Lee admitted that the drugs were his, and a grand jury indicted him on one count of possessing ecstasy with intent to distribute.
When Lee learned of this consequence, he filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence, arguing that his attorney had provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.
At an evidentiary hearing, both Lee and his plea-stage counsel testified that "deportation was the determinative issue" to Lee in deciding whether to accept a plea, and Lee's counsel acknowledged that although Lee's defense to the charge was weak, if he had known Lee would be deported upon pleading guilty, he would have advised him to go to trial.
A Magistrate Judge recommended that Lee's plea be set aside and his conviction vacated.
Applying the two-part test for ineffective assistance claims from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, the Sixth Circuit concluded that, while the Government conceded that Lee's counsel had performed deficiently, Lee could not show that he was prejudiced by his attorney's erroneous advice.
Held: Lee has demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel's erroneous advice.
(a) When a defendant claims that his counsel's deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Lee contends that he can make this showing because he never would have accepted a guilty plea had he known the result would be deportation.
The Government contends that Lee cannot show prejudice from accepting a plea where his only hope at trial was that something unexpected and unpredictable might occur that would lead to acquittal.
First, it forgets that categorical rules are ill suited to an inquiry that demands a "case-by-case examination" of the "totality of the evidence."
More fundamentally, it overlooks that the Hill v. Lockhart inquiry focuses on a defendant's decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after trial.
Pointing to Strickland, the Government urges that "[a] defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker."
In the unusual circumstances of this case, Lee has adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had he known that it would lead to mandatory deportation: Both Lee and his attorney testified that "deportation was the determinative issue" to Lee; his responses during his plea colloquy confirmed the importance he placed on deportation; and he had strong connections to the United States, while he had no ties to South Korea.
The Government argues that Lee cannot "convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances," Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356, 372, since deportation would almost certainly result from a trial.
Unlike the Government, this Court cannot say that it would be irrational for someone in Lee's position to risk additional prison time in exchange for holding on to some chance of avoiding deportation.
Although he has lived in this country for most of his life, Lee is not a United States citizen, and he feared that a criminal conviction might affect his status as a lawful permanent resident.
Lee's attorney was wrong: The conviction meant that Lee was subject to mandatory deportation from this country.
Everyone agrees that Lee received objectively unreasonable representation.
Lee admitted that the drugs were his and that he had given ecstasy to his friends.
Upon learning that he would be deported after serving his sentence, Lee filed a motion under 28 U. S. C. §2255 to vacate his conviction and sentence, arguing that his attorney had provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.
At an evidentiary hearing on Lee's motion, both Lee and his plea-stage counsel testified that "deportation was the determinative issue in Lee's decision whether to accept the plea."
Lee's attorney testified that he thought Lee's case was a "bad case to try" because Lee's defense to the charge was weak.
The attorney nonetheless acknowledged that if he had known Lee would be deported upon pleading guilty, he would have advised him to go to trial.
Based on the hearing testimony, a Magistrate Judge recommended that Lee's plea be set aside and his conviction vacated because he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Applying our two-part test for ineffective assistance claims from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), the District Court concluded that Lee's counsel had performed deficiently by giving improper advice about the deportation consequences of the plea.
On appeal, the Government conceded that the performance of Lee's attorney had been deficient.
To establish that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance, the court explained, Lee was required to show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Relying on Circuit precedent holding that "no rational defendant charged with a deportable offense and facing overwhelming evidence of guilt would proceed to trial rather than take a plea deal with a shorter prison sentence," the Court of Appeals concluded that Lee could not show prejudice.
To demonstrate that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a defendant must show that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that he was prejudiced as a result.
The first requirement is not at issue in today's case: The Government concedes that Lee's plea-stage counsel provided inadequate representation when he assured Lee that he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty.
As we held in Hill v. Lockhart, when a defendant claims that his counsel's deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
The dissent contends that a defendant must also show that he would have been better off going to trial.
That is true when the defendant's decision about going to trial turns on his prospects of success and those are affected by the attorney's error--for instance, where a defendant alleges that his lawyer should have but did not seek to suppress an improperly obtained confession.
Rather than asking how a hypothetical trial would have played out absent the error, the Court considered whether there was an adequate showing that the defendant, properly advised, would have opted to go to trial.
Lee, on the other hand, argues he can establish prejudice under Hill because he never would have accepted a guilty plea had he known that he would be deported as a result.
Lee insists he would have gambled on trial, risking more jail time for whatever small chance there might be of an acquittal that would let him remain in the United States.2 The Government responds that, since Lee had no viable defense at trial, he would almost certainly have lost and found himself still subject to deportation, with a lengthier prison sentence to boot.
Lee, the Government contends, cannot show prejudice from accepting a plea where his only hope at trial was that something unexpected and unpredictable might occur that would lead to an acquittal.
