconstitutional
neutralizes
advantages
belonging
place
origin
quoting
baldwin
seelig
ante
preservation
local
industry
protecting
rigors
interstate
competition
hallmark
economic
protectionism
commerce
clause
prohibits
seems
appreciate
eagerness
expressly
reserve
question
constitutionality
subsidies
industry
ante
expansive
view
commerce
clause
calls
question
wide
variety
state
laws
hitherto
thought
permissible
seems
state
subsidy
clearly
invalid
formulation
guiding
principle
identified
guardedly
asserts
pure
subsidy
funded
general
revenue
ordinarily
imposes
burden
interstate
commerce
merely
assists
local
business
ante
emphasis
added
analysis
must
taken
true
local
businesses
local
hardware
store
competing
businesses
state
notes
funding
subsidy
massachusetts
taxed
milk
produced
thus
assists
local
farmers
burdens
interstate
commerce
ibid
said
almost
subsidies
funded
general
state
revenues
almost
invariably
include
monies
use
taxes
products
even
funding
come
part
taxes
goods
merely
assist
ing
businesses
unquestionably
west
lynn
creamery
healy
neutralizes
advantages
possessed
enterprises
subsidies
particularly
form
cash
comes
thing
tax
forgiveness
often
admitted
purpose
indeed
nationally
advertised
purpose
making
profitable
conduct
business
elsewhere
distorting
normal
market
incentives
guiding
principle
also
appears
call
question
many
garden
variety
state
laws
heretofore
permissible
negative
commerce
clause
state
law
example
requires
contrary
industry
practice
use
recyclable
packaging
materials
favors
local
producers
establish
additional
separate
packaging
operation
sales
analysis
believed
law
unconstitutional
without
regard
whether
disruption
national
market
real
purpose
restriction
without
need
balance
importance
state
interests
thereby
pursued
see
pike
bruce
church
results
greatly
extend
negative
commerce
clause
beyond
current
scope
intend
consequences
want
foster
needless
litigation
concerning
adopted
expansive
rationale
another
basis
deciding
case
available
proceed
discuss
ii
historical
record
provides
grounds
reading
commerce
clause
says
authorization
congress
regulate
commerce
tyler
pipe
industries
washington
state
dept
revenue
scalia
concurring
part
dissenting
part
nonetheless
formally
adopted
doctrine
negative
commerce
west
lynn
creamery
healy
clause
years
ago
see
case
state
freight
tax
wall
since
decided
vast
number
negative
commerce
clause
cases
engendering
considerable
reliance
interests
result
stare
decisis
grounds
enforce
negative
commerce
clause
two
situations
state
law
facially
discriminates
interstate
commerce
state
law
indistinguishable
type
law
previously
held
unconstitutional
see
itel
containers
huddleston
nn
slip
nn
scalia
concurring
judgment
collecting
cases
applying
approach
least
second
part
always
easy
since
one
gets
beyond
facial
discrimination
negative
commerce
clause
jurisprudence
becomes
long
quagmire
northwestern
portland
cement
minnesota
see
generally
currie
constitution
first
hundred
years
pp
object
however
produce
clear
rule
honors
holdings
past
decisions
declines
extend
rationale
produced
decisions
see
american
trucking
scheiner
scalia
dissenting
west
lynn
creamery
healy
issue
us
present
case
whether
third
methodologies
must
fall
although
question
close
conclude
principled
point
disembark
negative
commerce
clause
train
difference
methodology
discriminatory
exemption
nondiscriminatory
tax
methodology
discriminatory
refund
nondiscriminatory
tax
money
taken
returned
rather
simply
left
favored
taxpayer
first
place
difference
hand
difference
assisting
industry
discriminatory
taxation
assisting
industry
means
west
lynn
creamery
healy
therefore
allow
state
subsidize
domestic
industry
long
nondiscriminatory
taxes
go
state
general
revenue
fund
perhaps
commentators
contend
line
comports
important
economic
reality
state
less
likely
maintain
subsidy
citizens
perceive
money
general
fund
available
number
competing
nonprotectionist
purposes
see
coenen
untangling
exemption
dormant
commerce
clause
collins
economic
union
constitutional
value
gergen
selfish
state
market
see
also
ante
however
basis
position
chief
justice
explains
nalysis
interest
group
participation
political
process
may
serve
many
useful
purposes
serving
basis
interpreting
dormant
commerce
clause
one
post
dissenting
opinion
instead
draw
line
clear
rational
line
limits
extant
negative
commerce
clause
jurisprudence
west
lynn
creamery
healy
chief
justice
rehnquist
justice
blackmun
joins
dissenting
less
description
reasons
lay
behind
massachusetts
law
strikes
law
undoubtedly
sought
aid
struggling
massachusetts
dairy
farmers
beset
steady
declining
prices
escalating
costs
situation
