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true
silas
manning
never
convicted
willie
mae
barker
never
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concede
hold
may
never
situation
indictment
may
dismissed
speedy
trial
grounds
defendant
failed
object
continuances
may
situation
defendant
represented
incompetent
counsel
severely
prejudiced
even
cases
continuances
granted
ex
parte
barring
extraordinary
circumstances
reluctant
indeed
rule
defendant
denied
constitutional
right
record
strongly
indicates
one
defendant
want
speedy
trial
hold
therefore
barker
deprived
due
process
right
speedy
trial
judgment
appeals
affirmed
footnotes
criminal
prosecutions
accused
shall
enjoy
right
speedy
public
trial
impartial
jury
state
district
wherein
crime
shall
committed
district
shall
previously
ascertained
law
informed
nature
cause
accusation
confronted
witnesses
compulsory
process
obtaining
witnesses
favor
assistance
counsel
defence
hold
right
speedy
trial
fundamental
rights
secured
sixth
amendment
explanation
record
although
barker
initial
trial
set
october
continuance
sought
october
two
days
trial
begun
apparently
manning
chose
appeal
final
two
convictions
written
motion
barker
filed
alleged
objected
every
continuance
since
february
record
reflect
objections
motion
dismiss
filed
february
objections
continuances
sought
commonwealth
march
june
tr
oral
arg
report
president
commission
crime
district
columbia
washington
persons
arrested
robbery
released
prior
trial
bail
mitchell
bail
reform
constitutionality
pretrial
detention
rev
citing
report
judicial
council
committee
study
operation
bail
reform
act
district
columbia
number
offenses
increasing
see
annual
report
director
administrative
office
courts
desirable
punishment
follow
offence
closely
possible
impression
upon
minds
men
weakened
distance
besides
distance
adds
uncertainty
punishment
affording
new
chances
escape
bentham
theory
legislation
ogden
ed
establish
justice
insure
domestic
tranquility
final
report
national
commission
causes
prevention
violence
testimony
james
bennett
director
bureau
prisons
hearings
federal
bail
procedures
subcommittee
constitutional
rights
subcommittee
improvements
judicial
machinery
senate
committee
judiciary
tombs
riots
new
york
city
times
challenge
crime
free
society
report
president
commission
law
enforcement
administration
justice
large
measure
many
procedural
safeguards
provided
accused
ordinary
procedures
criminal
prosecution
designed
move
deliberate
pace
requirement
unreasonable
speed
deleterious
effect
upon
rights
accused
upon
ability
society
protect
ewell
justice
white
noted
opinion
ewell
supra
overzealous
application
remedy
infringe
societal
interest
trying
people
accused
crime
rather
granting
immunization
legal
error
examples
see
american
bar
association
project
standards
criminal
justice
speedy
trial
approved
draft
note
right
speedy
criminal
trial
rev
second
circuit
rules
regarding
prompt
disposition
criminal
cases
aba
project
supra
example
proposed
statutory
rule
see
note
lagging
right
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trial
rev
pines
district
woodbury
county
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right
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criminal
trial
rev
note
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right
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trial
rev
see
state
maldonado
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state
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hill
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cert
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indication
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perez
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held
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even
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prosecution
right
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trial
although
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recognize
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rule
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eighth
ninth
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mann
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butler
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scafati
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see
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defendant
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judge
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note
lagging
right
speedy
trial
rev
footnotes
omitted
chief
justice
burger
wrote
dickey
florida
although
great
many
accused
persons
seek
put
confrontation
long
possible
right
prompt
inquiry
criminal
charges
fundamental
duty
charging
authority
provide
prompt
trial
omitted
circuit
judge
justice
blackmun
wrote
government
matter
trial
without
responsibility
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trial
criminal
cases
burden
trial
promptness
solely
upon
defense
right
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trial
constitutionally
guaranteed
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knowledgeable
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american
bar
association
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reason
position
number
situations
defendant
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charge
defendant
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counsel
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demand
jurisdictions
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public
interest
prompt
disposition
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cases
trial
criminal
case
unreasonably
delayed
merely
defendant
think
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seek
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charge
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project
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nothing
said
interpreted
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presumptive
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exercise
supervisory
powers
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time
period
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cases
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see
supra
see
simmons
cert
denied
note
right
speedy
trial
stan
rev
concurring
opinion
dickey
justice
brennan
identified
three
factors
consideration
source
delay
reasons
whether
delay
prejudiced
interests
protected
right
included
consideration
defendant
failure
assert
right
category
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length
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adopt
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see
also
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right
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trial
supra
another
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example
first
circuit
thought
delay
nine
months
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long
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good
reason
case
depended
eyewitness
testimony
butler
indicated
previous
occasions
improper
prosecution
intentionally
delay
gain
tactical
advantage
defendants
harass
marion
see
pollard
ewell
smith
hooey
klopfer
north
carolina
indicated
defendant
awaiting
trial
bond
might
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public
scorn
deprived
employment
chilled
exercise
right
speak
associate
participate
unpopular
political
causes
see
establish
justice
insure
domestic
tranquility
final
report
national
commission
causes
prevention
violence
statistical
evidence
persons
detained
arrest
trial
likely
receive
prison
sentences
obtain
pretrial
release
although
factors
bear
upon
correlation
see
wald
pretrial
detention
ultimate
freedom
statistical
study
rev
example
speedy
trial
issue
approached
see
judge
frankel
excellent
opinion
mann
supp
sdny
tr
oral
arg
hindsight
course
help
noting
barker
moved
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trial
following
indictment
successful
undoubtedly
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since
manning
testimony
crucial
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case
anticipated
outset
however
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tried
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times
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delay
march
october
explain
delays
prior
tr
oral
arg
mr
although
rejects
petitioner
speedy
trial
claim
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denial
petition
habeas
corpus
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barker
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trial
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requests
barker
opportunity
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factors
going
constitutional
judgments
speedy
trial
provision
appropriate
emphasize
one
major
purposes
provision
guard
inordinate
delay
public
charge
trial
wholly
aside
possible
prejudice
defense
merits
may
seriously
interfere
defendant
liberty
whether
free
bail
may
disrupt
employment
drain
financial
resources
curtail
associations
subject
public
obloquy
create
anxiety
family
friends
marion
factors
serious
others
inevitably
present
every
case
extent
every
defendant
either
incarcerated
pending
trial
bail
subject
substantial
restrictions
liberty
also
true
many
defendants
believe
time
side
prefer
suffer
whatever
disadvantages
delay
may
entail
desire
early
trial
personal
factors
prevail
countervailing
considerations
offered
state
connected
crowded
dockets
prosecutorial
case
loads
defendant
desiring
speedy
trial
therefore
within
reasonable
time
special
circumstances
presenting
pressing
public
need
respect
case
suffice
justify
delay
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considerations
case
outweigh
inevitable
personal
prejudice
resulting
delay
necessary
consider
whether
prejudice
defense
trial
major
evils
protected
speedy
trial
guarantee
exist
quite
apart
actual
possible
prejudice
accused
defense
marion
supra
course
cases
differ
among
allowable
time
charge
trial
permit
prosecution
defense
adequately
prepare
case
unreasonable
delay
criminal
cases
justified
simply
asserting
public
resources
provided
state
system
limited
case
must
await
turn
points
approach
also
subverts
state
goals
seeking
enforce
criminal
laws