The Government asks that we, like the Court of Appeals below, adopt a per se rule that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice from the denial of his right to trial.
First, it forgets that categorical rules are ill suited to an inquiry that we have emphasized demands a "case-by-case examination" of the "totality of the evidence."
And, more fundamentally, the Government overlooks that the inquiry we prescribed in Hill v. Lockhart focuses on a defendant's decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after trial.
But common sense (not to mention our precedent) recognizes that there is more to consider than simply the likelihood of success at trial.
Here Lee alleges that avoiding deportation was the determinative factor for him; deportation after some time in prison was not meaningfully different from deportation after somewhat less time.
The Government urges that, in such circumstances, the possibility of an acquittal after trial is "irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry," pointing to our statement in Strickland that "[a] defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker."
In the unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that Lee has adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had he known that it would lead to mandatory deportation.
Lee demonstrated as much at his plea colloquy: When the judge warned him that a conviction "could result in your being deported," and asked "[d]oes that at all affect your decision about whether you want to plead guilty or not," Lee answered "Yes, Your Honor."
Deportation is always "a particularly severe penalty," Padilla, 559 U. S., at 365 (internal quotation marks omitted), and we have "recognized that 'preserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence,' " id., at 368 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 322; alteration and some internal quotation marks omitted); see also Padilla, 559 U. S., at 364 ("[D]eportation is an integral part--indeed, sometimes the most important part--of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes."
The Government contends that Lee cannot make that showing because he was going to be deported either way; going to trial would only result in a longer sentence before that inevitable consequence.
We cannot agree that it would be irrational for a defendant in Lee's position to reject the plea offer in favor of trial.
But for his attorney's incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting the plea agreement would certainly lead to deportation.
The Court today holds that a defendant can undo a guilty plea, well after sentencing and in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt, because he would have chosen to pursue a defense at trial with no reasonable chance of success if his attorney had properly advised him of the immigration consequences of his plea.
Neither the Sixth Amendment nor this Court's precedents support that conclusion.
The Court and both of the parties agree that the prejudice inquiry in this context is governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984).
The Court in Strickland held that a defendant may establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by showing that his "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and, as relevant here, that the representation prejudiced the defendant by "actually ha[ving] an adverse effect on the defense."
And it explained that "[a]n error by counsel . . . does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment."
The parties agree that this inquiry assumes an "objective" decisionmaker.
When the Court extended the right to effective counsel to the plea stage, see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52 (1985), it held that "the same two-part standard" from Strickland applies.
To be sure, the Court said--and the majority today emphasizes--that a defendant asserting an ineffectiveness claim at the plea stage "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
But that requirement merely reflects the reality that a defendant cannot show that the outcome of his case would have been different if he would have accepted his current plea anyway.
* In other words, the defendant's ability to show that he would have gone to trial is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish prejudice.
The Hill Court went on to explain that Strickland's two-part test applies the same way in the plea context as in other contexts.
In Premo v. Moore, 562 U. S. 115 (2011), the Court emphasized that "strict adherence to the Strickland standard" is "essential" when reviewing claims about attorney error "at the plea bargain stage."
In that case, the defendant argued that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he had failed to seek suppression of his confession before he pleaded no contest.
See id., at 129 (describing the State's case as "formidable" and observing that "[t]he bargain counsel struck" in the plea agreement was "a favorable one" to the defendant compared to what might have happened at trial).
In that case, the Court extended Hill to hold that counsel could be constitutionally ineffective for failing to communicate a plea deal to a defendant.
The Court emphasized that, in addition to showing a reasonable probability that the defendant "would have accepted the earlier plea offer," it is also "necessary" to show a "reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time."
It instead required the defendant to show that the ultimate outcome would have been different.
In that case, the Court concluded that counsel may be constitutionally ineffective by causing a defendant to reject a plea deal he should have accepted.
The Court again emphasized that the prejudice inquiry requires a showing that the criminal prosecution would ultimately have ended differently for the defendant--not merely that the defendant would have accepted the deal.
The Court stated that the defendant in those circumstances "must show" a reasonable probability that "the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed."
This Court has held that the right to effective counsel applies to all "critical stages of the criminal proceedings."
In those circumstances, the Court has not held that the prejudice inquiry focuses on whether that stage of the proceeding would have ended differently.
It instead has made clear that the prejudice inquiry is the same as in Strickland, which requires a defendant to establish that he would have been better off in the end had his counsel not erred.
The majority misapplies this Court's precedents when it concludes that a defendant may establish prejudice by showing only that "he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial," without showing that "the result of that trial would have been different than the result of the plea bargain."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relies almost exclusively on the single line from Hill that "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
In Hill, the Court concluded that the defendant had not made that showing, so it rejected his claim.
