package org.elixir.data;

public class Texts {
    // Case 1 - Turner v. United States
    public static final String CASE_1_TEXT_1 = "\"Considering the withheld evidence in the context of the\" +\n"
            + "entire record, Agurs, supra, at 112, evidence is too little, too weak, or too distant from the main\" +\n"
            + "evidentiary points to meet Brady's standards.";

    public static final String CASE_1_TEXT_2 = "Petitioners--Timothy Catlett, Russell Overton, Levy Rouse, Kelvin Smith, Charles and Christopher Turner, and Clifton Yarborough--\n"
            + "and several others were indicted for the kidnaping, robbery, and murder of Catherine Fuller. At trial, the Government advanced the theory \n"
            + "that Fuller was attacked by a large group of individuals. Its evidentiary centerpiece consisted of the testimony of Calvin Alston\n"
            + "and Harry Bennett, who confessed to participating in a group attack and cooperated with the Government in return for leniency.\n"
            + "Several other Government witnesses corroborated aspects of Alston's and Bennett's testimony. Melvin Montgomery testified that\n"
            + "he was in a park among a group of people, heard someone say they were \"going to get that one,\" saw petitioner Overton pointing to Fuller,\n"
            + "and saw several persons, including some petitioners, cross the street in her direction. Maurice Thomas testified that he saw the attack,\n"
            + "identified some petitioners as participants, and later overheard petitioner Catlett say that they \"had to kill her.\" Carrie Eleby and Linda Jacobs testified that they heard screams coming from an alley where a \"gang of boys\" was beating someone near a garage, approached the group, and saw some petitioners participating in the attack. Finally, the Government played a videotape of petitioner Yarborough's statement to detectives, describing how he was part of a large group that carried out the attack. None of the defendants rebutted the prosecution witnesses' claims that Fuller was killed in a group attack. The seven petitioners were convicted.\n"
            + "Long after their convictions became final, petitioners discovered that the Government had withheld evidence from the defense at the time of trial. In postconviction proceedings, they argued that seven specific pieces of withheld evidence were both favorable to the defense and material to their guilt under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83. This evidence included the identity of a man seen running into the alley after the murder and stopping near the garage where Fuller's body had already been found; the statement of a passerby who claimed to hear groans coming from a closed garage; and evidence tending to impeach witnesses Eleby, Jacobs, and Thomas. The D. C. Superior Court rejected petitioners' Brady claims, finding that the withheld evidence was not material. The D. C. Court of Appeals affirmed.\n"
            + " did something.";

    public static final String CASE_1_TEXT_3 = "The Government does not contest petitioners' claim that the withheld evidence was \"favorable to\n"
            + "the defense.\" Petitioners and the Government, however, do contest the materiality of the undisclosed\n"
            + "Brady information. Such \"evidence is 'material' . . . when there is a reasonable probability that,\n"
            + "had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\"\n"
            + "Cone v. Bell, 556 U. S. 449, 469-470. \"A 'reasonable probability' of a different result\"\n"
            + "is one in which the suppressed evidence \" 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'\n"
            + "\"Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 434. To make that determination, this Court \"evaluate[s]\" the \n"
            + "withheld evidence \"in the context of the entire record.\" \n"
            + "United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112. Pp. 9-11.";