apparently
unique
massachusetts
new
jersey
filed
amicus
brief
support
respondent
new
jersey
enacted
similar
law
lie
northeastern
metropolitan
corridor
urbanized
area
every
prospect
becoming
value
agricultural
land
located
near
metropolitan
areas
driven
demand
housing
similar
urban
uses
distressed
farmers
eventually
sell
developers
merely
farm
produce
lost
milk
production
case
massachusetts
special
commission
whose
report
basis
order
question
found
without
continued
existence
dairy
farmers
commonwealth
lose
supply
locally
produced
fresh
milk
together
open
lands
west
lynn
creamery
healy
used
wildlife
refuges
recreation
hunting
fishing
tourism
education
app
milk
control
bd
eisenberg
farm
products
upheld
pennsylvania
statute
establishing
minimum
prices
paid
pennsylvania
dairy
farmers
commerce
clause
challenge
pennsylvania
milk
dealer
shipped
milk
purchased
pennsylvania
new
york
sold
observed
purpose
statute
reach
domestic
situation
interest
welfare
producers
consumers
milk
pennsylvania
went
say
one
commonest
forms
state
action
exercise
police
power
directed
control
local
conditions
exerted
interest
welfare
state
citizens
every
state
police
statute
necessarily
affect
interstate
commerce
degree
statute
run
west
lynn
creamery
healy
counter
grant
congressional
power
merely
incidentally
indirectly
involves
burdens
interstate
commerce
principles
guided
judicial
decision
century
consistent
precedent
observes
pure
subsidy
funded
general
revenue
ordinarily
imposes
burden
interstate
commerce
merely
assists
local
business
ante
correctly
recognizes
ondiscriminatory
measures
like
evenhanded
tax
issue
generally
upheld
due
deference
normally
accorded
state
political
process
passing
legislation
light
various
competing
interest
groups
ante
citing
minnesota
clover
leaf
creamery
raymond
motor
transportation
rice
strikes
method
state
subsidization
nondiscriminatory
tax
levied
milk
dealers
coupled
subsidy
milk
producers
ante
view
west
lynn
creamery
healy
method
imposing
tax
subsidy
distorts
state
political
process
dairy
farmers
otherwise
lobby
tax
mollified
subsidy
ante
points
still
least
two
strong
interest
groups
opposed
milk
milk
dealers
importantly
nothing
dormant
commerce
clause
suggests
fate
state
regulation
turn
upon
particular
lawful
manner
state
subsidy
enacted
promulgated
analysis
interest
group
participation
political
process
may
serve
many
useful
purposes
serving
basis
interpreting
dormant
commerce
clause
one
concludes
combined
effect
milk
order
simultaneously
burdens
interstate
commerce
discriminates
favor
local
producers
ante
support
conclusion
cites
baldwin
seelig
bacchus
imports
dias
supra
two
examples
constitutional
means
held
unconstitutional
effects
interstate
commerce
baldwin
bacchus
far
cry
case
baldwin
supra
order
sell
bottled
milk
new
york
milk
dealers
required
pay
minimum
price
milk
even
though
purchased
milk
vermont
farmers
lower
price
scheme
found
effort
prevent
vermont
milk
producers
selling
new
york
dealers
lower
market
price
justice
cardozo
explained
new
york
statute
importer
may
keep
milk
drink
sell
may
scheme
clearly
made
less
attractive
new
york
dealers
purchase
milk
vermont
farmers
disputed
law
negated
economic
advantage
massachusetts
west
lynn
creamery
healy
milk
order
adverse
effect
milk
dealers
incentives
purchase
lower
priced
milk
farmers
dealers
milk
taxed
equally
borrow
justice
cardozo
description
milk
dealers
massachusetts
free
keep
milk
drink
milk
sell
equal
terms
local
milk
bacchus
state
hawaii
combined
undisputed
power
tax
grant
exemptions
manner
found
violative
commerce
clause
state
exempted
local
wine
burdens
excise
tax
levied
liquor
sales
despite
strained
attempt
compare
scheme
bacchus
milk
order
case
ante
clear
milk
order
produce
effect
interstate
commerce
tax
exemption
bacchus
agree
statement
bacchus
distinguished
noting
rebate
case
goes
entity
pays
tax
milk
dealers
dairy
farmers
ante
distinction
significant
difference
decided
case
supports
conclusion
negative
commerce
clause
prohibits
state
using
money
lawfully
obtained
neutral
tax
milk
dealers
distributing
subsidy
dairy
farmers
indeed
case
comes
closest
supporting
result
reaches
opinion
butler
held
unconstitutional
otherwise
valid
tax
processing
agricultural
products
use
revenue
raised
tax
put
half
century
ago
justice
brandeis
said
dissenting
opinion
new
state
ice
liebmann
west
lynn
creamery
healy
stay
experimentation
things
social
economic
grave
responsibility
denial
right
experiment
may
fraught
serious
consequences
nation
one
happy
incidents
federal
system
single
courageous
state
may
citizens
choose
serve
laboratory
try
novel
social
economic
experiments
without
risk
rest
country