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brennan
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powell
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robert
chenoweth
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general
kentucky
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stephens
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carolina
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process
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fourteenth
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judgment
appeals
reversed
john
hill
attorney
general
david
kendall
first
assistant
attorney
general
joe
dibrell
anita
ashton
assistant
attorneys
general
filed
brief
state
texas
amicus
curiae
urging
reversal
paul
halvonik
charles
sevilla
ephraim
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sheldon
portman
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