    // Case 2 - ZIGLAR v. ABBASI ET AL., (2017)
    public static final String CASE_2_TEXT_1 = " (a) In 42 U. S. C. §1983, Congress provided a specific damages remedy for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by state officials, but Congress provided no corresponding remedy for constitutional violations by agents of the Federal Government. In 1971, and against this background, this Court recognized in Bivens an implied damages action to compensate persons injured by federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the following decade, the Court allowed Bivens-type remedies twice more, in a Fifth Amendment gender-discrimination case, Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, and in an Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause case, Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14. These are the only cases in which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself. Pp. 6-7.\n"
            + "\n"
            + "          (b) Bivens, Davis, and Carlson were decided at a time when the prevailing law assumed that a proper judicial function was to \"provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective\" a statute's purpose. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433. The Court has since adopted a far more cautious course, clarifying that, when deciding whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the \"determinative\" question is one of statutory intent. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286. If a statute does not evince Congress' intent \"to create the private right of action asserted,\" Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 568, no such action will be created through judicial mandate. Similar caution must be exercised with respect to damages actions implied to enforce the Constitution itself. Bivens is well-settled law in its own context, but expanding the Bivens remedy is now considered a \"disfavored\" judicial activity. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 675.\n"
            + "\n"
            + "     When a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under the Constitution, separation-of-powers principles should be central to the analysis. The question is whether Congress or the courts should decide to authorize a damages suit. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 380. Most often it will be Congress, for Bivens will not be extended to a new context if there are \" 'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.' \" Carlson, supra, at 18. If there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy as part of the system for enforcing the law and correcting a wrong, courts must refrain from creating that kind of remedy. An alternative remedial structure may also limit the Judiciary's power to infer a new Bivens cause of action. Pp. 8-14.";

    public static final String CASE_2_TEXT_2 = "2. Considering the relevant special factors here, a Bivens-type remedy should not be extended to the claims challenging the confinement conditions imposed on respondents pursuant to the formal policy adopted by the Executive Officials in the wake of the September 11 attacks. These \"detention policy claims\" include the allegations that petitioners violated respondents' due process and equal protection rights by holding them in restrictive conditions of confinement, and the allegations that the Wardens violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by subjecting respondents to frequent strip searches. The detention policy claims do not include the guard-abuse claim against Warden Hasty. Pp. 14-23.\n"
            + "\n"
            + "          (a) The proper test for determining whether a claim arises in a new Bivens context is as follows. If the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context is new. Meaningful differences may include, e.g., the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the extent of judicial guidance for the official conduct; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors not considered in previous Bivens cases. Respondents' detention policy claims bear little resemblance to the three Bivens claims the Court has approved in previous cases. The Second Circuit thus should have held that this was a new Bivens context and then performed a special factors analysis before allowing this damages suit to proceed. Pp. 15-17.\n"
            + "\n"
            + "          (b) The special factors here indicate that Congress, not the courts, should decide whether a damages action should be allowed.\n"
            + "\n"
            + "     With regard to the Executive Officials, a Bivens action is not \"a proper vehicle for altering an entity's policy,\" Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74, and is not designed to hold officers responsible for acts of their subordinates, see Iqbal, supra, at 676. Even an action confined to the Executive Officers' own discrete conduct would call into question the formulation and implementation of a high-level executive policy, and the burdens of that litigation could prevent officials from properly discharging their duties, see Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 382. The litigation process might also implicate the discussion and deliberations that led to the formation of the particular policy, requiring courts to interfere with sensitive Executive Branch functions. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 701.\n"
            + "\n"
            + "     Other special factors counsel against extending Bivens to cover the detention policy claims against any of the petitioners. Because those claims challenge major elements of the Government's response to the September 11 attacks, they necessarily require an inquiry into national-security issues. National-security policy, however, is the prerogative of Congress and the President, and courts are \"reluctant to intrude upon\" that authority absent congressional authorization. Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 530. Thus, Congress' failure to provide a damages remedy might be more than mere oversight, and its silence might be more than \"inadvertent.\" Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412, 423. That silence is also relevant and telling here, where Congress has had nearly 16 years to extend \"the kind of remedies [sought by] respondents,\" id., at 426, but has not done so. Respondents also may have had available \" 'other alternative forms of judicial relief,' \" Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U. S. 118, 124, including injunctions and habeas petitions.\n"
            + "\n"
            + "     The proper balance in situations like this, between deterring constitutional violations and freeing high officials to make the lawful decisions necessary to protect the Nation in times of great peril, is one for the Congress to undertake, not the Judiciary. The Second Circuit thus erred in allowing respondents' detention policy claims to proceed under Bivens. Pp. 17-23.\n"
            + "\n";

}