The Court did not, however, further hold that a defendant can establish prejudice by making that showing alone.
The Court observed that the lawyer's failure to file the notice of appeal "arguably led not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability," but instead to "the forfeiture of a proceeding itself."
The Court today observes that petitioner's guilty plea meant that he did not go to trial.
After explaining that a court should engage in a predictive inquiry about the likelihood of a defendant securing a better result at trial, the Court said: "As we explained in Strickland v. Washington, supra, these predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the 'idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker.' "
In other words, Hill instructs that the prejudice inquiry must presume that the foregone trial would have been reliable.
The majority responds that Hill made statements about presuming a reliable trial only in "discussing how courts should analyze 'predictions of the outcome at a possible trial,' " which "will not always be 'necessary.' "
I agree that such an inquiry is not always necessary--it is not necessary where, as in Hill, the defendant cannot show at the threshold that he would have rejected his plea and chosen to go to trial.
But that caveat says nothing about the application of the presumption of reliability when a defendant can make that threshold showing.
In any event, the Court in Hill recognized that guilty pleas are themselves generally reliable.
Finally, the majority does not dispute that the prejudice inquiry in Frye and Lafler focused on whether the defendant established a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
To the contrary, the Court repeatedly stated that it was applying the "same two-part standard" from Strickland.
Hill, supra, at 57 (emphasis added); accord, Frye, 566, U. S., at 140 ("Hill established that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea bargain context are governed by the two-part test set forth in Strickland"); Lafler, 566 U. S., at 162-163 (applying Strickland).
It instead concludes that one standard applies when a defendant goes to trial (Strickland); another standard applies when a defendant accepts a plea (Hill); and yet another standard applies when counsel does not apprise the defendant of an available plea or when the defendant rejects a plea (Frye and Lafler).
In my view, we should take the Court's precedents at their word and conclude that "[a]n error by counsel . . . does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment."
Petitioner does not dispute that he possessed large quantities of illegal drugs or that the Government had secured a witness who had purchased the drugs directly from him.
In light of this "overwhelming evidence of . . . guilt," 2014 WL 1260388, *15 (WD Tenn., Mar. 20, 2014), the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner had "no bona fide defense, not even a weak one," 825 F. 3d 311, 316 (CA6 2016).
Finding that petitioner has established prejudice in these circumstances turns Strickland on its head.
The Court has warned that "the prospect of collateral challenges" threatens to undermine these important values.
And we have explained that "[p]rosecutors must have assurance that a plea will not be undone years later," lest they "forgo plea bargains that would benefit defendants," which would be "a result favorable to no one."
Whereas a defendant asserting an ordinary claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must prove that the ultimate outcome of his case would have been different, the Court today holds that a defendant who pleaded guilty need show only that he would have rejected his plea and gone to trial.
Under its rule, so long as a defendant alleges that his counsel omitted or misadvised him on a piece of information during the plea process that he considered of "paramount importance," ante, at 10, he could allege a plausible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner suggests that each claim will "at least" require a "hearing to get th[e] facts on the table."
Given that more than 90 percent of criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas, Frye, 566 U. S., at 143, the burden of holding evidentiary hearings on these claims could be significant.
Those cases involved defendants who alleged that, but for their attorney's incompetence, they would have accepted a plea deal--not, as here and as in Hill, that they would have rejected a plea.
In both Frye and Lafler, the Court highlighted this difference: Immediately following the sentence that the dissent plucks from Frye, post, at 5 (opinion of Thomas, J.), the Court explained that its "application of Strickland to the instances of an uncommunicated, lapsed plea does nothing to alter the standard laid out in Hill."
Lafler, decided the same day as Frye, reiterated that "[i]n contrast to Hill, here the ineffective advice led not to an offer's acceptance but to its rejection."
Lee also argues that he can show prejudice because, had his attorney advised him that he would be deported if he accepted the Government's plea offer, he would have bargained for a plea deal that did not result in certain deportation.
The dissent makes much of the fact that Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52 (1985), also noted that courts should ignore the "idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker."
As we have explained, assessing the effect of some types of attorney errors on defendants' decisionmaking involves such predictions: Where an attorney error allegedly affects how a trial would have played out, we analyze that error's effects on a defendant's decisionmaking by making a prediction of the likely trial outcome.
Several courts have noted that a judge's warnings at a plea colloquy may undermine a claim that the defendant was prejudiced by his attorney's misadvice.
* It is not enough for a defendant to show that he would have obtained a better plea agreement. "
[A] defendant has no right to be offered a plea," Missouri v. Frye, 566 U. S. 134, 148 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 156, 168 (2012), and this Court has never concluded that a defendant could show a "reasonable probability" of a different result based on a purely hypothetical plea offer subject to absolute executive discretion.